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CANADIAN SECURITIES REGULATION 
SUMMARY 
The idea of setting up a national securities commission in Canada has recently 
returned to the forefront. In October 2002, the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of 
Finance of Canada asked Harold MacKay to define a process for determining the best 
securities regulatory system for Canada’s needs. After an investigation which 
indicated “a range of problems with the present system”, Mr. MacKay’s 
recommendation was accepted: a committee was set up “to conduct the necessary 
review and to make recommendations to policy makers”. The report is severe:  “The 
current system, as presently operated, must be improved significantly, and in a 
prompt fashion”. Similarly, the five-year report of the Ontario Securities Commission 
begins by recommending the creation of a single securities commission in Canada. 
The first chapter of that report is entitled “The Need for a Single Regulator”.  
The matter seems to have been settled.  Nevertheless, Harris (2002) points out that 
the debate is not based on a rigorous empirical study and he criticizes the very limited 
knowledge we have of the real problems in the Canadian securities market. We have 
conducted an in-depth analysis of the various aspects of the problem to understand 
this apparent paradox―one in which the absence of rigorous knowledge does not 
exclude finding that serious problems exist and recommending that steps be taken 
quickly.  Arguments made to justify centralization of securities regulation are not 
new.  They have been put forward several times over the last twenty years: 
•  Regulation of the Canadian financial sector is too complex and the existence of 
thirteen securities authorities (ten provinces and three territories) is harmful to 
proper market operations.  
•  Such a situation increases issuance and compliance costs, and thereby generally 
hurts the competitiveness of the Canadian market. Total costs of regulation, 
higher than in other countries, is particularly harmful in Canada because of the 
smaller market size.  
•  Regulation is confusing and sometimes not applied, and this situation hurts both 
the brokerage industry as well as financing for growth companies. The 
compartmentalization of Canadian securities authorities would make complex 
situations involving investors, intermediaries and issuers in various jurisdictions 
unmanageable.    2
•  Costs related to the existence of differences in provincial laws and multiple 
jurisdictions penalize businesses, intermediaries and the entire market in Canada. 
This situation has changed little and is even unchanged since the 1964 Porter 
Report because of the relative ineffectiveness of harmonization efforts in Canada.  
•  Market globalization is an argument in favour of a single Canadian securities 
authority and Canada must speak with one voice.  
•  The Canada regulatory system responds slowly to rapid changes in the 
environment because of the need for agreement from the different authorities 
involved.  Only a single commission can handle financial and accounting 
problems such as Enron and the number of such problems is an argument in 
favour of a centralized regulatory authority.  Finally, uniform regulation would 
avoid a race to the bottom, which occurs when several regulatory jurisdictions 
compete with each other.  
Most arguments put forward to support the idea of the inefficiency of securities 
regulation are not supported by regulatory and finance theory, and are generally 
based only on unsupported statements. The current debate in the field is a new 
illustration of the phenomenon which Lacasse (1995) describes: Canadian economic 
and regulatory policy decisions have more often than not been guided by myths put 
forward by pressure groups rather than by actual knowledge resulting from rigorous, 
independent research.  It is disturbing to realize that some are considering reforming a 
system which has not been analyzed carefully, on the basis of assertions made 
primarily by pressure groups. As a result, it was necessary to provide the basic 
components for a structured analysis in order to respond to the proposals and 
assertions made with respect to securities regulation in Canada. 
We will begin by discussing one of the main arguments of the proponents of 
centralization, which relates to the existence and lack of agreement of the 13 
securities commissions. This is the opportunity to show how securities operations in 
Canada are divided and to set out the significant progress made towards 
harmonization of Canadian regulation in this field.  
Secondly, we will analyze the arguments and evidence respecting inefficiency of the 
Canadian securities market in terms of trading costs in the primary and secondary 
markets. We will also present our own estimates of comparative costs for initial 
offerings in Canada and the United States.  
An analysis of various other arguments generally raised to justify an in-depth 
overhaul of the securities regulatory system form the subject of the third part.  They   3
are:  Canadian weakness on the international level, jurisdictional conflicts, response 
times, accounting manipulation and the ineffectiveness of harmonization efforts. 
In Part four we compare regulatory centralization with regulatory competition, which 
prevails in company law in the United States. We also present the intermediate 
solution of reciprocal delegation on which the European passport system is based.  
We will then highlight some very significant differences between the Canadian and 
American markets which make it difficult to transfer the American regulatory 
system―sometimes cited as a reference―to the Canadian system.   
Finally, we will examine the growth of the Canadian securities market during the last 
decade and the main challenges it will have to face.  Debate concerning the 
dynamism of the Canadian market is presently limited to only one of its components, 
namely the regulatory factor.  Without denying the importance of this factor, it is well 
established that dynamism of a stock market depends on many other factors such as 
trading mechanisms and costs and, more generally, market quality.   No study of the 
regulatory system would be complete without considering the growth and very nature 
of the industry being regulated.   
1) The debate and its key issues 
The first argument put forward by the proponents of securities centralization in 
Canada is that participants have to deal with thirteen securities commissions, 
thereby increasing costs and reducing the competitiveness of the Canadian 
securities market.  Of the 4,131 companies listed, 20% should be considered 
inactive.  Also, four provinces monopolize almost all of the issues (97%), the 
companies listed on an exchange (90%), the population (85%) and economic 
activity in Canada.  Thus, the vast majority of issuers deal with only one or two 
securities commissions and it is therefore difficult to argue that a Canadian issuer 
faces 13 commissions.  To address almost all investors, it only has to satisfy four 
jurisdictions.  In 2003, the disparities which remain only relate to relatively limited 
aspects of securities law.   
The Canadian Securities Administrators (CSA) have set up various mechanisms to 
limit the problems caused by the existence of multiple jurisdictions.  They are: 
•  a memorandum of understanding relating to the mutual reliance review system for 
applications for exemptive relief, the granting of receipts for prospectuses and the   4
acceptance of AIFs, set up through the adoption of the Memorandum of 
Understanding between all Canadian securities commissions.  The decision-maker 
in a particular securities authority may rely primarily on the analysis and review 
of the staff of another securities authority.  This system is known under the 
acronym MRRS (Mutual Reliance Review System).  
•  a memorandum of understanding between the different Canadian securities 
authorities for the purpose of regulating and simplifying the oversight of stock 
exchanges, the “SuperMOU”.  Each recognized exchange and recognized 
quotation and trade reporting system has a principal regulator responsible for its 
oversight and may have one or more exempting regulators.  The principal 
regulator informs the exempting authority of its oversight activities and provides 
it with all useful information requested by it.  
•  a registration streamlining system for securities representatives, allowing the 
efficient registration of representatives of securities firms with several securities 
authorities.   
•  national instruments and other texts of national scope, the results of cooperative 
efforts undertaken through the CSA.  The percentage of national instruments 
which are not currently harmonized is quite low.  Most securities transactions are 
now governed by national instruments, listed on the web sites of the provincial 
commissions. 
•  the Uniform Securities Legislation Project, intended to eliminate the remaining 
differences between provincial and territorial laws.  The project was tabled at the 
beginning of 2003.   
The procedures which have been implemented do not yet embrace the principle of 
mutual recognition which has been accepted in Europe, and the efforts to harmonize 
securities legislation are not entirely complete.  The few differences which still 
remain relate to sections which could not be harmonized yet due to the highly 
diversified nature of the Canadian market, a market in which hundreds of mining 
securities from the West trade with large-cap securities based primarily in Ontario.  
They also result from the presence in Canada of two different legal systems.   
However, the passport system based on harmonized regulation is at the center of the 
proposal made by the ministers of the provinces and the territories responsible for 
securities which is found in the June 2003 consultation document. 
2) Regulatory costs and inefficiency    5
According to the proponents of centralization of securities regulation, there are 
serious problems of efficiency in terms of excessive costs and delays resulting from 
compliance with statutes and regulations.  
Firstly, it is useful to point out the absence of any rigorous analysis of the costs of 
securities regulation in Canada or, for that matter, the United States, probably 
because of the difficulty of evaluating them.  Regulation implies three types of costs:  
direct costs of organizations, indirect or supplementary costs incurred by 
intermediaries to comply with such regulation, and distortion costs.  A comparative 
estimate of direct costs is difficult because of differences between the regulatory 
structures for the financial sector in different countries.  Whereas the United 
Kingdom now has only a single authority, a number of other countries regulate 
separately the banking, insurance and securities sectors.  Very little empirical study 
has been done on showing the additional costs related to regulation, and they almost 
all deal with specific aspects of American regulation.  We are unaware of any 
rigorous study on the additional costs caused by Canadian regulation.  It is, however, 
important to mention three major factors.  They are the putting in perspective of 
regulatory costs, the taking into consideration regulatory benefits and the effects of 
regulation on initial offerings. 
Putting in perspective:  Although the costs of regulating securities are significant, 
they should be put in perspective.  Issuers and investors incur various forms of costs 
on the primary and secondary markets, of which regulation is only one component.  
These costs include four components:  the spread which separates the bid and ask 
prices, the price effect of the announcement of large orders which replaces the spread 
when blocks are exchanged on the upstairs market, brokerage fees and the cost of 
settling trades.   
In Canada, only trading costs can be estimated, for the year 2001, at $5.7 billion if we 
use as a basis the rates in effect in the United States, which would certainly lead to 
under estimating Canadian costs.  Regulation plays a small role at this level and the 
costs are essentially related to intermediary remuneration. The total expenses of the 
four main Canadian securities commissions can be estimated at $104.09 million for 
the same year. To impute solely to regulatory costs the relative inefficiency of the 
Canadian market overlooks the fact that trading costs are essentially related to market 
operations and brokerage commissions, which are mainly the responsibility of the 
brokerage industry itself.   
Costs and benefits:  The costs of regulation must be put in perspective in relation to 
their benefit.  With optimal regulation, the marginal cost is equal to the marginal 
benefit. Several authors believe that this balance can only be achieved by   6
jurisdictional competition and criticize the regulatory monopoly approach.  There do 
not seem to be any cost/benefit studies of securities regulation in Canada.  
Initial offerings:  Initial offerings are probably the aspect of the securities business 
over which regulation has the most significant effect.  The change from the status of 
closed corporation to that of issuer is subject to greater requirements, whereas the size 
of the companies is relatively small.  The relative burden of the requirements is 
therefore potentially high.  Four studies show that the cost of initial offerings is 
significantly lower in Canada than in the United States, which does not have multiple 
securities commissions.  The process for an initial offering is not only less costly in 
Canada, it is also more rapid.  It is thus difficult to argue that the existence of several 
securities authorities in Canada heavily penalizes the competitiveness of the primary 
securities market, especially since in both countries brokerage commissions constitute 
the greater share of total direct costs.  In addition, our own estimates show that costs 
imputable to undervaluation, unrelated to regulation but related to broker conduct, are 
on average much higher than total direct costs, especially in the United States.  The 
advantage of Canada in terms of direct costs is around 2% of gross proceeds for an 
issue under 1 million.  It is around 1% for an issue of which the gross proceeds are 
between 1 and 100 million.  It therefore seems unlikely that regulatory costs are a 
significant factor for cost increases and a barrier to issuances.  
There is very little evidence that the present structure of Canadian regulation greatly 
penalizes this country:  issuers incur lower costs than in the United States, direct costs 
appear to be lower than those in Australia, which combined the securities 
commissions, and direct costs of regulation are only a small fraction of costs incurred 
by issuers and investors.  It is possible that the total level of regulation is not optimal.  
However, we do not have any studies confirming this.  
3) Various arguments 
A certain number of arguments are regularly put forward to justify revision of the 
Canadian model of securities regulation.  We will discuss them in turn below.  
Canada is weak on the international level and must speak with one voice because of 
market globalization.  This argument can hardly be considered significant.  The 
existence and initiatives of the CSA show that the degree of cooperation between 
securities commissions is high and common viewpoints strong.  The argument may 
therefore be reversed.  Is Canada’s influence not greater because it has four 
representatives at the international level (International Organization of Securities 
Commissions), when these representatives work together closely on most matters?   7
There are jurisdictional conflicts to the extent that participants may face thirteen 
different jurisdictions for penal proceedings.  Jurisdictional problem exists world-
wide, not only in Canada, and has lead to the European investment service directive 
(ISD 93).  One of the responses to the problem of multiple jurisdictions is the 
principle of cooperation and the project to set up uniform securities legislation in 
Canada.  
Response times to rapid changes in the environment are long because of the need for 
cooperation from the different organizations involved.  Although the implementation 
of solutions may be more rapid in a centralized system, it is not clear that the 
detection of problems and the proposal of solutions is accelerated by the creation of a 
single commission. Here again, proponents of regulatory competition insist that only 
organizations in a competitive situation react quickly to changes in market conditions. 
The accounting manipulations which lead to the American financial scandals would 
be avoided in a centralized securities system.  It seems paradoxical to invoke 
financial scandals which mainly affected American businesses to support 
centralization of securities in Canada.  These abuses took place mainly in a country 
where securities regulation respecting large companies is essentially under the 
jurisdiction of the federal government and a single commission, the SEC.  In addition, 
the wish of the American federal government to impose a uniform securities law 
seems to have had indirect negative effects including, according to certain scholars, 
the recent financial scandals.  These effects were reinforced by the inaction and lack 
of means of the SEC.  Furthermore, observers generally believe that a lack of 
enforcement, not regulation, in particular by the SEC, is the origin of the recent 
scandals. Based on the American example, it does not seem that the Enron affair can 
be a very solid argument for the creation of a single commission.    
For proponents of centralization, the efforts at uniformity are ineffective.  Despite 
national instruments and current initiatives, securities legislation is not completely 
harmonized.  The cooperation process set up through the CSA is relatively recent and 
certain major initiatives were put in place after 1997.  The harmonization process is 
continuing.  However, it is not clear that complete uniformity is desirable.  The very 
diverse nature of the Canadian market and local peculiarities mean that it can be 
considered a group of markets rather than a single market.  Most studies, however, 
seem to minimize the level of uniformity set up by the CSA.  A study of the national 
instruments shows, however, that they now govern a large part of the securities 
business.   
The regulatory burden prevents growth companies from having access to financing.  
Provisions for private placements are still different depending on the Canadian   8
jurisdiction, in particular for sophisticated investors.  Significant efforts at uniformity 
have been made and are ongoing.  The increased number of initial offerings, in 
particular for venture capital, the high mortality and the weak accounting and market 
performance of new listed companies leads us to believe that Canadian regulation 
gives start-up companies access to the stock market too easily.   
The various arguments put forward to justify the creation of a single commission are 
therefore not very convincing.  The benefits of the present system are systematically 
omitted from the debate and centralization is often presented as the only solution to 
the various problems raised.  This solution leads to a regulatory monopoly, a model 
criticized by many scholars.   
4) Regulatory competition   
Arguments put forward by proponents of regulatory centralization assume that a 
single authority would be able to regulate the securities industry in an optimal manner 
and at a lower cost. Perfectly homogeneous regulation would be preferable to the 
current situation.  This idea is opposed to the market approach, which exists 
particularly in the field of company law in the United States.  According to this 
approach, internal and external competition between regulatory bodies should lead to 
less complete and stable uniformity than that of centralization, but more in keeping 
with the real needs of participants. Between the two extremes there is a middle 
position such as reciprocal delegation, on which the European passport system is 
based.    
For several authors, regulatory competition is therefore a necessary condition to 
counterbalance the excessive power of central authorities who do not necessarily act 
to maximize social well-being and to allow mechanisms which can lead to maximum 
social utility to be set up. The counter-argument to this proposal is based on the race 
to the bottom concept: placed in a competitive situation, organizations are encouraged 
to reduce their requirements to attract trading and issuers. Aside from the fact that 
such behaviour adversely affects the local market by increasing risk and the cost of 
capital for issuers, there are various mechanisms allowing limits to be placed on the 
race to the bottom, in particular the establishment of minimum common standards.  
Some evidence suggests, however, that a race to the top and not to the bottom exists 
in the securities field where, traditionally, the most exacting jurisdictions have 
attracted a greater number of issuers and investors.   
Competition in company law in the United States seems to have led to the emergence 
of relatively uniform laws in the various States, although certain authors have   9
criticized this model.  Competition has been lead by the State of Delaware, where 
more than half of American corporations are incorporated and which, between 1996 
and 2000, incorporated 90.22% of new companies which chose a State other than 
their State of origin.  This movement does not seem to be to the detriment of 
investors, as changes from the place of incorporation to Delaware seem to be 
perceived positively by the stock market.  American specialists, such as Roberta 
Romano of Yale University, suggest that the competition prevailing in company law 
be applied to securities law.   
In the securities field, subject to constant changes, rapidity of adaptation to laws and 
regulations and quick detection of problems and tendencies is essential.  The 
European system of mutual recognition allows a certain degree of competition which 
encourages innovation.  This system does not lead to the disappearance of local 
authorities, which several countries are currently strengthening.  It also allows the 
existence of differences which can take into consideration the distinctiveness of 
various countries.  As with the European market, the Canadian securities market is 
diverse in terms of types of companies and provincial initiatives.  Because of its 
regulatory structure, Canada has found itself over the years in a system of imperfect 
regulatory competition.  The various jurisdictions can set up different rules, but 
issuers and intermediaries remain subject to the jurisdiction of the province where 
they operate or offer securities.  Such a system encourages innovation.  The creation 
of programs such as stock savings plans in Quebec, capital pools in Alberta and 
negotiated brokerage fees are examples of innovation begun in one province and 
copied in others.   
The European situation combines regulatory competition for securities and minimal 
standards.  The current steps following the Lamfalussy report, revision of ISD 93, 
new directives on prospectuses and the FSAP constitute various means used by the 
European Community to ease dysfunctions in the mutual recognition system initiated 
in 1993.  The absence of minimum standards and mechanisms allowing their 
development and implementation explains the lack of success of the process of 
mutual recognition set up in 1993. The objective of recent steps, and in particular 
those following the Lamfalussy report, is to implement the minimum standards 
required for the system of mutual recognition to function properly, and not to provide 
for the creation of a single securities commission in Europe.  There is already a forum 
allowing the setting up of common standards in Canada, and minimum common 
standards exist in almost all areas.  Nothing therefore prevents setting up a passport 
system.   
A system of regulatory monopoly is not necessarily preferable to that of regulatory 
competition.  Each of the two systems has advantages but the present debate only   10
mentions the disadvantages, either real or perceived, of the existing system.  It is true 
that in the absence of a uniformity effort allowing mutual recognition, a partitioned 
system has clear disadvantages.  However, the Canadian market has greatly evolved 
over two decades and the option chosen by the European Community should be 
seriously considered, especially since the American model, often cited as an example, 
certainly cannot be transferred into Canada. 
5) Canadian and American financial systems:  competition and regulation  
The American situation is often put forward as an example of regulatory 
centralization and its implementation within a federal state.  There are, however, 
significant differences between the two markets.    
The American financial market is very fragmented, both in banking and securities.  
Regulatory centralization may be best in such a case, although a number of 
researchers dispute this. Regulatory monopoly is, however, only apparent: it does not 
exist for banking or company law, and is only partial for securities.  The United 
States General Accounting Office states that in March 2002, the SEC oversaw nine 
exchanges, the over-the-counter market and seventy alternate trading systems, as well 
as twelve clearing houses.  The American banking and securities markets include a 
very large number of participants, which strongly compete with each other.  The US 
has regulatory competition for company law.  In the banking sector, a dual system 
was set up, allowing a certain degree of competition.  Securities regulation is 
segmented, with small local issues being governed locally.  The SEC may be 
considered a regulatory monopoly with respect to important securities, in the face of a 
competitive and fragmented industry.  In securities, the United States is considered to 
have onerous, costly and strict regulation.  This regulation applies to companies very 
different from those in Canada, where small issues predominate.  The SEC is 
considered to be inefficient, slow and lacking resources.  The Unites States is 
therefore not a model of regulatory centralization in the various areas related to the 
financial sector.   
On the contrary, the Canadian financial system is highly concentrated.  For the Task 
Force on the Future of Canadian Financial Services (MacKay letter), Canada was the 
developed country with the most concentrated banking sector in 1997.  The study by 
the Bank for International Settlements confirms this data and also shows strong 
growth in the concentration, which increased from 60.2 to 77.1% from 1990 to 1997.  
Such an increase is not seen in any other country.  Canada, along with the 
Netherlands, seems to be the OECD country where the banking sector is the most 
concentrated.  Despite this already high concentration, the largest banks have tried 
several times to merge.  In 2001 the six main integrated firms belonging to the six   11
largest Canadian banks had more than 70% of the business in the industry.  All the 
large integrated brokerage firms in Canada therefore belong to six banks representing 
more than 90% of the total banking assets in 2002.  These institutions are heavily 
involved in the holding of exchanges and in the boards of directors of various self-
regulatory organizations, where they hold the majority of seats (54%) as opposed to 
8% for issuers and none for investors.  
Canada has only one exchange group, two clearing agencies, one regulatory service 
and few alternative trading systems, which are mostly under the direct or indirect 
control of the large banks and their broker subsidiaries.  To our knowledge, no 
developed country presents such a high level of banking, financial and self-regulatory 
concentration.  The financial aspect is governed by provincial securities commissions.  
Centralization proposals for regulation of securities-related responsibilities will, faced 
with such a group, lead to a single securities commission.  The establishment of a 
national commission would lead to regulatory monopoly.  Authorization of the 
mergers of banks, which own the main brokerage firms, and the growing 
concentration in this sector, seems to be leading Canada to oligopoly.  According to 
the forecasts of regulatory theoreticians, a situation where a regulatory monopoly 
governs an oligopoly is potentially dangerous.  This cannot be ignored in the present 
discussion surrounding the restructuring of securities regulation in Canada.   
The American regulatory framework is complex.  The regulation of local issues has 
remained the responsibility of the States, and these issues constitute the vast majority 
of Canadian issues.  The American system has not proven its effectiveness and 
nothing therefore leads us to believe that the American securities regulatory model 
can be transferred to Canada.  Moreover, the very high concentration of the Canadian 
financial sector makes a regulatory solution based on a single body dangerous.    
The preceding sections should not make anyone believe that the Canadian securities 
market is not under stress.  It faces considerable challenges, but they do not appear to 
have been created by the provincial regulatory structure.    
6) Growth of the Canadian securities market:  findings and challenges  
According to the proponents of centralization for securities, regulatory 
decentralization and multiple securities commissions would impair the development 
of the Canadian stock market.  As there is little information on this market, we will 
look at its growth over the past decade and point out the special features of the 
Canadian securities market.     12
It is distinguished from other developed markets by the presence of many small-cap 
companies:  in 2002, 67% of operating corporations had shareholder equity of less 
than $10 million and less than 600 could be listed on the NASDAQ.  In addition, the 
Canadian market in characterized by the presence of many new companies.  On 
average, 189 new public offerings are conducted each year.  The Canadian market is 
also distinguished by the high mortality of listed corporations.   
Canadian stock market capitalization has more than tripled during the last decade, 
increasing from US$242 billion at the end of 1990 to US$771 billion in 2002.  In 
2000, Canada ranked behind France, Germany and Switzerland.  The market 
capitalization of Germany tripled in 10 years, whereas that of Japan stagnated.  If 
these variations are corrected to neutralize variations in the market index, the real 
Canadian capitalization increase is, however, much lower than that of other countries 
(with the exception of Japan).  The net Canadian capital created was only 16% in ten 
years, as opposed to 62% in France, 52% in the United Kingdom and Germany and 
24% in the United States.  Real Canadian capitalization growth and trading volume is 
slow, not very different from that of the economy, and the relative position of Canada 
in relation to the main countries of the OECD is worsening. Canada is unattractive for 
foreign corporations and the presence of foreign corporations is symbolic:  more than 
99.9% of the trading value in such securities is outside the Canadian market.  It 
appears that the Canadian stock market is no longer attracting trading in foreign 
stocks.  On the other hand, the American market captures a significant share of 
trading in large Canadian inter-listed companies.  More than one-third of heavily 
traded Canadian stocks are now traded in the United States rather than in Canada. 
This is a very worrisome situation, given the importance of a stock market for a 
country.   
The Canadian market is not the dominant market (where the majority of trades take 
place) for foreign securities, and it is progressively losing its role as the dominant 
market for high-volume Canadian securities. This phenomenon might grow, as 
models predict that the transfer of trading will continue to gravitate to the country 
offering the most favourable trading conditions. In addition, the upstairs market is 
developing rapidly, and only 30% of the total trading value for Canadian securities is 
now done on the regular Toronto market. This situation is generally seen as a 
problem and the NYSE, for example, greatly limits this practice.   
A study of factors leading investors to prefer one market over another shows that the 
Canadian securities market is facing important challenges. The factors which attract 
investors and issuers are mainly market quality, the registration effect, and the 
corporate visibility effect.     13
Market quality:  Investors and issuers are attracted by highly liquid markets, where 
large block trades of securities have minimal effect and where trading costs are the 
lowest possible.  Issuers are also attracted by markets where they can raise large 
amounts, which is related to market size.  They also attach great importance to the 
following of stocks by securities analysts.   
The registration effect:  Companies choose markets where disclosure standards are 
more strict than the country of origin to benefit from the registration effect and a 
lower cost of capital.  The Canadian market is facing a dilemma.  Should disclosure 
and governance standards be realigned with the new American standards for 
disclosure and governance set out in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act or, on the contrary, 
should they be softened to meet a more local dimension in keeping with the 
requirements of small-cap companies?   
The corporate visibility effect:  Having its securities traded on an American market is 
seen as prestigious.  Some companies whose products are sold in the United States 
also seek to make their customers their shareholders.   
The progression of trades to the United States should continue.  It represents a major 
challenge to the Canadian securities market. The TSX is meeting the criteria of world 
markets less and less.  It corresponds more to a regional market, defined according to 
Galper (1999) as follows:  the Regional Exchange dominates its local economy.  It 
has the greatest concentration of regional listings available and is the chief expert in 
these listings. By virtue of its intense national concentration, its index becomes a 
barometer of the health of the publicly quoted part of the regional economy. It may 
trade securities and derivative products.  It draws its clientele primarily from 
regional investors, with a smaller share of international investors interested in 
benefiting from the available expertise and opportunities.  The TSX Venture 
Exchange is apparently a small and medium business market (SMB, Schulman, 
1999), a category in which the NASDAQ also falls.  To the extent that Canada has 
less than 600 corporations which can be listed and traded on the NASDAQ, the TSX 
should also be in that category.  This appears to be all the more true as trading in 
large-cap securities progressively gravitates to the American market. The 
implications are significant, in terms of development and regulatory strategy. The 
main aspect to be considered for SMB exchanges is proximity:  an exchange provides 
a real estate function for companies in the sense that it is where companies locate 
their stock listings and it is where customers (investors) come to buy and sell that 
stock.  Therefore, to enhance the profile of an SMB market, exchanges should create 
attractive SMB market communities with financial influence, recognized value, and 
uniquely beneficial services (Schulman, 1999, p.14).  As the few large-cap securities 
are gravitating to American markets, it seems inescapable that the Canadian market   14
will progressively become a market of medium and small companies by international 
standards. 
The Canadian securities market is therefore facing major challenges in terms of 
public policy. A revision of the current regulatory structure is probably not an 
essential aspect of the situation. The progression of trades to the United States, the 
smaller and smaller portion of trades carried out on the downstairs market, and the 
total lack of attraction to Canada by foreign securities are more problematic. The 
stakes are high and cannot be ignored in the debate taking place in Canada. The 
factors of location, adaptation to different regional and sector factors, the framework 
of small-cap securities, the switch from risk capital to public financing and the 
survival of new issues will become major factors. Moreover, the reduction of real or 
perceived advantages from the transfer of trading to the United States should become 
a subject of study and careful thought.  
7) Conclusion 
 
The Canadian securities market is confronted with major challenges. It faces direct 
competition from a much larger market, where various market systems compete 
fiercely with each other. A serious review of the factors which encourage the 
migration of cross-border trading, and which seriously limit trading of foreign 
securities in Canada, is warranted. It appears difficult to impute to the provincial 
regulatory structure these difficulties which essentially affect the secondary market 
and the costs of which are mostly related to stock exchange operations and brokers. 
 
Regulation is often presented as a cost factor and an impediment to new issues, which 
are relatively numerous and comparatively inexpensive as compared to similar 
operations conducted in the United States. No study has shown that the current 
regulatory structure disadvantages Canadian issues. The analysis of prospectuses and 
applications for exemptive relief is also more rapid in Canada. While we are not 
saying that there is no room for improvement, it must be admitted that the argument 
of the negative effects of the regulatory system on Canadian issues has not been 
proven. 
 
The proposed centralized model would change with respect to harmonization of 
securities legislation which, to a great extent, is now governed by national standards.  
It would create a regulatory monopoly, a dangerous situation given the very high 
concentration of the regulated industry, and would cause the loss in Canada of the 
benefits of regulatory competition which currently prevails.  There are few arguments 
to the effect that such a structure would reduce direct costs and the Australian 
example seems to indicate the opposite. On the contrary, a system based on 
harmonization and mutual recognition (the passport) presents advantages which have 
lead the European Community to opt for this system of securities regulation.   15
SECURITIES REGULATION IN CANADA 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The idea of establishing a national securities commission in Canada is not new.   
Anand et al (1999, chapter 11) provide a detailed history of the progress of various 
projects since the 1967 CANSEC (Canadian Securities Commission) initiative of the 
Ontario Securities Commission (OSC). However, as early as 1964, the Royal 
Commission on Banking and Finance (the Porter Commission) had raised the need 
for the federal government to regulate securities. The most structured initiative was 
undoubtedly the Anisman report (1979), entitled Proposals for a Securities Market 
Law for Canada, which contained a full, detailed description of securities law in 
Canada. In 1994, the federal government made a proposal which, even in the opinion 
of the chairman of the OSC, would not result in the achievement of the objectives 
expected from a reform of securities regulation in Canada.  None of these projects 
came to fruition. More recently, a White Paper was published setting out a framework 
for analyzing the various possible options for securities regulation in Canada (Harris, 
2002)
1. However, the author wrote (p. iv): the debate in Canada typically has not 
been informed by robust empirical analysis and suffers from a lack of empirical data 
on the central issues in respect of Canadian securities regulation.  
In October 2002, the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance of Canada asked 
Harold MacKay to define a process for determining the best securities regulatory 
system for Canada’s needs. Mr. MacKay’s findings (2002)
2, presented as a 
consensus, are as follows: 
•  Achieving a sound, efficient securities regulatory system is a matter of national 
importance. Dynamic and fair capital markets and their key components 
(including the securities regulatory apparatus) are essential to the health of 
Canada’s economy and to the success of Canadian-based businesses.  They are 
also essential to the personal lives of individual Canadians as underpinnings to 
their employment and their ability to accumulate financial assets (in particular 
those counted upon for retirement);  
                                                 
1 Harris, A.D., A Symposium on Canadian Securities Regulation: Harmonization or Nationalization?, 
University of Toronto Capital Market Institute in association with the Canadian Foundation for 
Investors Education, Toronto, October 2002, available at  
http://www.mgmt.utoronto.ca/cmi/news/index.htm, (White Paper available in the text that follows). 
2 Letter from Mr. MacKay to the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance of Canada, 
November 15, 2002, available at http://www.fin.gc.ca/news02/data/02-094_1e.html.   16
•  In an increasingly competitive world, Canada’s regulatory structures have to be 
world-class, not run-of-the-mill. They should be designed to achieve competitive 
advantage for Canada and Canadians. This is especially true for securities 
regulation because of the ongoing challenge to define the role of Canadian capital 
markets in achieving Canadian goals in the face of the powerful influence of the 
US economy and capital markets;  
•  It is important to take regional interests fully into account in achieving 
improvements to the system and, in particular, to build on the expertise that exists 
among regulators across Canada;  
•  If the Canadian securities regulatory system was designed from scratch to achieve 
the objectives just noted, the system would undoubtedly differ greatly from the 
present one;  
•  The current system, as presently operated, must be improved significantly and 
quickly.   
After reporting that there is “a range of problems with the present system,” MacKay 
recommends that a committee be established without delay to “conduct the necessary 
review and to make recommendations to policy makers.”  
In this document, we attempt to understand an apparent paradox―one in which the 
absence of rigorous knowledge does not exclude finding that serious problems exist 
and recommending that steps be taken quickly. 
Most arguments put forward to support the theory that securities regulation in Canada 
is inefficient are the usual ones that have been raised in most of the previous reports 
and studies.  They often contain little discussion of the theory of securities regulation 
or financing and in general merely rely on statements, as pointed out by Harris 
(2002). Thus, the general objective of this study is to analyze the various arguments 
put forward by proponents of a centralized securities regulatory system.  Moreover, 
Mr. MacKay’s recommendations limit the debate on the vibrancy of Canada’s capital 
markets to only one of its components: the regulatory aspect.  Although the 
significance of this element cannot be ignored, it is clear that the dynamism of a 
securities market depends on many other factors, including trading mechanisms and 
costs and, more generally, the quality of the relevant market.  We will address this 
aspect by analyzing the growth of the Canadian securities market since 1990. 
This study therefore has a two-fold objective.  Firstly, it sets out a detailed analysis of 
the principal arguments put forth by those who contributed to the discussion on this   17
matter; to the extent possible, the analysis is founded on theories of the economy of 
regulation and finance. Secondly, it presents the results of empirical studies seeking 
to answer some of the key questions raised in the debate on a Canadian regulatory 
structure. 
The study also highlights important issues affecting the future of the securities market 
in Canada―issues that have been curiously absent from the debate. Indeed, as proven 
and illustrated by Lacasse (1995), Canadian economic and regulatory policy 
decisions have more often than not been guided by myths put forward by pressure 
groups rather than by actual knowledge resulting from rigorous, independent 
research.  It is disturbing to realize that some are considering reforming a system 
which has not been analyzed carefully, on the basis of assertions made principally by 
pressure groups. Consequently, it was necessary to provide the basic components for 
a structured analysis in order to respond to the proposals and assertions made with 
respect to securities regulation in Canada. 
This study is divided into six parts.  In the first, we sum up the principal elements of 
the debate, without, however, revisiting the history of the various attempts to amend 
securities regulation in Canada, given that such summaries can be found in the White 
Paper as well as in Anand et al (1999) and Ross and Neave (2001). The second part 
analyzes the arguments and evidence regarding the inefficiency of the Canadian 
securities market.  In the third part, we examine the other arguments generally raised 
in order to justify an in-depth overhaul of the securities regulatory system. The fourth 
part analyzes the concept of regulatory competition. In the fifth part, we highlight 
some very significant differences between the Canadian and American markets which 
make it difficult to transfer the American regulatory system―sometimes cited as a 
reference―to the Canadian system. This part also sets out some of the criticisms 
levelled by many participants against the American system.  Before concluding our 
report, in part six we examine the growth of the Canadian securities market and the 
challenges it will have to face.  Indeed, no study of the regulatory system would be 
complete without considering the growth and the very nature of the industry being 
regulated.  Yet this has often been the case in discussions regarding securities 
regulation in Canada.   18  19
PART 1 
1- THE DEBATE AND ITS KEY ISSUES 
Centralization of securities regulation in Canada is a recurring topic which was given 
new impetus by the Five Year Review Committee asked to review the Ontario 
Securities Act (OSC Report, 2003).  Its first recommendation reads as follows (p. 7): 
We recommend that the provinces, territories and federal government work towards 
the creation of a single securities regulator with responsibility for the capital markets 
across Canada.  Indeed, the first chapter of the report is entitled The Need for a 
Single Regulator and begins as follows:  
We add our voice to countless others raised in support of the urgent 
need for a single Canadian securities regulator.  This is the most 
pressing securities regulation issue in Ontario and across Canada.   
We urge the Minister to assume a leadership role in working with her 
colleagues across the country to resolve any remaining barriers to the 
establishment of a single regulator responsible for Canada’s capital 
markets activity. 
In this first part, we present and analyze the arguments put forth by organizations and 
specialists proposing a centralized securities regulatory system (CSRS),
3 as well as 
the problems recently noted by MacKay (2002). We pay particular attention to the 
argument that participants have to deal with thirteen securities commissions, thereby 
increasing costs and reducing the competitiveness of the Canadian securities market. 
We also attempt to determine the scope of the remaining differences between 
securities regulations in the various jurisdictions.  The arguments reviewed in this 
first part are analyzed in greater depth in the following parts. 
1.1 Overview of the Arguments Put Forward by Proponents of a CSRS 
The principal arguments put forward by proponents of a CSRS, or an in-depth 
overhaul of the Canadian regulatory system, are based primarily on the complexity of 
financial sector regulation in Canada
4 and, in particular, the existence of thirteen 
securities regulatory authorities (ten provinces and three territories). It is argued that 
                                                 
3 Otherwise also referred to as a single securities regulator with responsibility for the capital markets in 
Canada. 
4 The framework for financial sector regulation in Canada is described summarily by Mohindra (2002) 
and in greater detail by Ross and Neave (2001) and more specifically by Anand et al (1999). We have 
not repeated the description in this document.   20
this situation increases the costs of new issues and compliance and therefore, in 
general, adversely affects the competitiveness of the Canadian market. The argument 
continues that the overall regulatory costs, being greater than in other jurisdictions, 
are particularly damaging in Canada because of the smaller size of the Canadian 
market.  The rules are said to be confusing―at times not even applied―a situation 
which adversely affects the brokerage industry (by limiting the entry of new firms) as 
much as it does the financing of emerging growth companies (MacKay letter).  It is 
said that costs resulting from the existence of differences in provincial legislation and 
the multiplicity of jurisdictions penalize businesses, market intermediaries and the 
overall markets in Canada.  Consequently, Canada’s ability to compete in a global 
market, namely its ability to attract foreign businesses seeking equity capital and to 
hold on to Canadian businesses, is compromised due to the increased cost of capital 
for Canadian businesses resulting from the cost and complexity of transactions 
involving several jurisdictions.  
According to the White Paper (p. 9), the situation has not improved much—in fact it 
has remained unchanged since the 1964 Porter Report—due to the inefficiency of 
harmonization efforts in Canada.  For example, costs to issuers were not reduced at 
all by the implementation of the mutual reliance review system (the MRRS).  Market 
globalization favours a single securities regulator in Canada and it is essential that 
Canada speak with one voice.  The lines between jurisdictions are not clearly drawn 
and participants may have to deal with thirteen different jurisdictions for penal 
proceedings.  
The compartmentalization of Canadian securities authorities also makes complex 
situations involving investors, intermediaries and issuers located in various 
jurisdictions unmanageable.  
According to the Chair of the OSC,
5 the Canadian regulatory system is slow to 
respond to the rapidly changing market because the various agencies involved must 
consult one another.  Only a single commission would be able to handle Enron-type 
accounting and financial problems, and the ever growing number of problems of this 
type favours centralized regulation.  Finally, in the opinion of the Ontario Teachers’ 
Pension Plan Board,
6 a uniform regulatory regime would avoid the race to the bottom 
which occurs when there is regulatory competition.  
                                                 
5 OSC Annual Report 2002. 
http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/en/About/Publications/AnnualRpt2002/en/messages_chair.html. 
6 Comments filed by the Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan Board with the FYRC.   21
Firstly, it should be noted that in the report of the Royal Commission on the 
Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada (1985)―the result of the 
work carried out since 1982 by the Royal Commission which was chaired by D.S. 
MacDonald―the conclusion regarding securities regulation was as follows (Volume 
3, p. 167): 
In principle, there seems to be a strong argument for federal 
regulation. In practice, we have achieved much the same result with 
provincial jurisdiction because of the leading role that Ontario, the 
centre of the Canadian financial industry, has been able to play, often 
in partnership with Quebec. One research study
7 prepared for this 
Commission argues that there is no pressing reason to tamper with 
this arrangement: provincial regulation has satisfied national 
purposes. 
In the rest of this part, we analyze two major components of the prevailing 
discussion, which focuses on the existence of thirteen regulatory authorities but says 
nothing about the mechanisms for cooperation, the mutual reliance review system and 
the other initiatives which these bodies have implemented, or merely dismisses them 
as being ineffective. 
1.2 Regulation and the Canadian Securities Market 
The report of the Five Year Review Committee entrusted with reviewing the Ontario 
Securities Act  (OSC, 2003, p. 30) asks the overall question regarding securities 
regulation in Canada as follows:  
Because securities regulation in Canada is a matter of provincial 
jurisdiction, there are 13 different sets of securities laws administered 
by 13 provincial and territorial regulatory authorities. Many of the 
statutes are similar to one another.  Some have provisions that are 
entirely distinctive.  None of them is identical.  Even where the 
statutory provisions are identical, they may be interpreted and applied 
differently from one jurisdiction to the next. 
                                                 
7 T. J. Courchene, Economic Management and the division of Powers, The Background Studies for the 
Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada, 1986, 67, p. 154 à 
170.   22
The argument based on the existence of thirteen regulatory authorities is also found in 
the MacKay letter as well as in most texts dealing with the reform of the securities 
regulatory system.  
While one cannot deny the existence of thirteen provincial securities authorities in 
Canada, one must also consider that four provinces monopolize almost all of the 
share issues, the companies listed on an exchange, the population and economic 
activity in Canada.  Thus, even if there are thirteen securities regulatory authorities in 
Canada, the vast majority of issuers deal with only one securities commission. By 
satisfying the requirements of both the Ontario and the Québec securities 
commissions, an issuer can access more than half of the Canadian population.  By 
adding the Alberta and British Columbia securities commissions, an issuer can issue 
securities in four provinces representing more than 85% of the country’s population. 
1.2.1  Initial Public Offerings 
Table 1 illustrates this situation as regards initial public offerings (IPOs).  Of the 
1,891 IPOs identified between 1991 and 2000, only 60 (representing 3.2%) were 
carried out by businesses without a head office in one of the following four 
provinces: Alberta, British Columbia, Ontario and Québec.  
During that same period of time, there were fewer share issues by businesses from the 
other provinces and territories than by foreign companies (71)
8.  In actual fact, four 
regulatory bodies―not thirteen―supervise most issues in Canada.  
1.2.2 Listed  Companies 
Using the CanCorp Financials database, we analyzed all of the companies listed on 
Canadian stock exchanges.
9 Publications and official statistics (Boisvert and Gaa, 
2002; Prospectus of the TSX Group Inc., 2002) report a total of approximately 4,000 
listed securities in Canada, placing Canada in second place worldwide for listed 
companies.  However, of the 4,131 companies for which a recent stock exchange 
symbol is available,
10 879 should be considered inactive because neither the database 
nor SEDAR report total assets or provide any financial statements after 2000. 
                                                 
8 Most of the foreign firms that carry out an initial public offering in Canada do not subsequently list 
their securities on a Canadian stock exchange. The issues are generally offered concurrently in both 
countries. 
9 This database is prepared by Micromedia: http://www.micromedia.on.ca/AboutMML.htm. 
10 Stock exchange symbols that have been re-attributed have been omitted.    23
Table 2 provides a breakdown of those companies based on their place of 
incorporation.  Over 90% of the active companies are located in one of the four most 
dynamic provinces in terms of IPOs. There are eight companies in Newfoundland, 
three in the Northwest Territories and two in Prince Edward Island.
11  
Therefore, most securities issues are concentrated in four provinces which, in July of 
2001, represented over 85% of the Canadian population.  Consequently, most issuers 
and intermediaries have to deal with four securities commissions, not thirteen.  The 
Canadian Securities Administrators have undertaken and instituted several significant 
measures to limit the problems resulting from the existence of multiple jurisdictions, 
and an action plan was developed to further harmonize the regulatory system.  It 
would be worthwhile to assess these efforts and accomplishments which make certain 
studies and analyses carried out at the beginning of the 1990’s obsolete. 
 
 
Table 1: Distribution of IPO’s in Canada, 1991-2000, based on the location of the 
issuer’s head office 
Location  1991  1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Total 
AB  11  15  103  92 72 95  138  88 40 70  724 
BC  28  25 39 44 42 54 77 46 69 77  501 
FOR  7 2  3  12 11 13 13  5  4  1  71 
ON  11  12 42 57 36 52 66 55 40 28  399 
OTH  4  4 2 5 7 2  12  7 6  11  60 
QC  0 4  19  9  11 24 21 15 12 21  136 
Total  61 62  208 219 179 240 327 216 171 208  1891 
Sources: Financial Post, Report of New Issues, Cancorp Financials, www.sedar.com and www.cdnx.com. 
Issuer’s province of incorporation: QC: Québec, ON: Ontario, AB: Alberta, BC: British Columbia, OTH: 
Nova Scotia, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, New-Brunswick, Newfoundland, Northwest Territories, Prince 
Edward Island, Yukon, FOR: issues by companies with head offices outside Canada. 
                                                 
11 The last part of this study, which deals with the attributes of the Canadian market, contains a more 
in-depth analysis of listed securities in Canada.   24
Table 2: Distribution of Canadian and foreign companies listed on a Canadian 
stock exchange in November 2002, based on their place of incorporation 
 Active  companies  Inactive 
companies  Total 
 Number  %  Number  Number  % 
British Columbia  1175  36.13  222  1397  33.82 
Alberta 802  24.66  270  1072  25.95 
Ontario 691  21.25  177  868  21.01 
Québec 304  9.35  54  358  8.67 
Yukon 94  2.89  30  124  3.00 
Foreign companies  80  2.46  92  172  4.16 
Manitoba 33  1.01  12  45  1.09 
Nova Scotia  24  0.74  14  38  0.92 
New Brunswick  20  0.62  5  25  0.61 
Saskatchewan 16  0.49  3  19  0.46 
Newfoundland 8  0.25    8  0.19 
Northwest Territories  3  0.09    3  0.07 
Prince Edward Island  2  0.06    2  0.05 
Total 3252  100.00  879  4131  100.00 
Source:  Cancorp Financials, November 2002, a company is inactive if it has no assets or if it has not 
filed financial statements after 2000. The place of incorporation of Canadian federally incorporated 
corporations was determined based on the location of their head office. 
 
1.3 Mutual Reliance and Cooperative Efforts 
The Canadian Securities Administrators (CSA) is a forum for the 13 Canadian 
securities regulators to coordinate and harmonize regulation of the capital markets.  
Its mission
12 is to give Canada a securities regulatory system that protects investors 
from unfair, improper or fraudulent practices and fosters fair, efficient and dynamic 
capital markets, through development of the Canadian Securities Regulatory System, 
a national system of harmonized securities regulation, policy and practice.  Its 
principal accomplishments to date are the mutual reliance review system, the 
Memorandum of Understanding about the Oversight of Exchanges and Quotation and 
Trade Reporting Systems (SuperMOU), the registration streamlining system (RSS), 
the national instruments and the uniform securities legislation project, all of which 
                                                 
12  http://www.csa-acvm.ca/html_CSA/about.html   25
are discussed below.
13  The CSA’s plans and objectives are set forth in a strategic 
plan available on its web site. 
1.3.1  Memorandum of Understanding Relating to the Mutual Reliance Review 
System  
In order to improve the efficiency of the Canadian capital markets by streamlining the 
review of filings, the CSA agreed to create the mutual reliance review system
14 
(MRRS) so as to reduce unnecessary duplication in the review of filings made in 
multiple jurisdictions. On January 1, 2000, the Memorandum of Understanding 
(MOU) Relating to the MRRS
15 was implemented through its adoption by all the 
Canadian securities commissions. It applies to filings made in more than one 
jurisdiction.  It deals with applications for exemptive relief as well as with 
prospectuses and annual information forms. The MRRS is the result of an initiative 
undertaken in 1971.
16 These matters now fall within the scope of National Policy 
43-201, Mutual Reliance Review System for Prospectuses and Annual Information 
Forms (AIF), and National Policy 12-201, Mutual Reliance Review System for 
Exemptive Relief Applications. Corresponding notices were issued for Québec.  
Mutual reliance means that, in exercising discretion under securities legislation, the 
decision-maker in a particular securities regulatory authority is prepared to rely 
primarily on the analysis and review of the staff of another securities regulatory 
authority.  The MOU does not involve a delegation of power by the various securities 
commissions.  A receipt is still issued by each of the authorities based on its own 
rules.  The system facilitates the task of analysts in the various commissions and that 
of market participants with respect to applications for exemptive relief, the granting 
of receipts for prospectuses and the acceptance of AIFs.  
The procedure under the system is as follows: an issuer designates a principal 
regulator which is the regulator for the jurisdiction in which its head office is 
                                                 
13  We should also mention other projects currently under development, such as the integrated 
disclosure system (IDS) and the system for electronic disclosure by insiders (SEDI), implemented in 
May 2003. 
14 This is a very brief presentation of the MRRS which deals only with those aspects relevant to our 
mandate. 
15 The Memorandum of Understanding Relating to the Mutual Reliance Review System was approved 
by all of the securities regulatory authorities in October 1999. National Policies 12-201 and 43-201 
were attached to the MOU which therefore covers two systems (B.C.V.M.Q., 1999-10-29, Vol. XXX, 
No. 29). 
16 Prior to that time, distributions in Canada were governed by National Policy No. 1, Approval of 
Documents Across Canada, which dated back to August 20, 1986 and was inspired by the Énoncé de 
politique national numéro 1, Permis pour émissions nationales, dated March 1, 1971.   26
located.
17  The issuer deals only with this commission and receives a document from 
it confirming the decision of all the regulatory authorities involved with its 
application.
18  The securities regulatory authorities in Alberta, British Columbia, 
Québec, Manitoba, Nova Scotia, Ontario and Saskatchewan have agreed to act as 
principal securities regulators.  
The initial year of implementation of the MOU was a year of adjustments. With 
respect to applications for exemptive relief, there were a few withdrawals of 
exemptions.
19 The system seems to be working well for prospectuses.  In the autumn 
of 2001, an initiative to review certain examination procedures set out in the MRRS 
was undertaken.  Ultimately, very few changes were made to the initial version of the 
MRRS regarding applications for exemptive relief. Notices outlining the MRRS for 
prospectuses and applications for exemptive relief are available on the CVMQ web 
site
20 (25-01-2002 and 12-07-2002).  
A panel comprised of all of the staff involved with the MRRS within all the Canadian 
securities commissions―bringing together some 140 to 150 individuals―meets 
every two years to explain the document examination procedures (prospectuses and 
applications for exemptive relief) set out in the MRRS and to ensure consistency in 
the interpretation and application of new rules affecting distributions. 
1.3.2  Memorandum of Understanding About the Oversight of Exchanges 
The Montreal Exchange has been recognized as a self-regulatory organization since 
1984. Since its demutualization, the Bourse de Montréal Inc. has since been 
recognized as a self-regulatory organization.
21  The arrival of The Nasdaq Stock 
Market Inc. in November 2000 created a precedent because it was recognized by 
statute as a self-regulatory organization under section 1 of An Act respecting Nasdaq 
Stock Exchange activities in Québec (R.S.Q., c. E-20.01).  The TSX Inc. and the TSX 
Venture Exchange Inc. are covered by a temporary exemption
22 which should 
become a final exemption.  This situation led to the drafting of a memorandum of 
                                                 
17 Or that of its manager if it is a mutual fund. If the issuer’s head office is not located within the 
jurisdiction of a participating principal regulator, the issuer must designate another participating 
principal regulator with which it has a reasonable connection. 
18 The Commission des valeurs mobilières du Québec concurrently renders its own written decision. 
19 Exemption withdrawals may be statutory, administrative (these two are infrequent) or the result of a 
condition which is unacceptable to a commission. 
20 http://www.cvmq.ca/Upload/fichier_pdf/norme/A-XXX-43ang.pdf and 
http://www.cvmq.ca/Upload/fichier_pdf/norme/A-XXXIII-27a.pdf. 
21 CVMQ Decision No. 2000-C-0729 dated November 24, 2000.  
22 Exemption provided for under section 263 of the Securities Act (R.S.Q., c. V-1.1), CVMQ decisions 
No. 2002-C-0227 dated June 28, 2002 and 2002-C-0189 dated May 31, 2002.    27
understanding―the SuperMOU―between the various Canadian securities 
administrators (CSA) for the purpose of regulating and simplifying the oversight of 
stock exchanges, except the Nasdaq Stock Market inc. 
The SuperMOU is a memorandum of understanding about the oversight of exchanges 
and quotation and trade reporting systems.  Each recognized exchange and 
recognized quotation and trade reporting system has a principal regulator responsible 
for its oversight and may have one or more exempting regulators.  The principal 
regulator will inform the exempting regulator of its oversight activities and will 
provide the exempting regulator with all useful information requested by it
23. The 
SuperMOU was signed by the participating commissions other than the CVMQ on 
September 3, 2002, and will come into effect in those provinces when it is approved 
by the Ontario Minister of Finance on November 7, 2002. In Québec, the SuperMOU 
came into effect on July 17, 2003 when it was signed by the Minister in charge of 
Canadian intergovernmental affaires, Mr. Benoît Pelletier
24.  
1.3.3  Registration of Representatives 
The registration streamlining system (RSS)
25 was set up by the CSA on October 1, 
2002 in response to comments from industry to the effect that registration of 
securities representatives with thirteen jurisdictions was a costly and tedious 
process
26. The RSS makes it possible for representatives to register with several 
securities authorities as follows:  
1)  A representative registered in an initial jurisdiction copies the form accepted by 
that jurisdiction and files it with the subsequent jurisdiction together with a letter 
from his employer and the required registration fees.  The form must be signed by 
the firm and by the representative.  The conditions for registration of each 
                                                 
23 The SuperMOU will replace the Memorandum of Understanding Regarding the Oversight of the 
TSX Venture Exchange Inc. by the Alberta Securities Commission and the British Columbia Securities 
Commission which the CVMQ had signed with those commissions in September 2001.  
24 Under section 3.8 of the Act respecting the ministère du Conseil exécutif (R.S.Q., c. M-30), 
“Canadian intergovernmental agreements must, to be valid, be approved by the Government and be 
signed by the Minister [in charge of Canadian intergovernmental affaires]”. See the Act respecting the 
ministère du Conseil exécutif, as amended by the Act to amend the Act respecting the Ministère du 
Conseil exécutif as regards Canadian intergovernmental affairs, S.Q. 2002, c. 60 (assented to on 
December 18, 2002 and which came into force on the same date). A “Canadian intergovernmental 
agreement” means an agreement between the Government or one of its departments or government 
agencies and another government in Canada or one of its departments or government agencies. 
25 http://www.sfsc.gov.sk.ca/ssc/files/nat-noti/31-305.pdf. 
26 A centralized on-line registration system, such as the one now in place in the United States, is 
currently under review.   28
jurisdiction continue to apply and each jurisdiction retains its right to evaluate the 
registration and require additional information. 
2)  The subsequent jurisdiction then sends a letter to the initial jurisdiction asking for 
confirmation that the representative’s registration is in good standing.  The 
commissions have agreed to register representatives within two days of receipt of 
the initial jurisdiction’s reply. 
Non-residents can also register under the RSS, provided that, for each province, they 
agree to submit to the applicable law of the province and to its courts in the event of a 
dispute with a client domiciled in that province.  In this manner, Québec investors can 
institute proceedings against representatives who are not residents of Québec. The 
RSS is currently in effect in all the provinces. The RSS is currently in effect in all the 
provinces except Québec, which must obtain approval of the regulation authorizing 
its implementation from the Minister of Finance
27.  
1.3.4  The National Instruments 
Most securities activity in Canada is now governed by national instruments. 
Appendix 1 sets forth a list of national instruments and other texts of national scope 
which apply in the following areas:  
•  efficiency of the securities market and trading rules, 
•  registration and related matters, 
•  the distribution of securities, 
•  continuous disclosure, 
•  take-over bids and special transactions, 
•  securities transactions outside the jurisdiction, 
•  mutual funds, 
in addition to the MRRS and the RSS discussed above.  
Therefore, securities transactions in Canada are governed by a set of national 
instruments, with a few exceptions:  
•  Some national instruments have not yet been implemented in Québec due to the 
different approval process, but in many cases adherence to the national 
instruments takes place by means of internal directives.  
                                                 
27 Paragraph 26 of section 331.1 of the Québec Securities Act allows the adoption of a regulation 
which must be approved by the Minister of Finance.    29
•  There are still some differences, particularly as regards exemptions, which affect 
parts of some of the national instruments. They are the subject of discussion. 
These differences often reflect regional differences in market conditions. 
Although securities regulation is a provincial matter, it is governed to a significant 
extent by national instruments and policies applicable to all of the provinces. This 
harmonization is the result of cooperative efforts undertaken through the CSA. The 
percentage of national instruments which are not currently harmonized is quite low. 
However, the existence of national instruments has not removed some differences in 
the provincial statutes, particularly as regards terminology. Nonetheless, the use of 
national instruments should allow a move towards a passport system. This subsequent 
step is the subject matter of the Uniform Securities Legislation (USL) project.   
1.3.5  The Uniform Securities Legislation Project  
Recently, as they had said they would, the CSA firmly undertook to eliminate the 
differences in provincial and territorial securities law by embarking on a uniform 
securities legislation project.  The project resulted in a detailed proposal submitted for 
public comment in the various provinces in January 2003.
28  As stated in the 
CVMQ’s notice, the proposal is the:  
[Translation] fruit of a collaborative effort initiated over a year ago by 
a group of securities commissions in order to assess the relevancy and 
feasibility of formulating a common legislative framework for the 
various Canadian provincial and territorial securities authorities.  As 
such, the proposal is not intended to reform the current system based 
on provincial jurisdiction, but rather, to develop a common language 
to facilitate the work of the regulators and reduce the legal and 
administrative formalities which issuers and industry intermediaries 
must satisfy, while at the same time safeguarding the interests of 
investors. 
In this area, the situation in Canada is similar to that in the European Union: 
the foundations of the law are not uniform and, as stated in the proposal,  
[Translation] Québec is the only Canadian province with laws based 
on a civil code and with statutes and regulations having wording 
                                                 
28 See B.C.V.M.Q., 31-01-2003, Vol. XXXIV, No. 4 and its supplement at: 
http://www.cvmq.com/fr/publi/bulletin.asp?no=192&affBulletin=true.   30
based on a civil law system.  All the other Canadians jurisdictions 
operate in accordance with common law principles. Consequently, any 
initiative aimed strictly at standardizing statutory and regulatory 
securities texts is only possible in the common law provinces: they can 
in fact achieve identical results by adopting uniform statutory and 
regulatory language.  This is not the case for Québec which, to 
achieve the same results, must draft its texts in a different legislative 
context in accordance with civil law principles and adopt a legal 
language which is often different. 
Therefore, Québec participated in the project by adopting an approach based on 
harmonization.  As stated by Mr. Godin, Chair of the CVMQ
29: [Translation] Québec 
must develop an approach which is based on harmonization and which will 
accommodate the specific nature of our industry and investors. This project is part of 
a strategy of regulatory reform that aims to reduce the burden of regulation on market 
participants and make regulation more effective.  The CSA recognize that much of 
the burden on market participants is due to the fact that each of Canada’s provinces 
and territories has different securities legislation.  The project’s objective is to 
eliminate the adverse effects of such differences by developing harmonized statutes 
and regulations and, on the basis of this harmonized legislation, establishing 
mechanisms for delegating decision-making and for mutual recognition. The uniform 
securities legislation project would, in fact, be a harmonization project, resulting in 
the following principal changes (p. 2 of the project): 
•  The ability of a securities regulatory authority to delegate decision-making across 
all regulatory functions to another securities regulatory authority, subject to 
restrictions that would preserve each securities regulatory authority’s autonomy 
and jurisdiction.  This would allow the implementation of one-stop shopping.  For 
example, an applicant for exemptive relief or a prospectus receipt would file an 
application with the principal regulator only and would receive one decision only 
from that regulator, which decision would be the decision of all the regulators 
named in the application; 
•  A streamlined system for inter-jurisdictional registration of firms and individuals.  
Harmonized registration categories and obligations together with the 
aforementioned delegation of powers would make it possible to implement a 
national registration system.  Under this system a registrant in one jurisdiction 
could become registered in another jurisdiction simply by notifying the regulator 
in its home jurisdiction that it wishes to do business in the other jurisdiction and 
paying the appropriate fees; 
                                                 
29 http://communiques.gouv.qc.ca/gouvqc/communiques/GPQF/Janvier2003/30/c5155.html.   31
•  A civil liability regime for secondary market participants regardless of whether 
the issuer is a reporting issuer in the jurisdiction in which the security holder 
resides if the issuer is a reporting issuer in any jurisdiction of Canada; 
•  A streamlined securities act with details largely contained in rules to allow future 
changes to securities laws to be made in a timely and harmonized manner through 
the rule-making process.  The uniform act would be “platform” legislation setting 
set out fundamental rights, powers and obligations.  The uniform rules would 
contain detailed requirements. 
The power to delegate set out in the project makes it possible to envisage a mutual 
recognition system similar to the model adopted by the European Union to solve the 
problem which arose as a result of the creation of a single market subject to the 
jurisdiction of various civil law and common law countries.  The consultation period 
ended on April 30, 2003 and the CSA are hoping to introduce this significant change 
at the beginning of 2005. 
Considerable progress has been made since the creation of the CSA, primarily the 
introduction of national instruments. The MacKay letter recognizes the significance 
of what has been accomplished. It states:  
The regulators in the CSA have been conscious of the need for them to 
work together in the interests of investor protection and market 
efficiency.  To that end they have implemented a number of 
harmonization and streamlining initiatives.  Most market participants 
agree that these efforts have had some successes, particularly in the 
mutual reliance system of prospectus review and in a number of jointly 
promulgated national policy instruments.  
The CSA is also working on a number of other harmonization and 
streamlining projects, two of which deserve particular mention: (1) the 
continuing effort to develop common rules and procedures to permit a 
mutual reliance system of intermediary registration, and (2) the 
drafting of uniform securities legislation and rules for consideration 
by provincial and territorial governments. These are important 
initiatives which should be encouraged.  
The question remains as to whether these steps and other CSA 
harmonizing and streamlining initiatives alone will be adequate to   32
assure Canada of a sustainable, effective and efficient securities 
regulatory system in the decades ahead. 
The MacKay letter was drafted before the consultation process regarding the 
harmonization project was begun and it does not seem to take into account the 
importance of the national instruments. Co-ordination efforts have led to the 
emergence of significantly harmonized national instruments and the timetable for 
implementation of the USL indicates that a harmonized framework may well be in 
place very shortly. These results were obtained without resorting to a single 
centralized regulator. 
1.4 The Extent of Differences and Conflicts 
The initiative of the Canadian regulators, as well as the CSA’s action plan, indicate 
the high degree of awareness surrounding the continued existence of certain problems 
and, in particular, the differences which still divide securities legislation in Canada, 
as well as the conflicts and delays resulting from the existence of multiple 
jurisdictions.  The measures which have been implemented do not yet embrace the 
principle of mutual recognition which has been accepted in Europe, and the efforts to 
harmonize securities legislation are not entirely complete, although, as of 2003, a 
very large proportion of the national instruments have been harmonized. The few 
differences which still remain relate to sections which could not yet be harmonized 
due to the highly diversified nature of the Canadian market, a market in which 
hundreds of mining securities from the West trade with large-cap securities based 
primarily in Ontario. 
The most significant differences and problems which continue to exist and are felt by 
market participants can be divided into three categories. 
•  Rules governing distributions: despite the MRRS, in many cases regulators other 
than the principal regulator re-examine prospectuses.  The mutual reliance system 
will most probably have to develop into a mutual recognition system in which the 
principal regulator issues a receipt that is valid in all the other jurisdictions.  This 
is the proposal in the USL project; 
•  Multi-jurisdictional registration of dealers and representatives.  In this area, there 
are still inter-provincial barriers which also exist in other professional sectors, 
including the construction industry!  The passport-type systems that have been 
put to the test in the European Union are a potential solution to this problem;   33
•  The British Columbia Securities Commission (BCSC) performed a cost-benefit 
analysis of the current disclosure and prospectus preparation system (Wolf, 2002).  
Using questionnaires administered to issuers, the author attempted to measure the 
costs of completing a prospectus and to link the costs incurred by issuers to the 
various regulatory requirements.  The study indicates that it is possible to reduce 
issuance costs and cut the time to market by changing disclosure requirements.  It 
also indicates that issuers spend 87% of their compliance time on compliance 
with securities regulations that are already significantly uniform, thereby 
confirming our estimates as to the existing degree of harmonization in 2003. The 
author concludes that harmonization has already been achieved to a significant 
extent (p. 16):  
it suggests that those who look solely to harmonization or national 
regulation to reduce the regulatory burden may be sorely disappointed 
if they get their way. If only 13% of regulatory compliance effort is 
spent on areas that are non-uniform, the efficiencies to be gained 
merely from harmonization are slim, especially considering that 
harmonization will not reduce that 13% to zero―the requirements will 
remain, albeit in a harmonized form. 
As suggested by the findings of the BCSC, the Canadian problem is more closely tied 
to a comprehensive approach to securities regulation―an approach which is too 
onerous and costly―than to the effects of multiple jurisdictions. 
1.5 Conclusion 
Notwithstanding the assertions of proponents of a centralized securities regulatory 
system in Canada, most securities activity is managed by four commissions.   
Significant co-ordination and streamlining efforts have recently led to the 
implementation of systems to reduce the burden of multiple jurisdictions on the 
various types of market participants and to the introduction of national instruments. A 
major standardization/harmonization project is currently in the consultation phase, 
but it can be said that the current securities regulatory system has already been 
significantly harmonized.  However, some differences in the rules and interpretation 
thereof remain, which can give rise to additional costs.  The analysis of those costs is 
the subject of the next part. The analysis was carried out through observations made 
over a period of time when the degree of harmonization was lower than it currently is.   34  35
PART 2   
2- THE COSTS OF REGULATION AND INEFFICIENCY        
2.1 Arguments and evidence  
For MacIntosh (2002), countries like the United States or associations of countries 
like the European Union have such a large share in markets, that they can afford to 
run excessive burdensome regulatory regimes without losing a lot of securities-
related business.  They have market power. We have not. For MacKay (2002), there 
are serious problems of efficiency. He writes:  
many issuers and registrants point to the excess cost and the time 
delays that flow from complying with often different laws, regulations, 
rules or policies (or different interpretations of the same laws, 
regulations, rules or policies) across Canada. They argue that these 
cost burden and time delays (a) create a barrier to entry for new 
investment dealers, brokers and other intermediaries, (b) prevent 
companies wishing to access public markets, particularly emerging 
growth companies, from doing so - and, for listed companies, impose 
unrealistic compliance burdens on an ongoing basis, and (c) prevent 
issuers and dealers from offering investment products to institutional 
and retail investors everywhere in Canada unless they navigate the 
rule complexity caused by the present system.  
 Issuers and registrants complain about both the direct costs caused by reporting to 
several regulatory bodies and indirect costs, including substantial additional internal 
costs related to compliance. Concerns about costs and time delays seem to have 
greatest negative effect on small and medium-sized companies, least able to face the 
consequences of these problems.                               
Harris (2002, p. 34) summarizes the cost factors caused by the present situation in the 
following manner:   
•  Disparate substantive rules among the provinces, leading to additional time and 
effort incurred by issuers and intermediaries to determine the requirements in all 
relevant jurisdictions and to structure transactions, or to make filings in 
connection with intermediary registration, accordingly;    36
•  Disparate administrative practices among the provincial securities regulators, 
again leading to additional time and effort incurred by issuers and 
intermediaries to determine and comply with relevant issuance and registration 
requirements; 
•  Multiple regulators with overlapping and duplicative jurisdiction, leading to 
additional time and effort incurred by issuers and intermediaries in making 
multiple filings, and issuers and intermediaries paying multiple fees to those 
regulators; 
•  The opportunity cost to investors and intermediaries represented by domestic 
and foreign issuers who choose to bypass the Canadian capital markets in favour 
of other markets with more cost effective regulatory systems; and 
•  Lost economies of scale in the development and administration of regulatory 
policy by multiple jurisdictions, or, to consider the converse that might arise 
under a transition to a central regulator, inefficiency resulting from the 
consolidation of too much securities regulatory authority in a single body 
managed by regulators used to controlling and directing activity in a much 
smaller sphere. 
From these arguments we conclude that: 
•  Costs caused by the Canadian regulatory system prevent growth companies from 
having access to the public market by unduly increasing issuance costs and 
delays. Initial issuance costs and delays are thus abnormally high:   
•  The inefficiency of the system harms the brokerage industry by limiting access of 
new participants:      
•  Regulatory costs represent an obstacle for registration of foreign corporations in 
Canada. 
In Part 1, we discussed the situation with the disparate substantive rules among the 
provinces. To the extent that Canadian standards are now used, local differences in 
securities legislation may not have significant effects.      
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2.2 Putting in perspective 
Firstly, it is useful to point out the absence of any rigorous analysis of the cost of 
securities regulation in Canada or, for that matter, the United States. The authors 
show that the different methods used by researchers produce diverging results and 
point out the bias caused by methods presently used
30. 
Evaluation of the costs and benefits of regulation is difficult because its direct and 
indirect effects are numerous and difficult to estimate (Gagné et al, 2001). According 
to Briault (2003), there are three broad types of regulatory costs:  first, direct costs of 
paying for financial services regulators; second, indirect costs of regulation, namely 
the incremental costs of compliance; and third, the distortion cost
31. Comparison of 
the direct costs of regulation is difficult, mainly because the nature and scale of the 
financial services industries in different countries vary significantly. Whereas the 
United Kingdom now has only a single authority, a number of other countries 
regulate the banking, insurance and securities sector separately. The FSA (2003)
32 
proposes some indicators of the direct costs of regulation in different jurisdictions. It 
is important to note that Australia, which recently opted for a single regulator for the 
securities market, incurs significantly higher costs than Canada. The estimated cost of 
the Australian Securities and Investment Commission (ASIC) is estimated to be £73.8 
million. The total cost in Canada, including the Bureau des services financiers, is 
£55.4 million. The Australian capitalization is 64.5% of the TSX capitalization
33.  
The problem of the cost of securities regulation is important, but it should be put in 
perspective.  Issuers and investors incur various forms of costs, of which regulation is 
only one component.  In particular, it is useful to distinguish the effects on the 
primary market from those which may affect the secondary market.  The primary 
market is for initial issuances, and we will analyze in detail the costs and delays in 
this market.  It is possible that regulation, so pervasive with initial public offerings, 
                                                 
30 In particular, the bottom-up survey method (Gagné et al, 2001), used in works by Sawiak (1996) and 
Wolf (2002), leads to bias to the extent that corporations not very affected by regulatory costs are 
unlikely to participate in such surveys, which results in the overestimation of costs. 
31 C. Briault, Director of the Financial Services Authority, explains:  “the ‘distortion’ cost arising from 
the way in which regulation may change the nature of markets, may prevent or discourage firms from 
entering or using markets, may constitute new markets that would not exist in the absence of 
regulation, and may therefore have a significant effect on the nature and availability of the products 
provided by the financial services industry”. See The Costs of Financial Regulation, July 2003, 
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/speeches/sp140.html 
32 http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/annual/ar02_03/ar02_03app8.pdf 
33 A share of the ASIC total is devoted to aspects of corporate regulation which may not be performed 
by the regulators in other countries. ASIC also regulates financial advice and advisers as well as the 
selling and retail marketing of financial products. This is why the cost of the Bureau des services 
financiers should be included for comparison.      38
may penalize issuers.  The secondary market, in which already issued securities are 
traded, is by far the largest.  This is the market which primarily attracts foreign 
issuers. Even if cost and the issuance process were efficient, a foreign issuer would 
have no interest in listing its securities if the secondary market is thinly traded, 
trading costs high and market quality generally average. 
In the United States, for the year 2000 according to the Securities Industry 
Association
34, the total trading volume for shares rose to $34.118 trillion.  A rough 
estimate of trading costs puts them at around .75%
35.  All trading costs for that year 
were thus around $256 billion.  These costs include four components:  the spread 
which separates the bid and ask prices, the price effect of the announcement of large 
orders which replaces the spread when blocks are exchanged on the upstairs market, 
brokerage fees and, finally, the cost of settling trades. The first two components result 
essentially from market organization and liquidity, and broker conduct.  
To a large extent, brokerage fees depend on the level of competition but regulatory 
considerations may affect this level. For example, internal order matching, which 
facilitates trading by institutional investors (the upstairs market), is subject to less 
stringent regulation in Canada than on the NYSE. This difference may explain 
differences in total trading costs for institutional investors between Canada and the 
United States.   
Revenue for the American securities industry grew in 2000 to $60 billion
36, including 
the trading costs referred to above. This estimate only takes into account, however, 
brokers listed on the NYSE, but incorporates the various sources of revenue of 
brokers, including fixed income securities. During the same year, 2000, the American 
Treasury collected $2.1 billion through the SEC.  The operational costs of the SEC 
are estimated to be $377 million. The tangible and direct costs of American 
regulation are therefore a very small fraction of total costs incurred by issuers and 
investors in the American market.  A small reduction in trading costs (from .75% to 
.7489%) would have more effect on total costs incurred by American investors and 
issuers than the total elimination of SEC costs. Investors are very sensitive to trading 
costs. Atkins and Dyl (1997), for example, show a significant inverse relationship 
between volume and trading costs both on the NYSE and on the NASDAQ. 
                                                 
34 http://www.sia.com/press/html/question4.html. 
35 http://www.quickmba.com/finance/invest/tradecost/. 
36 http://www.sia.com/reference_materials/pdf/RsrchRprtVol3-9.pdf.   39
In Canada, trading volume on the TSX reached $716 billion in 2001 (TSX Group 
Prospectus)
37.  If trading costs are similar to those in the United States, investors 
spent in total 716 x .0075 = $5.370 billion.  Chant and Mohindra (2001) estimate the 
expenses of the Alberta, British Columbia and Ontario securities commissions at 
$72.9 million, which, when added to the expenses of the Quebec Securities 
Commission (CVMQ $17.3 million), total around $90 million. In 2002, these 
expenses amounted to $104.09 million (Schedule 2). 
In Canada, a change in trading costs which would reduce them from .75 to .735% 
would have the same effect on total costs incurred by markets as the elimination of 
the four main securities commissions. Trading costs of mid or small-cap securities in 
Canada are extremely high.  Cleary et al (2001), for example, put them at 1.3% for 
securities trading between $15 and $20 when a discount brokerage is used.  They are 
3% when the order is given to a full service broker.  The .75% estimate used here is 
valid for Internet trades and high-priced liquid securities and institutional investors.  
In 2001, the sales volume of the securities industry in Canada was $10.1 billion and 
operational costs were $2.8 billion. These values are respectively 9.8 and 2.7 in 
2002
38. 
A reduction in the regulatory burden is certainly a laudable goal.  Nevertheless, 
intangible costs have not been taken into account.  However, it is clear that regulatory 
costs only represent a small fraction of costs borne  by  issuers  and  investors,                                  
in both Canada and the United States.  To impute solely to regulatory costs the 
relative inefficiency of the Canadian market overlooks the fact that the essence of 
trading costs is related to market operations and brokerage commissions, which are 
mainly the responsibility of the brokerage industry itself.  
It is, however, possible that costs caused by the regulatory system primarily affect 
new issuers more than companies whose securities are already traded or even 
investors. It would therefore be useful to analyze initial offerings. 
 
                                                 
37 The volume was $640.9 billion in 2002. The 2001 data was used to ensure coherency with that of 
Chant and Mohindra (2001). 
38 http://www.ida.ca/Files/IndIssues/SecIndStatis/annual_totals_fr.pdf   40
2.3 The Effect on Initial Offerings 
When a company initially asks for outside public capital, it conducts an initial public 
offering which requires the preparation of a prospectus. The prospectus may be 
waived in certain cases and under certain conditions.  In order to issue securities in a 
given province, issuers must have the prospectus receipted by the securities 
authorities in each jurisdiction. 
For MacIntosh (1997, p. 210), the present situation of securities regulation requires 
issuers to deal with several regulatory bodies and multiplies the direct costs of an 
issue.  These are mainly fees of accountants, lawyers and other professionals involved 
in the preparation of a prospectus. In addition, because of the multiple review process 
for prospectuses, the issuer incurs additional internal costs (time spent by officers and 
employees) and opportunity costs. An issuer may be unable to benefit from a window 
of opportunity favourable to conducting an issuance or it may be unable to benefit 
from investment possibilities due to non-availability of funds.   
Relatively little empirical evidence exists to support these statements. To our 
knowledge, only Sawiak et al (1996) have analyzed, in an unscientific manner
39, 
costs caused by Canadian securities regulation on initial and secondary issues and 
estimated at around $20,000 the additional costs related to the (secondary) issue in a 
province other than the one where the corporation already issued its securities.  The 
study covered the year 1995.  Differences between the hold period rules in the 
various provinces were an obstacle to issues conducted outside the province of origin. 
For initial offerings, 30% of securities specialists estimated the registration costs in a 
second province at $5,000 or less, 60% of respondents placed them between $5,000 
and $10,000 and 10% of them placed them at over $10,000. 40% of respondents 
believed that the additional costs represent less than 1% of the total direct costs of 
issues, and 40% of them put them between 1 and 5% of these costs.  
MacIntosh states that the additional costs for a foreign issuer have not been measured, 
but that anecdotal evidence suggests that minimal additional costs may have a 
decisive effect on the decision of foreign companies to issue securities in Canada.  
                                                 
39 In their testimony before the Standing Senate Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce, on May 
7, 1996, the authors of this study said:   “We are not economists. We are not statisticians. We are not 
schooled in preparing questionnaires. We are securities lawyers. We prepared these questionnaires as 
securities lawyers trying to elicit that information which we thought would be useful to this committee 
in its deliberations. This report does not purport to be statistically reliable. We are not schooled in such 
matters. However, it does represent the canvassing of a number of individuals whose views now 
supplement our personal views…”   41
Data reported by Sawiak et al (1996) does not coincide with data respecting initial 
Canadian issues.  Kooli and Suret (2003a) observe that the average size of Canadian 
issues (outside capital pools)
40 was around $17 million between 1991 and 1998.   
Even if listing costs in a province other than the province of origin are $10,000, 
which seems to represent an upper limit for 90% of the specialists questioned, they 
can only raise the issue costs expressed as a percentage of gross proceeds by 10 / 
17,000 = .00058 or .058%, or 5.8 basis points for an average issue. It seems unlikely 
that the few thousand dollars which, according to offerings specialists, registration in 
another province represents could be a significant factor in increased costs and a 
barrier to issuances.  This is especially true since we have measured the effect on 
costs for an average issue, and the probability of an issue in several provinces 
increases with the size of the issue.  As a percentage, the additional costs become 
negligible for issuances of $40 million or more. Finally, these estimates were made 
before the implementation of the MRRS which, according to MacIntosh (p. 212), has 
reduced costs for users of capital markets. 
It is thus difficult to argue that the existence of several securities authorities in 
Canada heavily penalizes market competitiveness, as four studies show that the cost 
of initial offerings is significantly lower in Canada than in the United States, which 
does not have multiple securities commissions.  Higgins (1994) and Williams and 
Shutt (2000) demonstrate a net advantage for Canadian issuances.  These two studies 
covered a small number of samples (16 issuances for Higgins, 49 for Williams and 
Shutt).  
In a parallel study (Kooli and Suret, 2003a), we studied the direct and indirect costs 
of initial offerings in Canada and the United States during the period 1997-2000.  The 
data and findings from this study are described below.  The study covered 513 of 714 
Canadian IPOs during the period and 1,188 of the 1,534 American issues.  The issues 
omitted were those for which the obtaining of a prospectus seemed impossible.  The 
following costs factors were measured: 
•  Brokerage fees;  
•  Other costs appearing in the prospectus, which are related to legal costs, fees and 
preparation of the prospectus; 
•  The initial undervaluation, which resulted in a cost for companies whose 
securities were issued at a lower price than that established by the market.  
                                                 
40 Capital pool equity can only be offered in an initial offering to shareholders residing in Alberta or 
British Columbia.  Their analysis in the case of issues in multiple jurisdictions is therefore not relevant. 
http://www.sfu.ca/~mvolker/biz/cpc.htm.   42
The observations are separated according to the method of subscription (agent or firm 
underwriting), size (measured by gross proceeds), and the market on which the security is 
listed following the issue. 
We first showed the important effect of the size of issues, which results in significant 
differences between the various exchanges, as they attract different offerings customers.  In 
Canada, commissions and other costs as well as undervaluation are much greater on the 
CDNX (now the TSX Venture Exchange Inc.) than on the TSE (now the TSX Inc.), 
especially because of the presence of capital pools
41.  Table 3 shows direct and indirect 
costs of firm underwriting initial offerings in Canada.  They are 8.57% on average, for 
an issue of securities to be listed on the TSE, whereas direct costs are 19% for 
companies on the CDNX.  These differences are related to the fixed cost of an issue, 
which penalize small offerings much more.  We also note that IPOs on the TSE are 
less undervalued than those listed on the CDNX.  This difference is largely associated 
with the existence of capital pools in the sample.  These results are similar to those 
obtained by Williams and Shutt (2000) and Higgins (1994).  The costs of an issue are 
directly affected by risk levels and inversely related to size.  The smaller, the more 
junior and the riskier issuances on the CDNX command higher issuing costs.   
 
Table 3:  Average costs factors of a Canadian issue, based on exchange of listing 
  Canada 
  TSE CDNX Total 
Commission (%)  5.91% 9.52% 7.54%
 
Other expenses (%)  2.65% 9.47% 5.73%
 
Total direct costs (%)  8.57% 19.00%  13.27%
 
Undervaluation (%)  12.02% 62.71% 34.89%
 
Total costs of issue   20.59% 81.72% 48.16%
 
 
                                                 
41 Initially created under the name junior capital pools, these corporations became venture capital 
pools and then capital pool companies when the program was adopted by the CDNX and are now 
authorized in Quebec under the name Société de capital de démarrage (CPC). We will designate them 
under this acronym, although the regulatory framework for the successive versions of this program 
have evolved over the years and for different jurisdictions.   43
Table 4 summarizes the direct and indirect costs measured for firm underwriting 
initial offerings of equity in the United States. Direct costs are lower on the NYSE, 
but if we include the undervaluation factor, the AMEX has the lowest costs for IPOs 
in the United States. Corwin and Harris (1999) explain the differences between the 
exchanges by a) cost differences in exchange membership fees, b) broker recognition, 
with the most prestigious brokers potentially attracting more investors, and c) implicit 
certification resulting from access to a prestigious market and reducing the 
uncertainty and undervaluation associated with it. 
Table 4:  Principal components of initial offering costs in the United States 
 United  States 
Market AMEX  NASDAQ NYSE  OTC  Total 
Commission (%)  7.76% 7% 6.33%  8.57%  7.1%
 
Other expenses (%)  7.14% 3.3% 1.89%  7.33%  3.33%
 
Total direct costs (%)  14.9% 10.3% 8.23%  15.91%  10.44%
 
Undervaluation (%)  3.08% 43.19%  12.91%  20.63%  37.76%
 
Total costs of issue   18% 53.49%  21.11%  36.55%  48.2%
 
 
Our results generally show that direct costs are significantly higher for small issues 
than for large issues. Costs can therefore only be compared for categories of similar 
size.  Table 5 summarizes the different factors for costs of initial offerings by country 
for four groups on the basis of gross proceeds.  The average total direct cost of a 
Canadian junior issue (US$1 to 10 million) is less (15.98%) than that of an American 
issue (17.99%).  The direct cost for large-cap issues (more than US$100 million) is, 
however, similar in both countries 
In the two countries, brokerage commissions constitute the largest part of total direct 
costs.  They are 8.12% for issues from US$1 to 10 million and 5.53% for issues 
greater than US$100 million.  In the United States, the average commission is 9.29% 
for issues from US$1 to 10 million and 6.09% for issues over US$100 million.  
American brokers charge more than Canadian brokers do. On average, the 
commission is around 7%, confirmed by the results of previous studies in the United 
States on issues of between US$20 and 80 million.    44
Chen and Ritter (2000) explain the “7% principle” in the United States by collusion 
and the fact that those who issue shares pay little attention to costs.  Kryzanowski and 
Rakita (1999) examined the possibility of collusion in Canada and did not observe an 
abnormally high level of commissions during the period 1993-1997.  Our Canadian 
sampling also confirms this finding, and amounts collected by brokers are therefore 
higher on average in the United States than in Canada.  However, these costs are 
significantly higher in Canada and the United States than in other countries.  For 
example, in Japan the rate is 5.3% and in France it is 3.1%.  The United Kingdom 
shows an even lower rate, 2.1%. However, amounts collected from initial offerings in 
European countries are significantly higher than those in Canada (Ljungqvist and 
Whilhelm, 2002), which partially explains the differences in cost.  
 
Table 5:  IPO costs according to size of issue, excluding capital pool issues for 
the period 1997-1999. The average percentages are statistically different from 
zero to the 1% level. 
 
Canada 
















1.0 – 9.9  53 8.12% 7.86%  15.98%  30.61% 
10– 49.9  49 6.14% 3.31%  9.45%  11.30% 
50 – 99.9  10 6%  2% 8%  10.76% 
100 and over  16 5.53% 1.75%  7.28%  8.88% 
Average   6.88%  4.9%  11.78%  18.95% 
Weighted average  
(by size) 
5.35% 1.84%  7.19%  5.11% 
United States 
1.0 – 9.9  119 9.29%  8.7%  17.99%  9.05% 
10 – 49.9  532 6.93% 3.70%  10.63%  26.15% 
50 – 99.9  300 6.88% 2.12% 9% 55.57% 
100 and over  237 6.09%  1.2%  7.29%  67.19% 
Average   7%  3.3%  10.30%  37.5% 
Weighted average 
(by size)       
5.79% 1.43%  7.22%  38.38%   45
IPOs are generally undervalued and their initial return, measured between the day of 
issue and the first trades on the secondary market, is abnormally high in most 
countries (Ritter, 1988). On average, initial offerings of Canadian equity are less 
undervalued than American ones (18.95% as opposed to 37.5%). On a weighted 
average, the difference is even greater (5.11% as opposed to 38.38%). This result is 
related to the fact that several Internet and computer companies conducted large IPOs 
in the United States during the period corresponding to the bull market in technology 
stocks.  These IPOs generated extremely high initial returns.  The US$132 million 
offering by VA Linux Sys gave an initial return of 697.5%; Foundry Networks was 
525% and CacheFlow was 426.58%.  This phenomenon did not occur in Canada. 
In Canada, direct costs that can partially be ascribed to regulation are 15.98% for 
small issues. Undervaluation, essentially  related  to  broker  conduct,  is                       
30.61% for these issues.  Here again, it is interesting to make a comparison between 
the two types of costs to put in perspective the possible effects of regulation on the 
issuing process and financing costs.  Costs imputable to undervaluation are almost 
twice the total of direct costs.     
2.4 Regulation and delays for reviewing prospectuses 
For MacIntosh (1996, p. 210), somewhat less obvious, but probably more important, 
are the opportunity costs created by the delay associated with multiple review of the 
issuer’s prospectus. Delays caused by the prospectus review process may have very 
negative consequences due to the cyclical nature of the initial offerings market, which 
experiences hot and cold periods both in Canada and the United States (Kooli and 
Suret, 2003b).  The market is very receptive during hot periods and issuers may 
obtain significantly higher amounts for a given share of control during these periods.  
Moreover, significant delays in the issuing process may cause companies to not have 
funds when needed for an acquisition or investment, considering that hot issues 
markets are of relatively short duration.  
2.4.1  The American Situation 
The duration of the prospectus review process has recently been examined in the 
United States.  In his report on SEC operations, the American auditor general (GAO) 
wrote (GAO-02-302, p. 17):  SEC said that IPOs are a priority and that every IPO 
gets a full review process.  Industry officials said that it generally takes SEC 4 to 7 
weeks to complete a review process. Requests for exemptions, however, require more 
time and the American auditor general mentioned average delays of three to six   46
months, with extreme cases requiring more than one year:  A 1996 SEC inspector 
general report noted that is was not unusual for the length of time required for staff 
review to be a year or longer due to the complexity of the issues, the lack of delegated 
authority, or workload pressures. 
Practitioners have a more negative perspective than the GAO on the handling of 
prospectuses by the SEC, even though they recognize that there has been significant 
improvement.    Michael Lytton, of Palmer & Dodge LLP, writes:  generally, the 
process of public financings has been significantly accelerated. Follow-on offerings 
now take about a month; IPOs about three—that's about a month less than usual for 
each.
42  The review period of one to three months is also mentioned by Hausman 
43. 
2.4.2  The Canadian Situation 
The average processing time for a receipt application for a prospectus filed in Quebec 
under the MRRS and outside the MRRS has been studied, using CVMQ data, from a 
sampling of 1,455 prospectuses, including 660 mutual fund issues and 795 
prospectuses of other corporations.  
Under the MRRS, the principal authority examines the documents and issues the 
comment letter within ten working days following receipt of the preliminary 
prospectus. Subsequently, each authority other than the principal authority must, 
within five working days following receipt of the comment letter from the principal 
authority, make its own comments, if any. The principal authority sends the 
comments to the issuer, who has enough time to respond. Once the authorities are 
satisfied, the principal authority issues a final decision document for the prospectus.  
The short form prospectus review is identical, except that the time for review by the 
relevant authorities is respectively three days and a day and a half. 
Table 6 shows the results of an analysis of review times from a sample of 
distributions by prospectus conducted in Quebec and elsewhere in Canada under the 
MRRS or outside the MRRS from January 1, 1999 to September 30, 2002.  The 
results are divided according to whether it is a mutual fund or not. 
 
                                                 
42 http://www.palmerdodge.com/dspSingleArticle.cfm?ArticleID=155. 
43 Hausman, M. Going Public? Tips for Successful IPO Communications.  
http://www.expertmagazine.com/artman/publish/article_195.shtml.   47
2.4.3  Companies other than mutual funds 
The sampling includes 795 prospectus applications for which a receipt was obtained 
within an average of 19 working days. It is useful to distinguish long form 
prospectuses from short form prospectuses. The average review time is around thirty 
and eight days respectively. A distinction was also made between IPOs and other 
prospectuses for secondary issues, for which review is slightly quicker on average. 
Table 6 shows the results.  
Receipts for IPO prospectuses and short form prospectuses are granted within similar 
times, whether the CVMQ acts as principal or secondary authority.  Delays are longer 
for long form prospectuses for secondary issues when the CVMQ is the principal 
authority because of the type of corporation and the nature of the securities in 
question.  Quebec-only distributions are often conducted by small corporations or for 
non-traditional securities, which calls for a more complete and detailed review.   
Overall, the MRRS has allowed a reduction in the time required to obtain a receipt 
from 36 to 30 days for IPOs, from nine to eight days for short form prospectuses and 
from 31 to 27 days for distributions where the CVMQ acts as secondary authority.  
2.4.4  Mutual funds                            
The sampling includes 660 mutual fund prospectuses receipted within 41 days on 
average. Obtaining a receipt for a short form prospectus takes under 40 days on 
average when Quebec is the secondary authority, whereas it took 44 days before the 
MRRS. 
The difference between review times for mutual fund prospectuses and other 
corporations is due to the nature of these distributions. They are permanent 
distributions which may be continued indefinitely, if the mutual fund meets certain 
conditions
44.  The mutual fund has at least fifty days and up to twelve months to have 
the prospectus reviewed in the following year and to thereby extend the distribution 
period.  During this transition, the mutual fund may continue to distribute units, 
which gives it the necessary latitude to file its application for a receipt and answer 
comments made by authorities.  The window of opportunity concept is thus much less 
significant for these institutions. 
                                                 
44 Sections 33 and 34 of the Act.   48
Table 6:  Average review time for applications for distribution by prospectus 
under the MRRS and outside the MRRS according to type of corporation and 
nature of prospectus:  January 1, 1999 to September 30, 2002 
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Source: Commission des valeurs mobilières du Québec, 2002. 
 
2.4.5  Venture capital exits 
We can also learn about the obstacles that regulatory structures can put up for the 
financing of growth companies through a comparative analysis of the exit strategies 
of venture capital companies. Cumming and MacIntosh (2000, 2002) studied these 
strategies in the United States and Canada.  
In an initial article, the authors submit that greater Canadian regulation could 
influence exit strategies for the following reasons:     49
•  More strict regulation for direct investors (angels) and related investors (love 
money); 
•  The fact that regulation has inhibited the development of a secondary market for 
investment in small-cap securities; 
•  A regulatory environment seemingly more favourable to small companies in the 
United States than in Canada. 
There are differences between the exit methods of venture capital companies as Table 
7, taken from the results of Cumming and MacIntosh (2002), shows. 
 
Table 7:  Comparison of exit methods for venture capital companies  
Exit Method          United States   Canada 
Write-off 29.5%  20.1% 
IPO   26.8%  26.9% 
Acquisition 26.8%  11.9% 
Sale    8%  9% 
Buyback 5.3%  30.6% 
Other 3.6%  1.5% 
 
The proportion of initial offerings is identical in the two countries, and it is therefore 
difficult to argue that multiple jurisdictions inhibit this type of operation in Canada.  
This finding is consistent with results which show the efficiency in terms of cost and 
time of IPO review in Canada.  Buybacks are more frequent in Canada, whereas 
acquisitions are more common in the United States.  
It is difficult to attribute this difference to regulatory provisions and this result 
certainly has much to do with the much lower amounts Canadian venture capital 
companies invest. The authors write, moreover, that: further study should be 
undertaken of the impact of securities regulatory requirements on small firms and on 
the venture capital community, in order to ensure that the regulatory burden is not 
excessive.    50
The authors refer to findings on regulatory provisions by MacIntosh (1994), which 
clearly do not take into account recent changes to holding periods and private 
placements.  
In a second article, Cumming and MacIntosh (2002) show that differences in return 
between venture capital companies in the two countries is, in part, associated with the 
choice of exit strategy for investments and whether the exit is partial or total.  Legal 
considerations may explain discrepancies between the exit methods relating to hold 
periods, which are longer in Canada than in the United States.  However, this period 
has been cut back recently (2001) to four months for most provinces.  Moreover, 
many other factors, such as the average amount invested, experience of the officers of 
venture capital companies and liquidity may be used to explain the findings noted.  
Finally, regulatory factors referred to are related to differences which exist during the 
analysis period and not to the structure of Canadian regulation.  
There are therefore differences between the exit methods for venture capital 
distributions in the United States and Canada, but nothing points to the Canadian 
regulatory structure, although certain provisions, now amended, could have been 
factors which would explain these differences.  Here again, the level and nature of 
regulation is at issue, not the provincial structure of such regulation.  
2.5 Regulatory Costs for Issuers and Intermediaries   
The argument for diversity of securities legislation appears in the Porter Report 
(1964)
45, which notes only the faltering progress  made toward uniformity of 
securities legislation between the provinces.  
Harris (2002) considers that, with the exception of the lack of resources of provincial 
commissions, all the factors identified by the Porter Report are still relevant in 2002.  
Moreover, considerable efforts have been made to harmonize laws and regulations, 
and it is useful to update the Porter analysis. 
To consider that the situation which prevailed in 1964 is still valid in 2002 for 
securities regulation in Canada fails to take into account significant efforts made by 
the CSA for several years which we discussed in Part 1. During this period, securities 
laws were largely harmonized and there are generally only differences in specific 
sections.  The uniformity blueprint tabled in January 2003 completes this important 
work and may allow the use of passports. Although certain differences, such as the 
                                                 
45 Royal Commission on Banking and Finance, Report 561 (Porter Report).   51
characteristics of exempt investors, still remain, they are under review and will 
probably be eliminated.  The situation in Canada in 2003 cannot be considered the 
same as it was at the beginning of the 1960s.  
2.5.1  Prospectus Review and Exemption 
The MRRS does not ensure uniformity in the administration of securities laws 
across Canada. Each jurisdiction keeps decision-making power and may apply 
Canadian standards as it pleases and apply local requirements to any matter 
submitted to it.  In addition, a regulatory body may not participate in the MRRS if it 
is not in agreement with the decision made by the principal regulatory authority. 
The possibility that one or more bodies may not participate means that the MRRS 
has not created a completely transparent or uniform framework for securities 
regulation.   
The MRRS has therefore not completely eliminated the additional costs of multiple 
regulation for issuers and intermediaries.  Staff in non-principal jurisdictions may 
conduct an independent examination of documents filed in several jurisdictions.   
Market participants still have to pay fees in each jurisdiction as they did before the 
adoption of the MRRS. Only a system of mutual recognition would allow 
incontrovertible cost reduction
46. 
Provincial laws are not uniform but decisions are made based on national standards. 
USL should therefore increase the degree of uniformity.   
For the moment, there are differences, for example with respect to exemptions from 
the prospectus and registration requirements, public offerings, continuous 
disclosure and power of enforcement.  The MRRS does not exempt participants 
from the requirement of being familiar with the different requirements which exist 
across the country, obtaining advice about them and complying with the different 
systems. According to the proponents of centralization, enormous costs are 
associated with this process. However, we have not found any estimate of these 
additional costs, and the use of national standards makes the existence of such costs 
unlikely.   
 
                                                 
46 In Part 4 we will discuss the difficulties the European Community had setting up such a system.   52
2.5.2 Disclosure     
At the beginning of 1997, the CSA launched an electronic system for meeting filing 
requirements by public corporations and mutual funds in Canada. SEDAR (System 
for Electronic Document Analysis and Retrieval) allows the transmission, receipt, 
approval, review and dissemination of documents filed electronically.  More than half  
a million documents have been filed since 1997.  The procedure is the following
47.  
Issuers file their disclosure documents with the CSA through SEDAR and, after 
reviewing them, the regulatory authorities make the appropriate documents public. 
Certain documents are not systematically reviewed by the authorities:  these are 
disclosure documents such as financial statements, press releases, notices of meetings 
and annual returns
48. 
SEDAR facilitates the filing of documents with securities authorities.  It allows 
filings to be made electronically, in a single step, with all Canadian authorities.   
Electronic filing is governed by National Instrument 13-101, which is enforced in 
each jurisdiction through local legislation.  In certain cases, the local legislation 
changes provisions of the National Instrument.  Filers must be aware of the National 
Instrument, local enforcement legislation and the securities legislation and directives 
of each province or territory.
49  
We have not discovered any empirical evidence which would allow us to state that 
multiple jurisdictions lead to additional disclosure costs in Canada.      
2.6 Regulatory Costs for Governments 
MacIntosh (2002) believes that costs for securities regulation on a per capita basis are 
higher in Canada.  Chant and Mohindra (2001) criticize the higher costs of the 
Canadian system for governments. 
2.6.1  Problems of measurement  
Very little data exists allowing a comparison of costs, for governments, of securities 
regulation.  Moreover, in any analysis of this type it is useful to take into account 
both costs and benefits, which are difficult to measure, as the ultimate goal is to 
                                                 
47 http://www.cds.ca/cdshome.nsf/Main-F?OpenFrameSet&Frame=content&Src=Pages%2F-FR-
SEDARSCRIBE%3FOpen. 
48 Although these documents are not systematically analysed, they may be studied in detail.  In March 
2003, for example, the CSA undertook an analysis of the management reports of public companies. 
49 SEDAR Filer Manual, p. vi.   53
arrive at a situation where the marginal cost of regulation is equal to the marginal 
benefit issuers and investors derive from it.  Several studies, for example Chant and 
Mohindra (2001, p. 39), use comparable data presented by the U.K. Financial 
Services Authority (FSA, 2001) to show that securities regulatory costs related to 
total market capitalization are higher in Canada than any other country. 
Such comparisons, however, are very difficult to make for several reasons.  The 
structures and missions of various securities regulatory organizations differ from 
country to country.  In several cases, entities other than securities commissions are 
involved.  For example, France has, in addition to the Commission des opérations de 
Bourse [stock exchange commission] (COB), created in 1967, the Conseil des 
marchés financiers [council of financial markets] (CMF), created in 1996, and the 
Conseil de discipline de la gestion financière [disciplinary council for financial 
management], created in 1988.  The FSA figures only take into account the COB.  In 
addition, FSA data for the United States does not take into account State securities 
commissions (CESR report). Nevertheless, as Ciocca (2001) points out, the United 
States has remained faithful to a division of responsibilities in which the types of body 
entrusted with supervision are highly diversified, with (…) 6 for financial supervision 
(covering markets, insurance companies and pension funds with 137 local offices and 
some 8000 employees). In addition, it is necessary to consider the self regulatory 
bodies of the 9 most important financial markets. Aware of these limits, in 2003 the 
FSA fine-tuned the calculation of costs and henceforth takes into account four 
components of the cost of securities regulation
50. Direct costs associated with these 
components are £73.8 million in Australia, 56.8 in Canada, 37 in the United Kingdom 
and 977.3 in the United States. Reported as total capitalization, the percentages are 
0.029 %,  0.015 %,  0.004 %  and  0.014 %  respectively.  However, the duties of 
regulatory organizations are more a function of the number of reporting issuers than 
capitalization. It is possible to calculate a cost per reporting issuer.  It is $123,000 in 
Australia, $33,600 in Canada, $37,300 in the United Kingdom and $324,700 in the 
United States (Schedule 2). It is therefore difficult to claim, on this basis, that the 
direct costs of regulation are higher in Canada than in other countries with similar 
market practices. 
Secondly, outside the regulatory structure, the amount of oversight is a key element 
which may affect the expense level of the organizations.  It was clear in 2001 that the 
level was inadequate in the United States and additional funding was given to the 
SEC, the budget of which went from $372 to 473 million between 2000 and 2002.  
Under corporate clean-up legislation, the SEC budget should reach US$776 million.  
                                                 
50 These headings are: 1) Securities firms and fund management firms - prudential supervision, 2) 
Supervision of and standards for exchanges / clearing and settlement systems / market service 
providers 3) Supervision of, and standards for conduct on, capital markets (including transaction 
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American authorities have thus recognized the inadequacy of SEC funding.  Finally, a 
comparison of amounts devoted to funding commissions should take into account the 
level of activity they face. Capitalization is, in this respect, a mediocre indicator.  The 
number of listed corporations and especially the number of new issues should be 
used.  On this point, Canada cannot be compared to European countries.  From 1991 
to 2000, there were 1,891 IPOs in Canada, whereas during the period 1990 to 2000, 
Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2002) count 2,861 IPOs for fifteen European markets, 
including the main ones. In 2000, Canada was the 2
nd world market in terms of 
number of listed corporations, whereas France was in 8
th position, and the first 
European country, the UK, was in 4
th place. 
2.6.2  Costs and benefits of regulation  
Chant and Mohindra (2001)-type comparisons assume that it is best to spend as little 
as possible to regulate the financial sector.  Three points should, however, be made.  
Firstly, the comparative analysis of the FSA (2002) does not lead to the conclusion 
that the cost of securities regulation is abnormally high in Canada in relation to the 
United States. The under-financing of the SEC, as confirmed by the GOA, is 
significant and we cannot say that it is the cost of optimal regulation. Secondly, the 
2003 study of the FSA clearly shows that costs related to capitalization or per listed 
company are lower in Canada than in the United States. 
Thirdly, financial and accounting problems in the years 2001 and 2002 have 
demonstrated the enormous costs which may be caused by inadequate securities 
regulation.  The Enron bankruptcy and other scandals, associated in large part with 
oversight failures in the United States, have cost it hundreds of billions of dollars, an 
amount far beyond the cost of regulation.  Moreover, it is not clear that centralization 
of securities in Canada will result in significant cost reduction.  A Canadian 
commission should probably keep offices in most provinces, as the SEC does in 
eleven regions. 
2.6.3  Regulatory cost and taxation 
In the United States, the cost of securities regulation paid by issuers and 
intermediaries represents an actual tax, paid to the Treasury, of which the SEC only 
gets a small part.  In 2001, the SEC collected around $2.1 billion, and its total funding 
was $423 million.  Amounts paid by issuers and intermediaries thus represent five 
times the cost of operating the regulatory body. This amount is even higher than what 
the United States spends on all regulation and oversight of the “business” sector, 
including the commerce department and bodies related to international trade and 
competition, which, including the SEC, had a total budget of $1.8 billion in 2001.   55
Legal changes in 2001 reduced amounts collected by the SEC, which no longer 
expects to collect more than $1.3 billion in 2003, for an anticipated operating cost of 
$467 million.  It seems that this onerous tax on operations related to regulation has 
not affected the rapid development of the American securities market.  
In Canada, commissions also collect amounts higher than their operating costs, but 
the difference between amounts collected and operating costs is less than the United 
States (Chant and Mohindra, 2001).  In addition, a refund system allows commissions 
to reimburse the overpayment of fees collected, not required for reserves. 
In conclusion, it appears, firstly, that securities regulation may be a profit centre 
rather than a cost centre for some governments.  A tax reduction given by various 
governments to issuers and intermediaries may well be a more efficient and rapid 
way to reduce the regulatory burden for companies than any regulatory restructuring.  
Secondly, incomplete data given respecting the cost of certain regulatory bodies does 
not allow us to qualify regulatory costs in Canada since no type of regulation has so 
far been proven to be the optimal one. As with several arguments put forward to date, 
we can only conclude that available empirical results are very incomplete.  
2.7 Conclusion 
To a large extent, we must agree with the conclusions of Daniels (1992) and Harris 
(2002) to the effect that very little evidence can support statements respecting costs 
caused by the current regulatory situation for securities in Canada.  Daniels observed 
in 1992 that statements by participants in the regulatory debate were supported by 
practically no proof and deplored the almost total lack of empirical research on these 
matters.  
In 2002, Harris (p. iv) wrote that the debate in Canada typically has not been 
informed by robust empirical analysis and suffers from a lack of current empirical 
data on the central issues in respect of Canadian securities regulation.  He states 
(p.83) there is, therefore, a pressing need for a comprehensive and methodologically 
sound study of the incremental costs associated with the current regulatory system, 
focusing in particular on each of the categories of incremental costs. 
Empirical proof with respect to the costs of initial offerings is convergent and it 
shows that the initial offering process is less costly in Canada.  This work is not, 
however, specifically dedicated to pointing out the additional costs related to 
regulation.  In other words, it is possible that changes, and in particular moving in the 
direction of mutual recognition (studied in Part 4), will allow additional cost   56
reductions.  The works show, however, that the present structure does not create a 
comparative disadvantage as compared to the more centralized American structure.  
Data relating to the costs caused by regulatory bodies does not lead to any 
conclusion, since the balance of the regulatory costs and benefits is the key element 
in the debate. The reduction in SEC operating costs, as a function of the activity to be 
overseen, can certainly not be characterized as optimal. 
Finally, no attention is given in the current debate to the problem of trading costs or 
market quality.  It is as if the dynamism of the Canadian market is solely related to 
regulatory costs.  This is a mistake which we will try to partially correct in Part 6.    57
PART 3 
3- VARIOUS ARGUMENTS 
We will now study various arguments regularly invoked to justify revision of the 
Canadian regulatory system. They are: Canadian weakness on the international level, 
response times, accounting manipulation and the ineffectiveness of attempts at 
uniformity. 
3.1 Canadian weakness on the international level 
This argument in put forward by MacIntosh (2002), who believes that market 
globalization argues in favour of a single securities regulator in Canada.  Canada 
must speak with one voice.  This argument is also repeated in the MacKay letter. 
Market globalization clearly raises the question of the possible uniformity of rules 
and regulations.  As Carmen Crépin, Chair of the CVMQ, points out, the CVMQ and 
other Canadian securities regulators are actively participating in making uniform 
rules, at both the national and international level
51.  
The CVMQ brief to the Standing Senate Committee on Banking, Trade and 
Commerce respecting the report of the Task Force on the Future of the Canadian 
Financial Services Sector (October 23, 1998, p. 20) is explicit: 
[Translation] We believe that it is incorrect to say that Canada has less 
international influence in the securities industry that in banking or 
insurance.  As proof, the International Organization of Securities 
Commissions (IOSCO), an umbrella group of securities authorities 
from 90 countries, was created by private statute in Quebec (S.Q. 
1987, chap. 43).  Since that time, the role of the Commission and the 
other CSA’s in that international body has certainly not diminished.  
IOSCO was created with the goal of exchanging information to develop efficient 
markets and implement common standards.  The principles of cooperation in 
                                                 
51 June 8, 2000 speech by Ms. Crépin, “La vision stratégique de la CVMQ face à la mondialisation des 
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securities matters defined by this body are the following (IOSCO Objectives and 
Principles of Securities Regulations, February 2002): 
1.  The regulator should have authority to share both public and non-
public information with domestic and foreign counterparts. 
2.  Regulators should establish information sharing mechanisms that set 
out when and how they will share both public and non-public 
information with their domestic and foreign counterparts. 
3.  The regulatory system should allow for assistance to be provided to 
foreign regulators who need to make inquiries in the discharge of their 
functions and exercise of their powers. 
On the other hand, the multiple solutions proposed by the European Community 
range from multilateral agreements establishing a minimal level of requirements 
which local authorities may reinforce as needed (the current situation), to complete 
uniformity (Cox, 2002, Di Giorgio and Di Noia 2002); while Di Giorgio et al (2002) 
present a very uniform and centralized vision of European financial market 
regulation, contrary opinions come in particular from England.  There are two ways 
to address the problem:  
1)  The issue of globalization put Canada squarely in a situation of regulatory 
competition, not internally but in relation to other countries.  
The issue is therefore to determine how Canada can give itself the highest 
performing regulatory system possible to attract foreign companies and keep 
domestic ones.  We should therefore ask how to achieve the best level of 
regulation.  For some it is regulatory monopoly, while for others it is by 
creating regulatory competition.  These two arguments are analysed in depth 
in Part 4. 
2)  The second way consists in analysing the strategy set up by the European 
Community.  As we will also show in Part 4, Europe has set up a model which 
avoids a regulatory monopoly and leaves room for regulatory competition 
within a framework, however, of minimal standards.   59
The argument of sole representation for Canada at the international level can hardly 
be considered significant. The existence and initiatives of the CSA show that the 
degree of cooperation between securities commissions is high and common 
viewpoints strong. The argument may therefore be reversed.  Is Canada’s influence 
not greater because it has four representatives at the international level (IOSCO), 
when these representatives work together closely on most matters? 
3.2 Jurisdictional conflicts 
Jurisdictions are blurred and participants are faced with thirteen different jurisdictions 
for penal proceedings. The compartmentalization of Canadian securities authorities 
also makes complex situations involving investors, intermediaries and issuers located 
in various jurisdictions unmanageable. Very recently, the argument appeared 
(MacKay letter) that securities laws are not always applied.   
We note firstly that the jurisdictional problem exists world-wide, not only in Canada.  
The few cases generally put forward to illustrate the Canadian problem have their 
equivalent in the international market. One answer to the problem of multiple 
jurisdictions is the principle of cooperation.  
This principle was acknowledged in 2000 by the Supreme Court of Canada
52, which 
reversed the lower court decisions and upheld the power of securities authorities to 
collaborate in their areas of authority. Moreover, the revision of the European 
directive deals directly with this question, which is solved with the help of: 1) a clear 
definition of roles and responsibilities, 2) the setting up of a process of complete 
cooperation between authorities and 3) an agreement on the exchange of information.  
The problem of interjurisdictional authority is, moreover, one of the elements which 
lead to the European investment service directive (ISD 93). 
The plan to establish uniform securities legislation in Canada is the tangible result of 
work which sought to assess the relevance and feasibility of a common legislative 
framework for the different provincial and territorial authorities in Canada.  In this 
regard, according to Ms. Crépin, Chair of the CVMQ, [Translation] “Quebec has 
made its position known on this issue and has agreed to work towards harmonization 
rather than seeking uniformity”
53.  Quebec is the only Canadian province governed 
by a civil code, as the legal systems of the other provinces are all based on common 
law.  Uniformity in this matter is therefore not possible in Quebec, given its distinct 
                                                 
52 British Columbia Securities Commission v. Global Securities Corporation (2000) 1 S.C.R. 494. 
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legislative framework. Bill 57 (S.Q. 2001, c. 38) gave additional regulatory authority 
to the CVMQ, which may allow rapid harmonization. 
3.3 Response times  
The Canadian regulatory system responds slowly to rapid changes in the industry 
because of the need for cooperation from the different organizations involved.  We 
wonder whether response by a large specialized commission would be any faster. 
Response times of a regulatory body in the face of changes can be broken down into 
three parts: acknowledgement, analysis and the decision to act, or changes and 
implementation.  It seems clear that multiple commissions must cooperate with each 
other before implementing change and this part of the process may be slower in a 
decentralized system than in a single system.  This may or may not be counter-
productive, as the consultation process often allows the final “product” to be 
improved.  However, the effect of decentralization on other aspects of the process is 
largely undetermined, and arguments may be made either way.   
Acknowledgement of the problem:  
•  A central commission may have greater research and examination resources and 
acknowledge changes or problems more quickly; 
•  However, provincial commissions are closer to companies and investors and may 
be better at discovering the needs of participants and local problems;  
•  Several regulatory departments may see different problems, with different 
approaches. 
For example, the Alberta Securities Commission reacted in 1986 to the problem of 
market entry for small-cap companies with the capital pools program.  We can only 
guess if and when such a program would have been created in a centralized system, 
but it should be pointed out that Ontario and Quebec, respectively, only adapted and 
then adopted this program several years after it was launched out west.  
Analysis and proposals for solutions:  
•  A centralized commission may have more resources and devote more staff to the 
study of a problem and consultation on possible solutions; but    61
•  The decision-making process in large organizations is not necessarily more rapid; 
and  
•  The undue influence of pressure groups is less likely when there are several 
regulatory organizations. 
In conclusion, although solutions may be implemented more quickly in a centralized 
system, it is not clear that the discovery of problems and proposals for a solution are 
faster.  It is also likely that local problems will simply be forgotten.  
3.4 The accounting manipulation argument 
It seems paradoxical to invoke financial scandals which mainly affected American 
businesses to invoke securities centralization in Canada, as the chairman of the OSC 
did
54.  These abuses occurred mainly in a country where the essentials of securities 
regulation for large companies are under the jurisdiction of the federal government 
and a single commission, the SEC. A study of this argument is, however, an 
interesting occasion to gauge the steps and effects of intervention by a central 
government in the securities industry.  
For several authors such as Coffee (2002a), the Enron affair and other cases are the 
result of federal intervention in the field of securities regulation, in two main ways. A 
group of statutes has greatly limited the possibility of lawsuits in securities and the 
resources of the SEC have progressively weakened. According to Coffee, a series of 
decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court has reduced the possibility of lawsuits in the 
field of securities and various elements have played a decisive role in the progressive 
weakening of barriers able to limit malfeasance by directors.  These elements are set 
out below, after a brief survey of the American regulatory context for securities. 
Up to 1933, American securities markets were regulated at the State level.  The 
Securities Act of 1933 set up a system whereby businesses must comply with federal 
rules as well as those of the States.  Under pressure from businesses and the securities 
industry, which complained of inefficiencies caused by a double layer of regulation, 
in 1996 Congress significantly changed securities regulation. The adoption of 
NSMIA was a step towards a single regulatory system which, however, left certain 
powers to the States.  
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The States could therefore no longer register or require compliance of securities 
known as “covered securities”
55, which henceforth are the responsibility of the SEC.  
It can define what is included in the category of covered securities itself, by adding 
exchanges to the list drawn up by NSMIA or by defining the term “qualified 
purchaser”.  For example, under NSMIA, securities listed on the NYSE, the AMEX 
and NASDAQ are covered securities.  In 1998, the SEC decided that securities listed 
on Tier 1 of  the Pacific Exchange, the Chicago Board Options Exchange and Tier 1 
of the Philadelphia Stock Exchange are also covered securities.  The States retain the 
power to investigate and penalize for fraud and malfeasance respecting securities, 
disclosure and fees.  
NSMIA mainly benefits large issuers by significantly lessening regulatory 
requirements and costs of issuance. Issuers of covered securities are no longer 
required to register in each State. Certain States conduct an in-depth analysis of offers 
submitted to them (merit review), and may refuse to authorize an offer perceived as 
too risky for invertors. The SEC essentially makes an analysis based on disclosure 
(disclosure review). Its objective is not to prevent an investor from making a bad 
investment, but to ascertain whether the investor has sufficient information to 
consider the quality of the offer. By eliminating the merit  review for covered 
securities, NSMIA may have indirectly helped reduce investor protection
56.  Finally, 
the Uniform Securities Act (2002), a framework securities statute for the States, was 
adopted on January 4, 2003 by American securities authorities
57. It allows the States 
to harmonize their securities laws while recognizing that they may keep local 
differences potentially important for investor protection. 
The taking over of regulation and the power to sue by the federal government is 
recent. The 1995 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA), intended to limit 
the risk of frivolous lawsuits in the field of securities, was adopted despite the veto by 
President Clinton.  The main provisions of this statute were:  1) raising the standards 
for lawsuits in the securities area well above the level which existed for cases of 
fraud, 2) substitution of the concept of proportional liability for the concept of joint 
                                                 
55 This category includes securities of businesses or investment funds traded on the national level and 
subject to federal registration requirements, securities proposed to sophisticated investors and 
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56 For some non-covered securities, the Coordinated Equity Review Program, implemented in 1997, 
allows the analysis procedure to be coordinated between different States.  An issuer makes its offer to 
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57 www.nasaa.org.  This Act has to be passed by each State legislature next.   63
and several liability, and limiting penalties which could be imposed on auditors and 
brokers, 3) restricting the scope of RICO (Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organization) status so that lawsuits in securities can no longer go from damage 
proceedings to triple damage proceedings and 4) the adoption of safe harbour 
protection
58 for past information which makes conducting a lawsuit much more 
difficult  
The first effect of the PSLRA is to change the nature of evidence.  Henceforth, it 
must be shown that management of the business sued committed fraud deliberately. 
The PSLRA also imposes penalties on plaintiffs convicted of frivolous lawsuits.  For 
many, the provisions of the PSLRA discourage not only frivolous lawsuits but also 
well-founded lawsuits. President Clinton thus wrote in his notice of opposition that 
the PSLRA have the effect of closing the court house doors on investors who have 
legitimate claims (Ali and Kallapur, 2001). Several researchers and American 
organizations have tried to measure the effects of this Act.  Its coming into force was 
accompanied by abnormally low returns for securities in the sectors most likely to be 
sued, such as computer technology, electronics, pharmaceuticals and biotechnology 
as well as individual portfolio management.  The PSLRA was therefore viewed 
unfavourably by investors because of the restrictions imposed on potential private 
lawsuits in the field of securities. California Proposition 211, which reversed the 
majority of elements of the PSLRA, was defeated and this announcement also 
negatively influenced markets in the sectors concerned (Ali and Kallapur, 2001).   
Several researchers also studied the rate of lawsuits after adoption of the Act. A 
temporary lessening was observed in lawsuits over securities, of which the frequency 
later increased (Bajaj et al, 2000 and Stanford University
59), without significant 
variation being detected. The post-PSLRA period saw a very high number accounting 
readjustments and therefore the possibility of lawsuits.  It is therefore difficult to say 
that the post- and pre-PSLRA eras are similar.  Thomas and Martin (1997) maintain 
that the PSLRA substantially increase the difficulty of uncovering securities fraud 
and recommend using State legislation.  
In fact, this is what a majority of plaintiffs do, as the Bliley Report on PSLRA to the 
House of Representatives
60 reports that since enactment of that legislation 
considerable evidence has been presented to Congress that a number of securities 
class action lawsuits have shifted from Federal to State courts.  The more restrictive 
                                                 
58 See Poullet, Y., The Safe Harbor Principles –An adequate protection?  Text presented at the 
meeting of the IFCLA, Paris, June 15 and 16, 2000, http://www.juriscom.net/uni/doc/20000617.htm 
for a study of this idea. 
59 The Stanford University law faculty web site entitled  Securities Class Action Clearinghouse gives a 
great deal of data and several articles on securities lawsuits in the United States:   
http://securities.stanford.edu/. 
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conditions for lawsuits under the PSLRA have therefore lead to a transfer of cases 
from the federal level to that of the States (Ten Things Report)
61.  To counter this 
movement, the American government adopted the Securities Litigation Uniform 
Standard Act (SLUSA) in 1998.  This statute governs lawsuits at the State level.  It is 
based on the argument that securities class actions belong in federal court because 
they are national in character.  This statute lead to opposition by a large number of 
securities law specialists as well as the chairman of the SEC, A. Levitt, who later 
backed it (Painter, 1998). 
For several authors and jurors, the PSLRA had the advantage of placing issuers and 
intermediaries under the same statute, which was not the case when lawsuits were 
taken at the State level.  Thus a national market applied a national law.  However, as 
writers Weiss et al (2000) and Loomis (2000) described, different circuit courts 
applied the uniform act in an extremely varied manner, by taking diametrically 
opposed positions on significant aspects such as insider trading
62.  The experience of 
the PSLRA shows that the imposition of centralized regulation and the referral of 
lawsuits to the federal level is not synonymous with setting up national criteria.  The 
authors agree that lawsuits have become more difficult, and that cases were first 
transferred to the State level. As Perino mentions (2002):   
The picture that emerges (…) is that the PSLRA did not work as 
intended. This article demonstrates that as many or more class 
actions are filed after the Act as before. High technology issuers 
remain at significantly greater risk than issuers in other industries. 
There is statistically significant evidence, however, that suggests 
that the Act improved overall case quality at least in the circuit 
that most strictly interprets one of the Act's key provisions, a 
heightened pleading standard.  
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F3d 970, affirming a 1997 decision from the Northern District of California, requires pleadings to 
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the ruling in Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F3d 300, although the parties disagree as to the grounds of the 
affirmance.    65
At the end of 2001 and 2002, the SLUSA tried to put an end to several lawsuits 
initially commenced at the State level.  They dealt with the issue of fixed-income 
securities
63 and brokers against whom three cases had to be abandoned
64. In 
particular, the lawsuit against Merrill Lynch
65, was considered to fall under the 
SLUSA and was prescribed.  In all the cases, the courts considered that the lawsuits 
taken at the State level could not have been because of the SLUSA. 
For Coffee (2002a), the PSLRA and the SLUSA are in keeping with the wish to 
impose national rules for securities lawsuits and may be directly associated with the 
reduction in the possibilities of lawsuits and the emergence of much financial and 
accounting fraud. It is still early to judge the long-term effects of the important 
changes made since 1997 to the provisions governing securities lawsuits. In 
particular, it must be determined whether or not the cases abandoned at the State level 
are taken up at the federal level.  For the moment, it is possible to conclude that the 
wish to uniformize has not reached its goals, has limited the possibility of lawsuits 
and made proof more difficult.  Several indicators and several authors show that these 
statutes have not only limited frivolous lawsuits, but also closed the door on well-
founded lawsuits.  
However, as Painter points out (1998, p. 7), State private rights of action for 
securities fraud will continue to play a significant, albeit much reduced, role in the 
US securities markets
66. 
Finally the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, signed in November 1999 (which allowed the 
deregulation of the financial sector like the 1987 statute in Canada), abolished the 
provisions of the Glass Steagall Act which separated commercial banking from 
investment banking. Part of the problems related to conflicts of interest of analysts 
may also result from this change in the law.  
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address the problems that dual-forum class action litigation does create.   66
The wish of the American federal government to impose a uniform securities law 
seems to have had indirect negative effects. These interventions are seen by certain 
researchers as direct, although partial, causes of recent financial scandals. The 
exclusion of the States from lawsuits for securities having national scope eliminated 
several lawsuits and does not seem to have allowed uniformity of decisions.   
However, this effect was reinforced by the inaction and lack of means of the central 
regulatory body, the SEC
67. Based on the American example, it does not seem that 
the Enron affair can be a very solid argument to require uniform securities legislation 
in Canada. 
3.5 The SEC situation 
The existence of a single securities commission in no way guarantees the ability of a 
market to detect and control occurrences such as those which lead to the series of 
financial scandals in the United States.  
On this point, the analysis of Coffee (2002a) is completely parallel to that of the 
October 2002 Senate Committee Financial Oversight of Enron (FO Enron)
68 report.  
This report is extremely critical of the SEC.  It states (p. 5):  
The SEC staff failed to review any of Enron's post-1997 financial 
filings even though the company was undergoing significant growth 
and substantially changing the nature of its business and the SEC itself 
was aware that other gatekeepers, such as boards of directors and 
auditors, were proving increasingly unreliable…Had SEC staff 
reviewed these filings, they would have had an opportunity to uncover 
some of the problems with the company's financial practices that 
appear to have been signalled in those documents. In addition, the 
SEC staff made administrative determinations that allowed Enron to 
engage in certain accounting practices and exempted the company 
from certain regulatory requirements. Whether or not these decisions 
were reasonable at the time, what is particularly troubling is that the 
SEC lacked any procedures by which to monitor the effects of these 
determinations to see whether they were being applied appropriately by 
the company and/or whether the circumstances that underlay them had 
changed. The leeway afforded Enron by these determinations in certain 
                                                 
67 For a critique of the role of the SEC in the Enron affair, see:  Financial Oversight of Enron:  The 
SEC and Private-Sector Watchdog, Report of the Staff to the Senate Committee on Governmental 
Affairs, http://www.senate.gov/~gov_affairs/enron100702.htm.  
68 Financial Oversight of Enron: The SEC and Private-Sector Watchdog, Report of the Staff to the 
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cases appears in fact to have been abused by the company in ways that 
ultimately played a role in Enron's collapse. In short, the SEC's 
interactions with Enron reveal the downside to the Commission's 
largely reactive approach to market regulation and should provide an 
impetus for the Commission to reorient some of its activities toward 
more proactive anti-fraud measures. Unfortunately, although the 
Commission has stepped up its enforcement activities post-Enron, it 
has been less than proactive in attempting to address fraud at an 
earlier stage, before it becomes a corporate calamity.  
The committee notes the limited means of the SEC, but asks whether: the SEC is 
effectively functioning as the lead market watchdog that it was meant to be. For 
Romano (2002, p. 61): the pattern of rapid behavioural and procedural adjustment 
by market participants in the fallout from Enron’s collapse is a powerful indicator 
that increasing the regulatory authority of the SEC is not the sole or even a primary 
mechanism for deterring corporate fraud. It therefore seems risky to take the 
American model as a reference when determining how to fight fraud and accounting 
manipulation. It is essential to understand why the centralized system failed to such 
an extent.  
Various reports and studies, including the FO Enron report, Coffee’s study (2002) 
and various reports of the American Auditor General (GAO or United States General 
Accounting Office)
69 isolate the main explanations, which are full of information for 
studying Canadian proposals. The GAO-03-302 report indicates that, from 1980 to 
2000, trading volume increased thirty times in the United States and that the number 
of initial offerings in 2000 was fifty times what it was in 1980. The percentage of 
households investing in mutual funds went from a few percent to 52%.  During the 
same period, according to Dudley and Warren (2002), the SEC budget went from $72 
million to $372 million.  It therefore increased five times. The GAO estimates that 
between 1990 and 2000 the SEC’s workload increased by 80% and its resources by 
only 20%.  Not only are financial and human resources insufficient, information 
systems, including EDGAR, are considered inefficient and incomplete.  In 2001, the 
percentage of documents filed by companies subject to analysis or a mere overview 
was around 8%, whereas SEC officers believe this rate should be around 35%, which 
would allow review for each company every three years. 
                                                 
69 The main GAO studies respecting the SEC are: SEC Operations: Increased Workload Creates 
Challenges, GAO-02-302 ,  5 March 2002;  Securities And Exchange Commission: Human Capital 
Challenges Require Management Attention.  GAO-01-947 17 September 2001; Securities and 
Exchange Commission: Reviews of Accounting Matters Related to Public Filings, GAO-01-718 14 
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Chant and Mohindra (2001) compare pay for SEC officers and members with that of 
the Ontario and Alberta securities commissions, and suggest that Canadian pay scales 
are excessive. The GAO puts the pay problem at the centre of the SEC problem, 
where almost a third of the staff left the institution between 1998 and 2000, for 
reasons essentially related to pay (GAO-01-947).  
Pay at the senior levels is 50% lower than in the private sector, and significantly 
lower (18 to 39%) than that which exists in comparable government institutions.  
High turnover, the fact that a number of positions remain unfilled and the 
inexperience of part of the staff partially explain the problems experienced by the 
SEC.  Here again, we hesitate to conclude that Canadian pay scales are abnormally 
high in comparison with the American situation.  Those of the SEC seem to be overly 
low. 
3.6 Harmonization and diversity 
Despite national instruments and current initiatives, securities legislation is not 
completely harmonized. We have analysed these aspects in the section dealing with 
costs, as the main effect of a lack of uniformity is financial. The cooperation process 
set-up through the CSA is relatively recent and certain major initiatives (MRRS, 
SEDAR) were put in place after 1997, although attempts at cooperation through 
policy statements (C1 to C49) date back to the 1970’s.  This means that many of the 
conclusions of studies covering the previous period require major updating.   
Moreover, the CSA Strategic Plan
70 indicates clear acceptance of the problems still 
posed by the current situation. The harmonization process is continuing. It is, 
however, not clear that complete uniformity is desirable.  The very diverse nature of 
the Canadian market and local peculiarities mean that it can be considered a group of 
markets rather than a single market. 
Diversity of the Canadian securities market is revealed by the characteristics of 
companies on one hand and provincial initiatives on the other. Small western 
businesses have little in common with those at the heart of the Ontario economy, 
which are also different from medium-sized businesses central to the Quebec 
economy.  Moreover, independence with respect to securities has been used by 
various provinces to initiate programs meeting the needs of their respective 
customers—companies and investors. 
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3.6.1  Characteristics of companies  
Around 21% of Canadian corporations listed in 2002 are inoperative (Table 1, Part 
6.1.2).  Most listed companies are very small: 67% of operating companies have 
shareholder equity of less than $10 million.  More than 70% of companies with less 
than $10 million of equity are from British Columbia and Alberta.  Table 8 shows 
that 35% of traditional issues
71 in Canada are made by resource companies (mining, 
oil and gas) and essentially concentrated in two provinces.  Half (47%) of British 
Columbia issues are from mining companies.  This province represents 58% of all 
mining company issues in Canada between 1995 and 2000.  Alberta has 75% of oil 
and gas issues.  Ontario has more than 70% of issues by financial services companies, 
more than half the issues in the consumer products area and 39% of issues in 
technology.  In Quebec, 28% of issues are in technology and 22% come from 
manufacturing and the pharmaceutical sector. 
 
Table 8: Breakdown by sector and province of head office of traditional issues 
between 1991 and 2000             
Sector AB  BC  F  ON O  QC  Total
05 Agriculture and fishing  2 1 1      4
10 Mining  20 148 13 48  8  20  257
11 Oil and gas  126 20 7 3  2  2  160
1 5  R e a l  e s t a t e  ( c o n s t r u c t i o n )   4212       9
22 Consumer products  7 6 1 23  2  4  43
25 Technology  31 55 18 96  6  38  244
26 Manufacturing and others  16 18 4 32  2  17  89
28 Pharmaceutical products  7 6 3 13  2  12  43
40 Media and telecommunications  2 5 2 10  5  5  29
50  Business  1 7 19 2 5  34
60 Financial services, insurance,  real  estate  6 6 5 26 1 3  47
70 Services  4 11 1 16    2  34
71 Transportation, electricity, gas, and health 
care  4 2 7 2 2  17
9 9  U n c l a s s i f i e d   2344   1     1 4
Total 232 290 59 300  33  110  1024
Data from Financial Post lists, excluding capital pool company issues.  Technology issues exclude 
biotechnology, reclassified as pharmaceuticals AB: Alberta; BC: British Columbia; F: Foreign; ON: 
Ontario; O: other provinces; QC: Quebec. 
                                                 
71 Companies not participating in the capital pools program.   70
3.6.2  Provincial initiatives  
These initiatives include specific programs intended to encourage small business 
financing, such as capital pools launched in the West and programmes d’encadrement 
du développement in Quebec. The relative importance of government intervention is 
another source of differences between the provinces.  We will examine these two 
aspects successively. 
3.6.2.1 Programs promoting company financing 
The first junior capital pool was launched in Alberta jointly by the Alberta Securities 
Commission and the Alberta Stock Exchange in November 1986.  In 1997 the British 
Columbia Securities Commission and the Vancouver Stock Exchange adopted a 
similar program, the venture capital pool.  The current venture capital pool of the 
CDNX, started on March 1, 2000, replaces the two previous ones following the 
merger of the Vancouver and Alberta stock exchanges in November 1999.  It is the 
result of joint work by the Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba
72 and British Columbia 
securities commissions and the CDNX. In Ontario, the program has been in force 
since June 15, 2002, and in Quebec since November 12, 2002.  According to Policy 
2.4 of the TSX Venture Exchange
73, the goal of capital pool programs is to give 
companies an instrument to obtain financing more quickly than through a traditional 
public offering.  This program allows the creation of a listed corporation with no 
assets or business plan, no operating history, no assets except cash, and the sole goal 
of finding and acquiring assets or companies as take-over targets. Once the 
transaction, called a qualifying transaction, is complete, the new entity may be listed 
for regular trading.   
Table 9 shows the importance assumed by this program during the 1990’s:  there are 
868 issues relating to capital pools, as opposed to 1,023 traditional issues. The second 
part of Table 9 shows that almost 81% of capital pool issues are from Alberta and 
British Columbia. 
A comparison of Parts A and B of the table shows the relative importance of the 
capital pool program as a proportion of the total number of issues.  In Alberta, there 
are twice as many capital pools as conventional issues.  The capital pool program was 
later adopted by other provinces, in particular Ontario and Quebec (2002).  It is a 
product typical of the competition which exists between the provinces in securities 
                                                 
72 The Winnipeg Exchange joined the TSX Venture Exchange in November.  A similar program, the 
keystone company program, existed previously.  
http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/en/Regulation/Rulemaking/Policies/pol_41-601_20020412_np.pdf. 
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matters.  Experience in Alberta allowed, with successive adjustments, adoption of the 
program in most of Canada.  It is neither certain nor even likely that a single authority 
would have been able to design and promote such a program of an initially regional 
nature, which was responsible for more than half of IPO’s in Canada between 1995 
and 2000 (682 capital pool issues, as opposed to 659 traditional issues.)  
 
Table 9: Breakdown of activities of initial issues in Canada, 1991-2000, by 
province of head office of issuing corporation 
 
Part A 
Traditional Canadian IPO’s 
 
Province  1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Total 
AB  4  4  52 28 17 30 52 23 10 12  232 
BC  28 22 34 27 26 39 46 24 22 22  290 
F  7 2 2 8 9  13  9 5 4    59 
ON  11  9  39 46 26 38 50 28 29 23  299 
O  4 3 1 3 3 1 7 4 2 5  33 
QC      4 19 7  9 18  20 9  6 18  110 
Total  54 44  147  119  90  139  184  93 73 80  1023 
 
Part B 
Canadian IPO’s under capital pool program 
 
Province  1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Total 
AB  7  11 51 64 55 65 86 65 30 58  492 
BC      3  5  17 16 15 31 22 47 55  211 
F      1  4  2  4    1  12 
ON      3  3  11 10 14 16 27 11  5 100 
O     1 1 2 4 1 5 3 4 6  27 
QC         2 2 6 1 6 6 3  26 
Total  7  18  61 100 89 101  143  123 98 128  868 
Sources:  Financial Post, Report of New Issues, and  Cancorp Financials, www.sedar.com and 
www.cdnx.com. Province of incorporation: QC: Quebec, ON: Ontario, AB: Alberta, BC: British Columbia, 
O: Nova Scotia, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, New Brunswick, Newfoundland, Northwest Territories, PEI, 
Yukon, F: Foreign. 
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From 1970 to 1990, Quebec set up several programs to help capitalize and develop 
companies, and in particular the Quebec Stock Savings Plan (QSSP). When it was 
created in 1979, the QSSP had three goals: reduce the tax burden of high income 
taxpayers, encourage stock holding and facilitate the growth of long-term capital of 
companies.  It offered investors the possibility of deducting from their taxable income 
the cost of certain shares provided they were held for two years. At first, the 
deduction granted was the same no matter what size the issuing company was.  As a 
result, from 1979 to 1983 investors mainly purchased shares of large companies.   
Large and medium-sized companies were the main beneficiaries of the program.  The 
program was subsequently redirected to small-cap stocks.   
In 1983, the percentage of acquisition costs which could be deducted was changed 
according to size and type of securities
74.  In addition, from 1987, the deduction given 
for stocks of large corporations was limited to $1,000 per taxpayer.  The various 
amendments to the program directed investors towards shares of small-cap 
companies
75 and the QSSP became, in part, a program to help companies obtain 
capital.  
There are (or have been) other initiatives such as the Programme d’aide à la 
capitalisation  (PAC), investment in Quebec business investment companies 
(SPEQ’s), and a tax credit for amounts invested in the Quebec Solidarity Fund 
(FTQ).  These last two tax deduction programs lower the tax of taxpayers who, 
directly or indirectly, make an unsecured investment in eligible, generally small 
companies. Implementation of these programs is the result of successive interventions 
by various pressure groups, which based their arguments on the existence of 
disparities in financial markets. The QSSP and labour fund programs were 
subsequently adopted by other provinces. Lacroix (1987a and b) describes how the 
program was progressively adjusted and then adopted in the western provinces.   
Labour funds have also been set up in several provinces, which have thus 
progressively adopted programs of the same type but still differ greatly on the relative 
significance of government intervention in the area of corporate financing.   
                                                 
74 There are four categories of companies: large, intermediate, emerging and others as well as two 
types of securities:  common and subordinate.  Large companies have over $250 M of assets (since 
1987) whereas the assets of emerging companies is between $ 2 and 50 M. Intermediate companies are 
between these two limits whereas the category of “other” companies includes those whose assets are 
less than $2 M. For each category, a lower deduction percentage was attached to subordinate 
securities. 
75 Since January 1, 1988, an investment fund may also be eligible for the QSSP. A QSSP fund agrees 
to use all or part of the funds collected to make investments in shares eligible for the QSSP, and lets 
investors benefit from deductions similar to those allowed by the direct acquisition of QSSP securities.   73
The net effect of these programs in terms of optimal allocation of funds and corporate 
development is probably not totally positive, but their existence demonstrates the 
creativity provinces have shown faced with the problem of venture capital.   Different 
approaches have been used to meet local needs: capital pools were created, firstly, to 
meet the needs of resource companies.  The purpose of the QSSP, in addition to 
company financing, was to increase the rate of shareholding in Quebec.  Differences 
of context and approaches are thus sensitive and the uniform regulation approach has 
great difficulty taking account of this diversity. 
3.6.2.2 The importance of government intervention 
Government intervention in financing growth companies is particularly strong in 
Quebec; it seems much less important in the other provinces.  Quebec governments 
have implemented a vast group of measures intended to facilitate financing and 
growth of businesses in the new economy, to which are added measures initiated by 
the federal government.  For many years, Quebec was over-represented in terms of 
the number of financings and amounts invested in the venture capital area.  Most of 
this capital was directly or indirectly related to government action.  
Direct intervention in the area of venture capital has been made by the Innovatech 
corporations.  Indirect intervention has also taken place through the labour fund and 
the Société générale de financement.  The participating loan and loan guarantee area 
has been entrusted to Investissement Québec, while government pension plans 
intervene on a large scale in private investments and venture capital through the 
Caisse de dépôt et placement and its subsidiaries.  These measures were in addition to 
those arising out of federal programs (BDC). 
Table 10 shows the relative importance of venture capital financing relating to 
government intervention in Quebec: 138 of 160 investments made in four months 
(October 2001 to February 2002) are related to government initiatives.  Despite these 
actions, entrepreneurs still frequently mention the difficulty of financing technology 
companies
76.  
The Canadian securities market is thus extremely diverse, both with regard to the 
nature of the companies involved in it and to provincial initiatives, and the relative 
effect of these initiatives in the economy.  
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Table 10: Venture capital investment in Quebec: 
October 13, 2001 - February 28, 2002 
 
Government and para-government  Number of investments 
Business Development Bank of Canada  20 
Local development centres  4 
Centre québécois de valorisation des biotechnologies  3 
Labour fund – SOLIDE  57 
Hydro Québec Capitech  6 
Innovatech 40 
T2C2 (Caisse de dépôt et placement du Québec)  8 
  138 
Other  
Techno Cap  13 
Investissement Desjardins  7 
Miscellaneous 2 
  22 
Source: Canadian Venture Capital Association (web site, 2002). 
 
3.7 The access to financing of growth companies argument 
This argument was put forward by Mackay, who writes that many issuers and 
registrants point to the excess cost and the time delays that flow from complying with 
often different laws, regulations, rules or policies. (…)  these cost burden and time 
delays  (…)  prevent companies wishing to access public markets, particularly 
emerging growth companies, from doing so.  In Part 2 of this study we analysed the 
cost and delays incurred by issuers, and showed that in Canada there are shorter time 
delays and lower costs than in the American market. 
Several studies have been conducted on the exit method of venture capital and the 
barriers to financing junior companies.  These works allow us to complete the study 
of costs and time delays. They approach two main aspects, namely private placements 
and market entry following an investment in venture capital. MacIntosh (1994) and 
Riding (1998) approach the whole problem, whereas Cumming and MacIntosh (2000, 
2002) discuss exit from venture capital investment. 
   75
3.7.1 Private  placements 
A private placement is a method of financing whereby a company obtains capital by 
selling securities to one or several investors. This method of financing thus differs 
from a public offering in several ways. Firstly, the private investor(s) keep the 
securities, as opposed to brokers under conventional issues, for a time determined by 
law (holding period). A private financing may thus, for the purchaser, have a 
significant impact on the balance and diversity of his portfolio.  Secondly, the issuer 
is not required to prepare a prospectus—it may obtain an exemption.  In most cases it 
prepares a notice of distribution or offering memorandum. Asymmetrical information 
is therefore potentially significant, which explains legal provisions limiting access to 
private placements to 1) institutional investors such as banks, trust companies or 
investment companies, 2) sophisticated investors and 3) special situations between 
the company and investors. Access to this type of investment is therefore reserved for 
investors who have the ability to manage the effect of investments, often large but 
illiquid, on their portfolio and those able to evaluate and adequately structure the 
investment. Companies which decide to finance in this way and investors who enter 
the private market must be subject to special conditions under the exemption system.  
These complex provisions are not the same in all provinces and have recently been 
changed.  
Securities laws also cover holding periods for private investments. They attempt to 
establish a balance between two contradictory situations. A long period leads to an 
increase in the cost of financing, since a liquidity premium is required by investors 
holding illiquid stocks. This premium increases in proportion to the length of time 
before an investment may be resold (Das et al 2002).  
A short period allows investors to circumvent provisions of the law on public 
offerings.  Provisions for private placements are still different depending on the 
Canadian jurisdiction, even though attempts at harmonization have been made.   
Exemptions for distribution to a limited number of investors: 
All provinces, with the exception of New Brunswick, offer prospectus and 
registration exemptions for the issue to a limited number of investors, under certain 
conditions.  As Anand et col. (1999, p. 257-260) mention, conditions differ greatly 
from one province to another.  However, these differences should have little effect 
given the local scale of issues which may, in the case of Quebec, affect more than 
twenty-five investors (except in the case of inflation hedges, where the maximum 
number of investors is fifty). In Ontario, British Columbia and Alberta these   76
provisions have recently been amended and the concept of closed corporation have 
been introduced. The most important differences are related to the definition of 
sophisticated investor. Recent changes have amended the definitions in Ontario, 
Alberta and British Columbia
77.  
Exemptions for sophisticated investors: 
These relate to institutional investors and individuals whose high net worth assumes 
significant investment knowledge.  The rules vary from one province to another and 
have also recently been amended.  
3.7.2 Recent  evolution 
Ontario Rule 45-501 on Exempt Distributions: 
The Ontario Securities Commission Rule 45-501 on Exempt Distributions replaces a 
group of seven exemptions by two categories called the closely held issuer exemption 
and the accredited investor exemption. The closed corporation exemption allows a 
lifetime maximum of three million dollars to be raised from thirty-five non-accredited 
investors, without regard to their sophistication or qualifications in the area. These 
investors may resell their securities as long as the other shareholders and officers 
approve the transactions.  Special provisions apply for tax shelters. 
The exemption for sophisticated investors replaces several exemptions, including 
distribution to a limited number of investors. Sophisticated investors may invest 
without limitation in distributions without a prospectus. This exemption governs in 
particular institutional investors, sophisticated investors and those whose net worth 
exceeds $1 million.  Other provinces have also amended the rules in this area. 
 
                                                 
77 See National Instrument 45-101, Rights Offerings and the CVMQ document entitled: Régime de 
dispense de prospectus et d'inscription en regard de la nouvelle règle ontarienne 45-501 [prospectus 
and registration exemptions under the new Ontario Rule 45-501], attached as a schedule to Weekly 
Bulletin 2002-03-15, Vol. XXXIII, No. 10. These documents are available on the CVMQ web site. 
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Multilateral Instrument 45-103
78 
This exemption came into force in April 2002 in Alberta and British Columbia in 
order to harmonize the exemption rules in these provinces. 
A private issuer exemption allows issues to family, friends and associates, as well as 
sophisticated investors. The limit is fifty subscribers under Instrument 45-103 as 
opposed to thirty-five in Ontario, and the $3 million maximum issue amount is not 
found in Instrument 45-103. Accredited investors have similar characteristics to those 
defined under 45-501. There are slightly different provisions between the two 
provinces.  The Ontario rules are therefore different from those of Alberta and British 
Columbia but they constitute a step towards greater uniformity of exemption rules, 
which directly affect private placements. Harmonization of holding periods completes 
this evolution. A consultation launched in January on small business financing should 
help this standard evolve. 
Multilateral Instrument  MI 45-102 
The adoption of Multilateral Instrument 45-102 in November 2001 introduced a new 
Canada-wide
79 system respecting the resale of securities acquired under an 
exemption. This is an important subject related to the problem of the resale of private 
placements and in particular those made by venture capital companies. Resale 
restrictions are intended to give some stability to prices, which may be greatly 
influenced by the rapid transfer of large blocks held by these investors.   
The provisions affect several categories of securities and apply to various 
circumstances and the application is technical and complex. The complexity results 
from the CSA’s wish to create a uniform system, but the exemption rules are not the 
same in the various provinces.  While there has been some progress, the exemption 
system is still diverse and significant differences remain among the provinces.  It is 
possible that the former, much more diverse situation …inhibited the development of 
a secondary resale market for investments in small and medium sized enterprises to a 
greater degree in Canada than in the U.S. (MacIntosh 1994). However, Cumming 
and MacIntosh (2002) also point out (note 14, p. 37) that further research must be 
conducted to measure the effect of regulation on small businesses and the venture 
capital industry before we can say that the regulatory burden is excessive. Other 
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factors such as market liquidity may also influence the exit strategies of venture 
capital investors, as well as the lesser skills of venture capital investors.  Cumming 
and MacIntosh (2002) show that the exit method of venture capital investors 
influences returns in this industry
80. However, once again, the role of factors of a 
regulatory nature remains to be defined and measured.  Moreover, similar studies on 
European venture capital show significant differences as compared to American 
venture capital with regard to exit strategies. Schwienbacher (2002) attributes these 
differences to liquidity differences in the various markets. It is not certain that 
completely uniform regulation is best. Moreover, in many provinces, regulatory 
provisions for securities have become a tool for economic development.  Experiments 
have been conducted, particularly respecting venture capital financing and public 
financing of small businesses. Although these experiments probably cannot be 
qualified as successful in all cases, we note a migration to provinces other than the 
home province, which shows their interest for large economic players.  The argument 
that uniform legislation is preferable disregards these realities. The ability to innovate 
in the securities industry is a direct consequence of regulatory competition in Canada.  
Part 4 is devoted to an analysis of this concept. 
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PART 4 
4-REGULATORY COMPETITION 
Arguments put forward by promoters of the uniformity and centralization of 
securities regulation in Canada rely essentially on the concept of the immediate 
effectiveness of such regulation:  a single authority would be able to regulate the 
securities field in an optimal manner and at a lower cost and perfectly homogeneous 
regulation would be preferable to the situation which currently prevails. The 
imposition of this homogeneous regulation by a central authority was put forward by 
Breton (2000) as the strong harmonization method. This idea is opposed to that of 
regulatory competition.  Instead of monopolistic regulation, its defenders propose a 
market approach to regulation, whether for tax, environmental, company or financial 
market regulation. According to certain promoters of this approach, competition 
should lead to less complete and stable harmonization than that of imposed 
harmonization but more in accordance with the real needs of participants. Breton 
calls this approach weak harmonization. There has been a debate surrounding 
regulatory competition for a number of years in the United States. The creation of a 
European arena, gaps noticed during recent financial scandals, and market 
globalization have given new life to this important area of study, where not only 
internal regulatory competition, which operates between the State and organizations, 
is considered, but also external competition. In fact, American and Canadian 
regulation is confronted by that of other jurisdictions, particularly for securities due to 
the emergence of integrated European markets
81. 
Imposed harmonization and centralization may appear as a means of optimizing the 
regulation of securities or companies in a country, federation or union such as that 
being built in Europe.  
This regulatory model is not, however, the only one presently in place and the United 
States is a perfect example of an approach diametrically opposed to that of 
centralization for company law. In this area, the United States uses competitive 
regulation:  there are as many company laws as there are States and certain States 
have laws substantially more attractive for companies than others. This is especially 
true for Delaware, where almost half of American companies listed on the stock 
exchange are incorporated.  
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Between the two extremes there is a middle position which leads to models of mutual 
recognition (or reciprocal delegation). Harris (2002) presents the advantages and 
disadvantages of each approach. Maykut (2001) believes that reciprocal delegation is 
reasonable and viable in Canada. Anand (2001) and Scarlet (2001) criticize this idea. 
Anand observes that the mutual recognition approach requires “a real commitment to 
the harmonization of provincial securities statutes” and believes that uniformity can 
only be attained by setting up a national regulatory body. The reciprocal delegation 
solution is, however, used by the European Community in the securities field. It is 
also clearly found in the blueprint for uniform/harmonized securities laws proposed 
by the CSA in January 2003. 
In this first part we will discuss the concept of regulatory competition, and then we 
will study its application in the United States in the area of company law. A third 
section is dedicated to the idea of competition for accounting standards, then for 
securities. We will then analyse the steps taken by the European Community towards 
a mutual recognition system also known as the European passport. We will conclude 
with the lessons learned from these experiences and thoughts on the debate presently 
taking place in the Canadian securities industry. 
4.1 Regulatory competition:  principles  
Regulatory competition is part of a broader framework of interjurisdictional 
competition which we will describe here by the acronym IJC. IJC is defined as the 
rivalry among governments in which each government is trying to win some scarce 
beneficial resources or to avoid a particular cost (Kenyon, 1997). This competition 
has many aspects. Direct and indirect taxation, grants and tax expenditure programs 
intended to encourage or keep business are an important element of it. Quality of 
health care, education and infrastructure are also part of it. In the regulatory field, 
labour law, company law and environmental law are the most frequently used. The 
various components set out above determine the competitiveness of jurisdictions. 
This competitiveness depends, however, on the relevant economic agent. A paper 
company does not use the same criteria in its choice of location as a retiree. 
Globalization of stock exchanges has led to the internationalization of the concept. 
Perry (1994) defines international regulatory competition (in the securities field) as a 
contest among regulatory jurisdictions to attract activity by offering the most efficient 
regulatory environment in which to operate. A regulatory environment is efficient if it 
offers participants precisely the regulation for which they are willing to pay. 
There are several theoretical models of IJC, from Tiebout (1956) to Breton (1996). 
Kenyon (1997) offers an overview of them. They apply to different aspects of 
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focussed on taxation. We are interested here in concepts, work and results which 
affect the underpinnings of IJC directly related to company law and securities law, 
while incorporating the dimension of accounting standards associated with it.  
Theoretical models of IJC stem from the work of economists such as Oates (1998, 
1999), Tiebout (1956) and Breton (1996), who observe that regulatory authorities are 
not necessarily motivated to regulate for the better. For example: 
If we discard the assumption that politicians and public sector 
bureaucrats are somehow motivated to maximize a social welfare 
function, as the most superficial observation of the world entreats us to 
do, the most important reason for decentralizing the public sector is 
that decentralization makes possible and, in effect, stimulates 
intergovernmental competition.
1 Indeed, once it is accepted that public 
officials are like everyone else in society in that they are motivated, to 
a significant degree at least, to pursue their own interest, 
intergovernmental competition is required for two different, if related, 
reasons:  a) as a check on political power much like market 
competition acts as a check on corporate power; and b) as an invisible 
hand mechanism capable of producing a maximum of social utility. 
Regulatory competition is therefore a necessary condition to counterbalance the 
excessive power of central authorities who do not necessarily act to maximise social 
well-being and to allow mechanisms which can lead to maximum social utility to be 
set up.  
Vietor (1994), following a comprehensive analysis of several cases of regulation and 
deregulation in the United States, makes the following observation. All regulation 
produces undesirable effects which are generally ignored. It tends to oppose market 
forces and technological progress rather than support them and sooner or later the 
process takes the upper hand over permanency. These three strong tendencies end up 
creating regulatory dysfunction and block the process of adjustment of regulations 
and organizations to the reality of markets changing more and more quickly.  
An ideal regulator must, to the contrary, anticipate the impact of its decisions, 
develop regulations which guide rather than constrain market forces, limit the 
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For Vietor, regulatory competition is a means of attaining, at least partially, these 
various objectives. Levich (1993) suggests measuring the net regulatory burden 
(hereinafter NRB) to which businesses are subject. NRB represents the incremental 
regulatory cost less the marginal benefits of regulation
82. When there are several 
jurisdictions, companies locate their business in the least costly regulatory 
environment. This regulatory arbitration causes companies to choose jurisdictions 
with a low NRB. This does not necessarily mean that these entities are less exacting, 
but that the advantages and costs of each regulatory element are offset. Authorities in 
high NRB jurisdictions must therefore reduce their requirements and eliminate all 
regulation of which the marginal cost is greater than the marginal benefit. 
International regulatory competition thereby imposes discipline, which limits 
excessive regulation. As Tung (2002) mentions, in the areas of corporate, securities, 
and bankruptcy law it (regulatory competition) forces governments and their 
regulators to compete to offer regulation that firms and their investors prefer. Two 
schools disagree as to the ultimate result of this competition, which may involve a 
race to the bottom or a race to the top. They also disagree in terms of ability and 
rapidity of the systems to adapt, whether they are subject to competition or not. 
For promoters of regulatory competition, it would also have the effect of causing a 
certain legislative uniformity. Provisions of which the net cost is to a large extent 
greater than the benefit should be abandoned, while overly flexible provisions should 
also be abandoned, as they cause an increase in the cost of capital in the fields of 
securities and company law for example. This adjustment would be for the best, but 
may oppose the power of the various jurisdictions if competition is not perfect.  
Company law competition in the United States seems to have led to the emergence of 
relatively uniform laws in the various States (Romano, 1985; Black, 1990). 
4.1.1  Race to the bottom or the top 
Race to the bottom  
This basic argument of opponents to regulatory competition suggests that various 
jurisdictions will reduce their requirements to attract economic agents. For example, 
with respect to laws governing takeovers, Bebchuk and Ferrell (1999) argue, 
conceptually and based on observation, that American States use competition to put 
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forward mechanisms for protecting existing directors against takeovers. There are, 
however, various mechanisms allowing limits to be placed on the race to the bottom, 
in particular the establishment of minimum common standards. Hertig (2001) 
describes them in the European framework. The main argument against this is, 
however, an economic one and allows for a race to the top, in particular for disclosure 
of financial information and securities regulation.  
In fields other than securities there are several examples of the race to the bottom, 
which Breton (2000) calls decentralization failure. Tariff wars between countries, 
grant programs to attract and keep business and tax wars betweens the States in the 
1930’s are examples of it. However, Breton observes that at the international level 
these wars have lessened and mechanisms have been put in place to contain them. 
Race towards the top  
This argument rests on the fundamental relationship of finance which associates risk 
and reward. The lessening of regulation below the NRB limit increases the level of 
risk of investors who will require a risk premium resulting in a higher cost of capital 
for businesses subject to the reduced regulation. Certain evidence suggests that this 
situation occurs in particular in the field of securities where traditionally the most 
restrictive jurisdictions have attracted a high number of issuers and investors.  
As Warren points out (1990, p. 189), the New-York and London markets have 
emerged as the largest international securities markets despite having the two most 
comprehensive securities regulatory systems in the world. The first beneficiaries of 
this action are shareholders because an optimal regulatory system increases share 
value. The race towards the top argument is defended by Romano (1993, 1998, 2001, 
2002) and Winter (1977, 1989), among others. Jackson and Pan (2001) recapitulate 
the various empirical works and professional studies which confirm that issuers tend 
to comply with the highest standards (those of the United Kingdom in Europe) in 
choosing their disclosure strategy. Some of the works cited also show that issuers 
exceed minimum disclosure standards in an attempt to positively influence the 
market. There is therefore a great deal of evidence of the principle of the race towards 
the top respecting the disclosure of information. The reaction of issuing companies in 
the European Community after the adoption of the European passport directive is also 
consistent with this behaviour.  
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4.1.2  Stability and ability to change  
Centralized and competitive regulatory systems also differ in terms of stability, 
ability to change and ability to implement new measures, as well as in terms of total 
or partial possibility of capture.  
Stability:  for Harris (2002), a single centralized regulatory system is more stable than 
a competitive system. It is therefore more foreseeable, which represents a definite 
advantage for issuers and investors. However, a stable system represents a 
disadvantage in a rapidly changing environment, as in the case of securities. A stable 
system is in fact synonymous with less capacity for change.  
Capacity for change:  this capacity has two dimensions. Legislation must be able to 
adapt to change (time adaptation) and geographical differences (place adaptation) 
when a jurisdiction has disparities, which is the case in Canada.  
Time adaptation: MacIntosh (1997, p. 232) notes that setting up a centralized 
regulatory system leads to decreased responsiveness.  
The securities field, as well as company law, are in rapid evolution. Decentralized 
regulatory bodies may be able to innovate more rapidly to respond to these changes. 
However, regulatory response must be followed by an implementation phase which, 
in a decentralized system, is necessarily longer because it requires cooperation. 
Place adaptation:  proponents of decentralization argue that this system allows better 
adjustment to local realities and more flexible adjustment to local changes in 
conditions.  
Implementation:  even if regulatory bodies detect changes and adapt to them, these 
changes must still be implemented at the global level. Proponents of a centralized 
system argue that fragmenting responsibility imposes a long and costly process, since 
cooperation is required. Within the framework of the capture theory, which says that 
regulatory bodies are sooner or later captured to their advantage by the regulated 
entities, this process may have certain advantages. It limits the power of the largest 
pressure groups.  
Regulatory centralization and decentralization thus both present advantages and 
disadvantages which are easily described but which cannot be easily measured:  we   85
must therefore turn to an analysis of existing situations to attempt to determine to 
what extent one model may be considered preferable. We will analyse successively 
the situations which exist in the areas of company law, accounting standards, and 
securities and will pay special attention to the European Community. In several ways, 
the Community must deal with a problem similar to that in Canada. 
4.2 Regulatory competition in company law  
In the United States, regulatory competition is the standard for rules governing the 
relationship between directors and shareholders, falling under the jurisdiction of the 
States. However, the statute in force in the jurisdiction of incorporation governs the 
entire company, wherever its operating location, and companies freely choose their 
State  of incorporation. An identical situation has also existed for a short time in 
Europe, where companies can choose their country of residence. This competition has 
caused several important differences between the abilities of American States to keep 
companies which are physically present in their territory. Bebchuk and Cohen (2002) 
observe that Illinois and California only incorporate 11 and 22% of “their” companies 
while Indiana and Minnesota keep 70 and 75% respectively. Delaware gets 85.23% 
of companies incorporated outside their State of location and this movement is 
increasing. From 1996 to 2000, Delaware incorporated 90.22% of new companies 
which chose a State other than their State of origin. These indicators caused Bebchuk 
and Cohen to conclude that the market domination of Delaware is even clearer and 
growing more than indicated by the figure usually quoted. According to these 
authors, 57.75% of all American public companies and 59.46% of Fortune 500 
companies have their head office in that State, as opposed to less than 5% in the State 
of New York, which, however, comes second in terms of number of incorporations. 
Delaware also grants a very large proportion of IPOs. Daines (2001) shows that in 
1996 this State attracted 64% of all U.S. IPOs, attracting 36.5% in 1981.  
Considering the similarities of the implications of company and securities laws, 
competition in company law is an essential object of study to analyse and understand 
the effects of regulatory competition for securities. Moreover, a great number of 
works have been devoted to this subject involving the special situation in Delaware. 
4.2.1  The Delaware situation  
Delaware has systematically adopted its laws to corporate needs. This State is the 
only one to offer a special court to settle disputes in company law and offer 
companies significant protection against hostile takeovers. Legal protection broadly 
authorizes defensive manoeuvres against takeovers. It has been reinforced by the 
development of a doctrine permitting recourse in particular to poisoned pills by the   86
Delaware courts. Jurisdiction shoppers recognize that Delaware’s provisions are 
extreme but other States have adopted provisions which go further still, without 
however attracting as many companies as Delaware (Bebchuk and Cohen, 2002)
83. 
However, as these authors indicate, the ability to attract companies is directly 
associated with protection against takeovers.  
The main legal characteristics of Delaware are the following: 
•  Greater protection for directors against hostile takeovers;  
•  Lower transaction costs on the sale of companies;  
•  Less limits on defensive tactics of directors for takeovers; 
•  A body of law and vast experience in takeovers. 
From the outset, Carey (1974) states that the willingness of Delaware to attract 
businesses, for tax revenue, should result in the lowering of legal requirements, 
mainly in the area of shareholder protection. Carey argues that directors profit from 
less restrictive laws at the expense of shareholders in a number of areas. Delaware 
would therefore initiate a race to the bottom which would align its laws with the 
wishes of directors. The only way to counter this mechanism, for this author, would 
be recourse to a single statute at the federal level. Carey’s argument has the advantage 
of allowing empirical verification of the effect of regulatory competition.  Less 
investor protection represents increased risk which should translate into a greater cost 
of capital. As company value is determined by the value of future changes actualized 
by this cost of capital, all things being equal, a company registered in Delaware must 
have a lower value than it would have in another jurisdiction. Changes of jurisdiction 
to or from this State must also translate into changes in company value. This 
theoretical statement is not confirmed empirically.  
4.2.2  Empirical work  
There are many empirical studies of the effects of regulatory competition in company 
law and summaries of them are proposed by Bhagat and Romano (2002), Romano 
(2002) and Bebchuk et al (2002). We will only set out here the main methods and the 
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principal results of tests dealing with either of the following hypotheses:  if regulatory 
competition benefits shareholders, changes of domicile to a more favourable 
jurisdiction should lead to an increased share price (and vice versa); all things being 
equal, a company registered in a State having a favourable jurisdiction must be worth 
more than one located in a less favourable jurisdiction. 
Using event analysis techniques
84, a few studies show an abnormally positive return 
on the announcement of reincorporation in Delaware (Romano, 1985; Wang, 1995; 
Hyman, 1979). However, Wang’s results are more significant when he divides the 
sample as a function of a State to which the companies go and Hyman’s study is 
based on a summary methodology. Contrary to what Romano states (2002, p. 65), 
evidence of the effect of a transfer of head office to Delaware is not systematically 
positive or significant at the conventional 5% threshold. As Daines (2001) indicates, a 
change of head office is often associated with a change of strategy and the effect of 
the two events is combined. For Bebchuk et al (2002), it is difficult to infer from 
existing studies that a Delaware incorporation has a significant positive effect on 
shareholder wealth. Table 1 of Bhagat and Romano (2001) shows moreover the rarity 
of significant statistical results in studies covering the period after 1983. Romano 
(2002, p. 65) retorts, however, that an abnormal return of 1% may be economically 
significant. 
A second approach was used by Daines (2001), then by Subramanian (2002) and a 
few other authors to determine to what extent the types of law to which companies 
are subject influence their value.  
Daines uses a measure of the company’s value relative (Tobin’s Q ratio)
85 and shows 
that, all things being equal, Delaware companies are worth more than those of other 
States. The study covered 4,481 companies listed on a stock exchange during the 
1981-1990 period. The results are statistically significant for twelve of the sixteen 
years studied, and also economically significant. For example, in 1996, the difference 
in value is of the order of 5%. However, a similar study, conducted during the 
following period, shows that Delaware’s advantage is decreasing. Subramanian 
(2002) estimates it at 2.8%. 
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Although it is not perfectly clear that a transfer to Delaware has a significant effect on 
shareholder wealth, the fact remains that this State has been able to attract a very 
significant portion of American companies, which could not have been done if 
shareholders were against it. This movement does not seem to have caused major 
problems in terms of governance or executive behaviour. In the framework of 
regulatory competition, Delaware has therefore succeeded in developing a body of 
law which appears optimal for a majority of companies. Several provisions have been 
copied by other States and Delaware therefore seems to be contributing to an 
improvement in the company law system in the United States. This observation is the 
cornerstone of the argument developed by Romano (2002) in the field of securities 
law. This model, however, has raised criticism. 
4.2.3  Criticism of regulatory competition in company law. 
Arguments and research results showing the advantages of regulatory competition in 
the field of company law are not unanimous. Bebchuk and Ferrell (1999), Bebchuk et 
al(2002) and Bebchuk and Cohen (2002), present different criticisms of this proposal. 
Certain criticisms are centered on a race to the bottom (from the shareholders’ point 
of view) as States would be in competition to protect as best as possible executives 
from takeovers which may discipline them. However, for Bebchuk and Cohen (2002) 
or Kamar (1998), the American situation is no longer one of competition but of a 
monopoly over new incorporations, where the body of law and knowledge of 
company law constitute a barrier to entry. 
Despite these criticisms, Bebchuk recognizes that regulatory competition may 
produce beneficial effects. However, in the particular area of protection against 
takeovers, the effects would be negative.  
4.3 Competition in accounting  
The idea of regulatory competition has also been studied and put forward for the 
establishment of accounting standards
86. Sunder (2001) proposes and shows that:  a 
competitive regulatory regime for accounting standards, within and across national 
jurisdictions, that allows individual firms to choose from a set of accounting 
standards, is more efficient. The arguments are developed by Dye and Sunder (2001). 
For Sunder, delegation by the SEC of the exclusive power to establish accounting 
standards has created a regulatory monopoly, the FASB, which was the object of 
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severe criticism due to its inability or slowness in establishing firm rules in several 
key areas.  
Accounting for inflation, oil industry exploration costs, pension plans and employee 
remuneration based on shareholders’ equity are some examples of the lack of 
effectiveness of the FASB. The problem of revenue recognition, for which the SEC 
has used its power of intervention and imposed the Statement of Accounting Board 
101 (SAB 101), should also be added to this list, as well as the problem of special 
purpose entities.  These entities have proliferated since the beginning of the 1980’s. 
The problem was apparent, however, beginning in the 1970’s, and the FASB 
Emerging Issues Task Force was put in charge of the matter at the end of the 1980’s. 
As Jensen shows (2002)
87, almost all the members of EITF came from the financial 
sector or very large companies and were associated with the main beneficiaries and 
users of SPE. The first intervention of the FASB mentioning the SPE occurred in 
1996 (FAS 125), but it was only following the Enron affair, where the use of SPE 
played a key role, that FASB issued complete and precise directives. Beginning in 
1997, directors of large American companies were asking for an in-depth review of 
FASB or its disappearance
88.  
Although he says that the American system is still the best in the world, the person in 
charge of accounting at the SEC, Robert K. Herdman
89, has asked the FASB to deal 
with the following three problems: 
•  The current standard – setting process is too cumbersome and slow; 
•  Much of the recent FASB guidance is rule-based and focused on a check-the-
box mentality that inhibits transparency; 
•  Much of the recent FASB guidance is too complex. 
Criticism addressed to the FASB actually results in large part from its status as a 
regulatory monopoly, which has the following consequences: 
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•  In an extremely complex environment, it is becoming impossible to study the 
effects of different standards. Only a competitive system will allow it; 
•  A regulatory monopoly easily becomes subject to significant pressure by 
various groups when important decisions are made; 
•  A regulatory monopoly is unable to use the criteria of the reduction of the cost 
of capital to establish or change rules and standards. For Sunder (2002), as for 
a number of other authors, the ultimate object of the process of accounting 
standardization (as, moreover, the process of regulating the securities market) 
should be a reduction in the cost of capital. Good quality financial statements 
and an efficient disclosure process increase the quality of information 
available to investors, reduce asymmetry and lower the rate required by 
investors which is also the cost of equity.  A company which benefits from a 
lower cost of capital has a significant competitive edge. Socially this criteria 
is superior to that of the maximization of shareholder wealth (or share value) 
since its advantages are distributed among several categories of participants in 
the company. 
Sunder (2001) observes that, in the United States, company law has been able to 
improve because of competition between States. The functioning of exchanges has 
benefited from competition between the NYSE, NASDAQ and other exchange 
organizations, including the electronic exchange networks. On the other hand, 
nothing has allowed competition at the level of the establishment of standards. In 
addition, the United States is protected from any foreign competition by refusing to 
list foreign companies using standards other than US GAAP. 
Arguments against competition in accounting regulation are not lacking. These 
arguments are, however, the same as those put forward by proponents of a Canadian 
regulatory monopoly for securities. They concern the race to the bottom, the 
abandonment of an optimal uniform system, and the difficulties and cost of 
implementation.  
The race to the bottom argument is raised to counter any proposal for regulatory 
competition. For accounting standards, it seems established that broader disclosure of 
more information translates into a reduction in the cost of capital for small companies 
not often followed by analysts (Botosan, 1997, Schrand and Verrecchia, 2002) and 
for large companies (Botosan and Plumlee, 2001, O’Hara and Easley, 2001).   91
Companies wishing to reduce their cost of capital must accordingly use high quality 
accounting systems. In a system open to competition, companies do not necessarily 
use an existing model which, in the particular case of accounting standards, is 
considered the best in the world. However, recent stock market scandals and 
university studies prevent this opinion, often put forward in the United States, from 
being defended
90. For example, Leuz (2001) observes no significant difference in the 
level of various indicators related to the cost of capital for a number of companies 
which choose IAS or GAAP standards in Germany. He concludes that:  the choice 
between IAS and GAAP is of secondary importance. 
Finally, Sunder (2001) contemplates the practical dimensions of the implementation 
of competition between IAS and GAAP standards in the United States. Supervisory 
responsibility of the various accounting standardization bodies may be delegated to 
IOSCO and the role of the SEC in reviewing various documents submitted by 
companies would remain unchanged. The same type of analysis is proposed by 
Dunmore and Falk (2003) in the area of audit regulation. He maintains that 
competition in this field is an efficient substitute for government regulation, which 
would offer a reliable means for auditors to indicate the quality of their services. 
4.4 Regulatory competition and the securities industry  
4.4.1 General  principles 
In a sector subject to rapid changes, the ability of laws and regulations to adapt 
quickly and the rapid detection of problems and trends is essential. As the primary 
goal of a stock market is to provide issuing companies with capital at the lowest 
possible cost, regulation should be made to correspond to the needs of investors. The 
issue is therefore whether a competitive system will allow this double objective to be 
reached more efficiently than a regulatory monopoly. Also, because of international 
competition, it is important to define a regulatory system which is attractive to both 
local and foreign companies so as not to lose a share of the financial market. 
According to Choi and Guzman (1998) and Romano (1993, 1998, 2001, 2002), 
competition is preferable to reach this objective. The proposed forms of regulatory 
competition and, in practice, the existing forms of competition are two types, which, 
as Tung (2002) points out, are very often confused. The form proposed by Romano, 
and which prevails in company law in the United States, is direct regulatory 
competition. Choi and Guzman (1998) propose a type of model used in Europe, 
called portable reciprocity. The Canadian system, for the time being, resembles 
neither of these models, although certain forms of competition in terms of provisions 
may be observed. Tung analyses the differences between direct competition and the 
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passport and shows the very important differences between them in terms of effects 
and policies. 
Romano’s main argument is the success of regulatory competition in the field of 
company law in the United States. To the extent that this system has allowed an 
optimal legal framework to be developed, it should be the same for securities. The 
model proposed by Romano is a transposition of the situation which prevails in 
company law. However, we have shown that, for several authors, the success of 
competition in that legal field is questionable. 
Issuers choose the jurisdiction, i.e. the place where they file their prospectus and ask 
for registration (federal regulation is becoming optional) and other jurisdictions 
recognize the laws and regulations of the state or province of registration
91. 
The choice of place and therefore of regulatory system is clearly disclosed to 
investors, in particular by brokers when the securities are sold. The system chosen by 
a company may subsequently be changed with shareholder approval
92.  Romano 
(2002, p. 115) recognizes that this system may lead to different treatment of the same 
situation for investors
93.  However, application of the doctrine called internal affairs, 
already applied in company law, would solve this problem. This doctrine refers to the 
original jurisdiction all cases involving a corporation which is registered there. 
Romano recommends that the State of registration differ from that where the 
company carries on its principal business to allow competition to fully come into 
play.  
The portable reciprocity approach of Choi and Guzman (1998) is an extension of the 
concept of bilateral recognition. In the classical system, two countries agree that an 
entity meeting the requirements of the original jurisdiction may operate in the host 
country. This is the principle used between Canada and the United States within the 
framework of the Multijurisdictional Disclosure System (MJDS). The portable 
reciprocity approach extends this approach to a situation involving several 
jurisdictions, where the issuer is entitled to choose the principal regulatory entity. 
Approval by this entity will be recognized by the other jurisdictions, but the principal 
jurisdiction must be indicated to investors (in the case of the issuance of securities). 
Although similar to the approach of Romano, reciprocity has very different 
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implications and implementation requirements. In particular, and the case of the EC is 
a clear illustration of this, the regulatory competition approach can only function if 
the various jurisdictions agree on minimum standards. Otherwise, jurisdictions will 
use various techniques to block access to their market.  
The advantages of this type of approach to regulation are quick reaction time and 
especially limits on over-regulation, which, in the opinion of certain participants in 
favour of deregulation, seems to be a tendency of authorities in the area
94. Over-
regulation is particularly penalising in the securities industry because of the mobility 
of capital. Laws and regulations developed in a context of competition take the real 
needs of participants into account to a greater extent. Regulatory competition leading 
to a bottom-up approach may be preferable to the classic top-down approach which 
seems to lead to over-regulation. In fact, regulatory competition allows the creation of 
a feedback effect which allows the preferences of agents to be revealed:  these 
preferences translate into a flow of issuers to the preferred systems. Romano (2001, 
2002), but also Fox (2001), Choi (2001) and Jackson (2001), point out the advantages 
of regulatory competition for securities. The importance of the over-regulation 
argument warrants a special section all to itself. 
4.4.2  Over-regulation, particularly with respect to disclosure  
A single regulator may impose disclosure requirements without regard for investors. 
This argument is based on two observations. Firstly, in the absence of regulation, 
companies would still disclose information which would, in many cases, be certified 
by an independent body. Modeling this behaviour has given rise to a large body of 
work, of which Verrecchia (2001) gives a partial summary. Disclosure would have 
the effect of increasing liquidity and reducing information asymmetry, which allows 
the cost of capital to be reduced. In addition, imposition of disclosure regulation 
could produce positive external effects. The benefit of disclosure by companies 
would have overall positive effects greater than the effect on each company by 
allowing a more efficient, more liquid and less volatile stock market. However, 
regulating disclosure also has net costs and benefits of which the disclosure 
requirements have not been proven by the different analytical studies (Admati and 
Pfeiderer, 2000). 
The intervention of the regulator in this field comes from the proposition that the 
quantity and quality of the information which would be available in such a case 
would not be optimal. The regulator has therefore generally sought to increase the 
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quantity and level of detail of information disclosed, which sometimes limits the 
disclosure of certain aspects of information considered potentially harmful such as 
management forecasts.  
Empirical research in the field of accounting has effectively shown the lack of effect 
of several of the SEC’s disclosure requirements. As Verrecchia (2001) mentions, it is 
almost impossible to show the positive or negative effects of additional disclosure 
requirements on the American market. Bushee and Leuz (2002) show that imposing 
disclosure requirements on companies whose shares are traded over the counter has 
had positive effects on the price and liquidity of these shares, from which companies 
not subject to this requirement did not benefit
95. The imposition of these rules  would 
therefore seem to have had positive external benefits but the study shows that 74% of 
companies subject to this new obligation preferred to leave the OTCBB for the 
market known as the Pink Sheet of the National Quotation Bureau
96, which indicates 
that they believed the cost of compliance greater than the loss caused by their transfer 
to a less liquid and transparent market. This study evidences the positive and negative 
effects of a new regulatory requirement. In fact, although disclosure and liquidity 
increased for approximately one-third of companies involved, they decreased for two-
thirds of the securities. 
Lo (2000) studies the economic consequences of a change imposed by the SEC in 
1992 requiring the disclosure of executive compensation. The objective of the SEC 
was to improve governance by requiring the disclosure of the methods and amounts 
of executive compensation. Lo distinguishes companies opposed to the change from 
those that did not conduct any lobbying.  
The first had abnormally high levels of compensation and saw their rate of return 
increase sharply after the adoption of the new standards. The performance of 
companies which did not oppose the regulatory change remained unchanged. This 
result is consistent with the hypothesis that increased disclosure causes a reduction in 
agency problems and improved governance among companies where it was relatively 
weak.  
                                                 
95 Before 1999, companies whose assets did not exceed $10 million and who had less than 500 
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The effects of fair disclosure (FD) regulation, which requires companies to disclose 
the same information to analysts as to all investors, was studied by Straser (2002), 
Bushee  et al (2002) and Eleswarapu et al (2003) who obtained different results 
respecting this additional requirement on the quantity and quality of information 
issued by companies. Analytical and empirical studies therefore seem to point out the 
inherent difficulty in determining the optimal level of regulation in terms of 
disclosure.  
4.4.3  Illustrations of regulatory competition in the securities field  
There are fewer illustrations of regulatory competition than other fields because of 
the dominance of American and British models. Perry (1994) presents the 
development of the Euro-bond market as a successful example of competition as 
compared to the American market, due to lower regulatory costs. Several authors 
attribute lower borrowing costs in this market to an NRB close to zero, which is not 
the case in the American market. As Niemeyer (2001) states, securities regulation 
may be influenced by pressure groups:  
The regulator has to have the ability and the motive to impose 
adequate regulation. It is not obvious that a given regulatory body 
fulfills both of these requirements. Ability here refers to both the 
information available to the regulator and the enforceability of the 
regulation. For all rules and regulations, especially non-government 
regulation, it is important to scrutinize the motives of the regulator. 
Weak and diffuse groups, such as consumers and retail investors, often 
have difficulties in influencing regulatory solutions. Furthermore, 
strong interest groups are more likely to affect the regulatory solution 
for specific regulations, like securities regulation, than for more 
general forms of legislation and regulation. Conflicts of interest may 
therefore be important in securities regulation. In some cases, these 
conflicts may result in inappropriate regulation and therefore a non-
regulated situation may be superior. 
There are factors other than regulation which guide the choices of issuers and 
investors. Liquidity is one of those factors
97.  
In Europe, several authors agree that we are witnessing a race to the top. Choi and 
Guzman (1998) say that European firms often choose to comply with the disclosure 
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requirements of British securities laws even though it would be permissible to 
comply with the weaker requirements of their home countries. Also, according to 
Romano (1998), in addition, European firms listing in London typically comply with 
the higher United Kingdom disclosure requirements rather than with the lower ones 
of their home countries, although they need not comply with U.K. rules under the 
European Community disclosure directives. 
Because of its regulatory structure, Canada has found itself for several years in an 
imperfect system of regulatory competition. The various jurisdictions can develop 
different regulations, but issuers and intermediaries remain subject to the jurisdiction 
of the provinces where they operate or offer securities. There are no mutual 
recognition agreements as in the case of the EC, or agreement for regulatory transfer 
from the state of incorporation as is the case under U.S. company law. 
However, despite its partial nature, regulatory competition for securities in Canada 
has attracted the attention of several researchers. For Daniels (1992, p.94-96), a 
dramatic shift in power to the federal government is not unequivocally desirable from 
a functional perspective, nor practically feasible from a political perspective.  
Daniels describes the advantages of regulatory competition, which has allowed 
provincial regulations extremely sensitive to the rapidly evolving needs of investors, 
issuers and registrants. In particular, he notes that this structure has allowed the 
creation of distinct regional markets and an enviable record of innovation and 
experimentation in regulatory products.  
Without drawing up an exhaustive list, the effects of competition in Canada may be 
illustrated through several examples. The creation of programs such as Junior Capital 
Pool (which have become capital pool companies in Quebec) or stock saving plans, 
described in the previous Part, are examples of innovation started in one province and 
copied in others. The fact that certain companies of these other provinces relocated to 
Alberta to benefit from the Junior Capital Pool program probably helped its adoption 
outside of Alberta. The case of negotiated brokerage fees, initiated in Quebec and 
subsequently accepted by the other provinces, is another example of the positive effect 
of competition. However, provincial securities initiatives are often ignored in later 
documents, which limits their visibility and underestimates the effect of regulatory 
competition in Canada. For example, the Fraser Institute
98 attributes the creation of 
labour funds to a federal government initiative in 1987, although the Quebec Labour 
Fund was created in June 1983 as a result of an initiative of the government of 
Quebec. Similarly, Todd (1983), in his analysis of the evolution of negotiated 
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brokerage fees in Ontario, does not mention the fact that the movement was initiated 
in Quebec.  
As Roy points out (1985, p. 57), regulatory competition has also played a role in the area 
of brokerage firm ownership. He writes:   
[Translation] From the beginning of the 1970’s Ontario limited to an 
overall maximum of 25% and an individual ceiling of 10% ownership 
by non-residents (of Canada) of brokerage firms registered with the 
Ontario Securities Commission. Self-regulatory bodies followed the 
movement started by Ontario and incorporated into their own by-laws 
similar standards for their members. In opposition, following the 
Parizeau, Bouchard and Tetley reports, Quebec adopted an open 
policy vis-à-vis foreign investments in this area, preferring to ensure 
minimal local control of participants. The Quebec Securities 
Commission supported this policy by reversing decisions of the 
Montreal Stock Exchange harmful to foreign investors or prohibiting 
any restriction of such nature respecting public brokerage firms 
registered in Quebec.  
Finally, competition and existence of multiple jurisdictions also plays a role in the 
adoption of certain solutions. The Candeal Inc. case is an illustration of this.  
Candeal is a parallel trading system specialised in fixed income securities for 
institutional investors. Candeal Inc. is majority owned by six brokerage firms 
(subsidiaries of the large banks) which together occupy a dominant position in the 
Canadian fixed income securities market and two technology partners. In July 2002, 
the TSX Group inc. took a 40% interest in Candeal
99, through its TSX Markets 
division. Given the heavily concentrated structure of the Canadian stock market, the 
issue of competition was raised. Candeal Inc. asked for recognition as an ATS and the 
CVMQ registered it as a broker. In its decision, the CVMQ explicitly mentioned that 
it did not intend to exempt Candeal Inc. from the application of the relevant 
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4.4.4 Criticism  of  regulatory  competition in securities 
The main arguments opposed to regulatory competition are information externalities 
(Fox, 2001), the race to the bottom, instability and the absence of harmonization. For 
example, Cox (1999) predicts that if issuers have the possibility of choosing their 
jurisdiction of issue, they will choose the least demanding. Regulatory competition 
would then lead to relocation to the least stringent jurisdictions. However, the 
attraction of the most strictly regulated markets for foreign issuers appears difficult to 
reconcile with this statement. Other arguments may also be put forward, such as the 
difficulty for investors to sue issuers and intermediaries internationally. We will now 
analyse these arguments which have not been discussed before.  
Instability 
Breton (2000) cites the case of securities in Canada as an example of non-
convergence to an optimum. For Breton, this situation results from the dynamic 
instability caused by competition. Changes in one jurisdiction lead to more significant 
changes in competing jurisdictions, which leads to a new reaction. It seems to us that 
two other explanations should be considered in this specific case. Regulatory 
competition can only lead to harmonization at the top if the agents (issuers and 
investors) have similar concepts of utility. The need for information and propensity to 
risk of Alberta investors interested in junior gas exploration stocks are probably very 
different from those of an institutional investor which holds a large position in stocks 
of banks or insurance companies in Ontario. Furthermore, the Canadian system is not 
one of pure regulatory competition because regulation of the province of origin is 
only valid in that province. Provincial bodies therefore retain local monopoly power.  
Breton examines three ways to solve blockages. The first two destroy the competition 
mechanism and whether they have worse effects than some types of instability is 
surely a possibility  (p. 12). The methods are centralization or the imposition of 
uniform standards. Breton prefers what he calls weak harmonization to  strong 
harmonization. Control of instability can be achieved while preserving regulatory 
competition and instituting clear mechanisms for dispute resolution. This is the path 
the European Community seems to have chosen.  
Absence of harmonization 
Regulatory competition is often seen as being incompatible with harmonization. Tung 
(2002) argues that this is not the case, for several reasons. Firstly, minimal   99
harmonization is required for certain forms of regulatory competition to exist such as 
the portable reciprocity which underlies the European passport.  
Secondly, in cases of direct regulatory competition, the law of the jurisdiction of 
origin applies in the host jurisdiction. There must therefore be minimal agreement 
between the regulatory bodies.  
In the European Community (EC), regulatory competition is seen as a means of 
harmonizing regulation by meeting the needs of agents as opposed to imposed 
harmonization (top-down approach), considered unrealistic. In theory, competition 
should cause a tendency toward harmonization provided economic agents have 
similar concerns. However, there are several examples where the mechanism does not 
work. In U.S. company law, it seems that the system has led to a quasi-monopolistic 
situation of one State which has been able to build a significant comparative 
advantage. Moreover, Choi and Guzman (1998) recognize that the regulatory 
competition model does not necessarily lead to regulatory uniformity. They admit 
that regulatory needs differ depending on the investors and argue that the portable 
reciprocity model allows different regulatory systems to coexist, thereby eliminating 
costs caused by the imposition of uniform regulation on vastly different issuers and 
investors. The question then becomes the following: in a highly diversified 
community, should we consider one or more regulatory systems? On this point, and 
more broadly on the experience of regulation of a heterogeneous confederation, the 
European experience warrants careful analysis.  
4.5 The European situation 
The building of a common Europe is full of lessons because the Community was 
confronted with the necessity of analysing and reforming securities regulation in 15 
countries. As Jackson and Pan (2001) write, the European Union currently provides a 
regulatory structure analogous to what proponents of issuer choice advocate for the 
United States. Thus, Europe presents a natural laboratory for testing theoretical 
disputes arising out of the regulatory competition literature. Numerous works and 
reports have been produced and may be used to put the Canadian situation in 
perspective and especially to analyse, in the real world, the idea of regulatory 
competition in the field of finance. 
Jackson and Pan also write: 
The notion that the legal structure of the European Union might 
present a venue of regulatory competition has been recognized for   100
some time now. In fact, the principle of mutual recognition has been 
associated with regulatory competition since its inception. Mutual 
recognition, as envisioned by the European Commission in its 1985 
White Papers and applied in the Listing Particulars Directive (1980) 
and Public Offers Directive (1989), was meant to generate a 
"competition among rules" and force regulatory harmonization among 
the member states. Several commentators predicted in the early 1990s 
that the passport concept could force all member states to lower 
regulatory protections to the minimum standards of the directives (a 
race to the bottom)
27 while others speculated that member states might 
converge on some other standard (potentially a race to the top). 
Steil (2002) expressed the wish that regulatory competition would allow a real 
European financial arena to be developed. However, the Lamfalussy Report
101 (2001, 
p. 13) makes an observation strangely similar to that observed in Canada by Mackay:  
The Committee notes that an almost consensual view has emerged that the European 
Union’s current regulatory framework is too slow, too rigid, complex and ill-adapted 
to the pace of global financial market change.  Moreover, almost everyone agrees 
that existing rules and regulations are implemented differently and that therefore 
inconsistencies occur in the treatment of the same type of business, which threatens to 
violate the pre-requisite of the competitive neutrality of supervision. The situations 
are, however, very different. Canada already has a very harmonized regulatory 
framework, which is not the case in Europe. 
The current steps following the Lamfalussy Report, the revision of ISD 93, new 
directives on prospectuses and the FSAP constitute different means used by the EC to 
ease dysfunctions in the mutual recognition system instituted in 1993. This system is 
one of the components of regulatory competition under the European model.  
4.5.1 Different  situations 
The European situation differs greatly from that which prevails in Canada. A market 
structure based on bank financing in Europe is different from the much more 
disintermediated market structure in Canada, where the capital markets have a more 
important role in financing companies, probably due to the proximity of the United 
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States
102. The diversity of regulatory structures, legal systems, traditions and 
languages is very strong in Europe.  
Gros and Lannoo (2000) describe very important differences which exist for tax, 
accounting standards and governance policies. They observe, in particular, (p.113) 
that the harmonization of accounting standards has not gone sufficiently far, and 
consequently mutual recognition does not work. 
Warren (1990) describes as follows the situation which prevailed at the beginning of 
the 1990’s:   
European securities regulation has been described as "virtually non-
existent outside the United Kingdom."  Although corporate law is 
fairly well-developed in the various jurisdictions, European stock ex-
changes have been self regulating, with little or no direct oversight by 
national governments.  Most European states have not mandated full 
disclosure systems for the distribution and trading of securities" nor 
have they prohibited insider trading" or other manipulative practices 
generally proscribed by United States securities laws for most of the 
20th century. (..) Furthermore, most European states have lacked 
governmental "competent authorities" or regulatory bodies to 
administer those regulations that were in force or to supervise self-
regulatory organizations in the securities industry.   
Warren admits that efforts made in connection with establishing the common market 
in 1992 led to a rapid evolution toward the adoption of higher and more coherent 
standards but important differences remain ten years later. In his summary of answers 
made by member states to a series of questions respecting the treatment of 
prospectuses, the CESR (2002) illustrates very important differences between 
Community countries.  
These differences affect the organizations in charge (exchanges, commissions, banks 
in certain cases), their powers to inspect, to delay takeovers or halt trades or simply 
their statutory authority to approve prospectuses. Laws sometimes do not define a 
public offering or the responsibilities of relevant authorities in several countries. 
Prospectuses are analyzed very differently depending on the country. The Lamfalussy 
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Report also points out the absence of precise European regulation on a great number 
of issues (such as prospectuses, transborder guarantees, market abuse, investment 
services), as well as the differences between the legal and tax systems.  
Finally, the degree of cooperation at the European level was extremely limited and 
observation of this situation led to the creation in 1998 of FRESCO (Forum of 
European Securities Commissions) (Lannoo, 2001). In addition, there are no 
generally accepted guidelines which govern legislation on financial services 
(Lamfalussy Report). 
The challenges facing Europe are therefore of a different type than those facing 
Canada. However, analysis and the European experience may help our examination 
and will be discussed here under three headings. Firstly we will study the investment 
service directive (ISD 93), then its update and finally the main recommendations of 
the Lamfalussy Report and the reactions it caused.  
4.5.2  Competition and harmonization 
For Ferrarini (2002, p. 5), European Securities regulation is the result of an initial 
attempt at substantially comprehensive harmonization, which was soon converted 
into a plan of minimum harmonization and mutual recognition. As a result, some 
regulatory competition between the Member States is allowed, also in compliance 
with the subsidiarity principle.
103 
Regulatory competition for securities currently exists in Europe and this market 
therefore constitutes a preferred laboratory to analyse the effects of competition. 
However, this competition is mitigated by the adoption of minimal standards which 
constitute a basis which allows mutual recognition, in theory. However, this system 
has not functioned properly:  few issuers have actually used mutual recognition (the 
passport) and additional requirements have regularly been imposed under the heading 
of “general good justification”. 
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Furthermore, slowness in the progress to a European financial arena has led to the 
development of an action plan, review of the investment service directive and the 
creation of a Committee of Wise Men (Lamfalussy Committee). We will quickly 
review these various elements, studying them from the point of view of regulatory 
competition.  
4.5.3  The investment service directive (ISD 93) 
The ISD, known as the European passport directive, has dominated the financial 
landscape since its adoption in 1993 (Moloney, 2002, p. 355). It is based on European 
directives respecting the carrying on of business and freedom of location which are 
the foundation of the European Treaty.  
The overall strategy of this directive has been to totally free the investment service 
market by subjecting suppliers of services solely to the authority of their country of 
origin. ISD has thus allowed a true passport to be set up which allows a company 
registered by the authority of its country of origin to offer services in all the countries 
of the Union without further authorization. A supplier of services remains governed 
by the rules of his country of origin. The ISD is an application of the principle of 
mutual recognition developed by the European Court of Justice. This principle has 
exceptions under the heading of general good justification. Tison (2000) analyses the 
conditions for exemptions under which a country may have additional requirements 
and thus contravene the principle of mutual recognition. At the level of all economic 
activity (outside ISD), the absence of harmonization is one of the causes put forward 
to derogate from this principle. 
This situation also prevails for financial services despite the existence of minimum 
standards of harmonization which in theory limit recourse to the concept of general 
good justification. The ISD theoretically allows perfect mutual recognition. However, 
two areas remain problematic and can give rise to additional requirements:  they are 
the rules of conduct, the oversight of which is up to the countries where the service is 
rendered (Article 11 (2) ISD) and the regulation of financial products in private law 
which is not covered by the principle of mutual recognition.  
To facilitate use of the passport, the second banking directive and the ISD provide for 
a notice procedure by which an authority of the host country notifies the supplier of 
services who requests market access of the specific rules required under the principle 
of general good justification. However, the commission is looking into the mandatory 
or discretionary nature of these additional roles and even into pursuing the notice 
system.   104
The purpose of the ISD is not to harmonize laws but it uses a minimal harmonization 
approach. Analysis of issuer behaviour in the framework of the ISD has been 
conducted by Jackson and Pan (2001). They conclude that market forces determined 
the way in which companies conducted pan-European offers and not the provisions of 
the ISD. 
Companies have not used the passport, but have conducted international-style 
offerings, i.e. private placements outside the country of origin where they were in 
compliance with existing provisions. Rules governing disclosure in this context are 
not so much affected by regulatory provisions, but by international practices based on 
American standards. Put in a competitive system, issuers have therefore chosen not to 
use the lower standards prevailing in several countries of the Union and complied 
with higher standards and disclosure requirements not required by the regulation in 
place
104. We cannot, however, rule out that the quasi-systematic use of general good 
justification by several countries has limited use of the mutual recognition provisions.  
4.5.4  Revision of the ISD and FSAP 
The effectiveness of the 1993 ISD
105 has been mitigated by extensive dilution of the 
ISD's principle of “home country control” whereby a firm can operate EU-wide on 
the basis of mutual recognition of supervision since numerous provisions of the ISD 
allow for host country intervention in the interests of the "general good". Article 11 of 
the Directive provides for host authorities to implement local conduct of business 
rules in addition to those enforced in the home country of the firm. 
Though this may be helpful in terms of protecting retail investors, it is currently 
applied indiscriminately to inter-professional business which is over-burdened with 
application of rules designed with the small, household investor in mind. In addition, 
there has often been wide variation in the interpretation and implementation of the 
ISD at the national level. Important obstacles to competition have been observed and, 
for example, use of the passport by issuers has been very limited. 
The EC has therefore developed a financial services action plan (FSAP, 1999), the 
main objective of which is maximum integration of European financial markets, with 
a 2005 horizon, to optimize the use of capital in the Community. The FSAP contains 
43 measures, of which, according to Durance (2002, p. 12), the main ones are the 
following:   
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•  The integration of “large” markets through universal recognition of 
prospectuses, the adoption of a common definition of professional investor, 
use of the same accounting standards, common minimum standards respecting 
takeover bids, institution of a single market for institutional investors based on 
the European passport and mutual recognition of retirement plans, life 
insurance and mutual funds.  
•  Opening up of retail markets to facilitate remote sale of financial services to 
customers through information and the application of the legislation of the 
vendor’s country. 
•  Reinforcement of prudent surveillance by the definition of a common 
solvency ratio for banks. 
•  Authorization of optimal functioning of the European financial market by the 
reduction of the risk of tax distortion on savings income. 
In February 2002, 25 measures had been achieved, including the adoption of uniform 
accounting standards (IAS, now IFRS) with a 2005 horizon for companies listed on 
an exchange and their subsidiaries. Several others are still being studied but two new 
measures have been adopted since then:  the proposal on prospectuses (November 
2002), and that on market abuse (insider trading and market manipulation, October 
2002). The action plan thus involved the revision of the ISD as well as the setting up 
of a more efficient and, accordingly, more restrictive decision-making model for 
member States. This analysis of decision structures was the object of the Lamfalussy 
Report. As Ferrarini mentioned (2002, p. 22), the two steps are inseparable.  
4.5.5  Revision of the ISD 
The ISD 93 no longer allowed the use of an efficient framework governing 
transborder investment activity in the European Union. It did not establish clear rules, 
from which competition between trading systems (stock markets and others) and their 
integration could take place. Its main deficiencies are the following: 
(1)    The ISD does not provide for sufficient harmonization to allow effective 
mutual recognition of consents issued to investment firms. As a result, the efficiency 
of the passport it introduced has been largely diminished by the exercise of double, 
and sometimes multiple, oversight of transborder transactions;   106
(2)  The restrictions it contains for investor protection are out of date:  the rules of 
investor protection must be reviewed to require investment companies to actively use 
new trading opportunities in order to obtain the best possible results for their clients; 
(3)  The ISD does not cover the full range of services offered to investors (for 
example, investment advice or new distribution channels) or financial trading;  
(4)  The directive does not allow for a response to regulatory and competition 
issues raised by competition between stock exchanges and between them and the new 
trade execution infrastructure. Competition between the different methods of 
executing trades constitutes the main regulatory challenge faced by the EC oversight 
authorities. The few provisions of the ISD respecting regulated markets, as they are 
excessively limited, do not provide a clear regulatory framework in which these 
regulated markets and other trading systems can compete to attract liquidity or in 
which investment firms can execute off-market orders when providing other services 
to their clients; 
(5)  The ISD has used an optional approach respecting regulation of market 
structures, thereby creating a major obstacle to the creation of a competitive and 
integrated trading infrastructure. From one member State to another, the methods of 
trade execution are therefore very diverse. Equally fundamental divergences in the 
regulation of market structures have indirectly caused disparities in national trading 
agreements, rules governing market operation, the competitive edge which exists 
between the infrastructure for trade execution and behaviour of market participants. 
These disparities greatly affect transborder trades and fragment liquidity; 
(6)  Provisions of the ISD respecting designation of authorities having jurisdiction 
and their cooperation are insufficient: a condition precedent to the existence of an 
orderly single market is total and immediate cooperation and the continuous flow of 
information between the national authorities. 
(7)  Provisions of the ISD are rigid and out of date:  they do not allow for a 
response to the hot regulatory questions raised by the evolution of market structures, 
of business transacted in them and of prudent practice. This necessity testifies 
moreover to the futility of attempting to regulate financial markets by inserting very 
detailed provisions in unchangeable legislation.  
Given that the ISD did not provide for any mechanism to harmonize national 
approaches to implementation (this absence underlies all the issues examined by the   107
Lamfalussy Committee), the Commission believed that a new approach was needed 
to surmount the present difficulties, seize new possibilities offered and meet the 
legislative challenges caused by the transformation of European securities markets. 
An essential objective of this revision consisted of endowing the ISD with structural 
mechanisms of realization.  
4.5.6  The Lamfalussy Report 
 
The Lamfalussy Report deals essentially with setting up structures which would 
allow the ISD to be modernized, and more specifically with setting up minimum 
standards required for the mutual recognition system to function properly. It does not 
involve the creation of a European Securities Commission; the two committees set up 
are essentially joint decision-makers whose powers go further than those of the CSA 
because they can have their decisions approved by the European parliament. The 
Lamfalussy Report proposes a decision-making structure which uses four levels 
based on committees, within the framework of the principle of comitology
106. 
 
Lamfalussy expresses the need for harmonization, which is not total but allows 
adequate operation of a mutual recognition system. Lannoo (2001) is also clearly in 
favour of harmonization but sets limits to it. He also criticizes the Lamfalussy Report 
for not paying sufficient attention to the process of stimulating proper market 
operation throughout the various institutions and financial intermediaries involved. 
He writes on page 1:  Full harmonisation is not realistic, however, nor is it even 
desirable since some degree of competition between jurisdictions can do no harm.  
This reaction is rather common and several researchers have criticized the Committee 
for having very clearly defined how to reach a goal, but without defining it. However, 
the recommendation on structures was clearly the mandate of this committee.  
Contrary to what is sometimes argued neither the Lamfalussy Report nor the FSAP 
provides for the creation of a single securities commission in Europe, as the web site 
of the European Commission states
107. This option is only mentioned and the 
approach of imposed harmonization is seen as an approach of last resort
108. The 
sequential steps in the building of a financial Europe can be characterized as follows: 
•  Step 1:  ISD 93 and regulatory competition, limited by the strong prerogatives 
of States.  
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•  Step 2:  updating of ISD 93 and new directives:  regulatory competition made 
possible by the imposition of minimal standards for mutual recognition to 
become effective.  
•  Step 3:  re-examination in 2004 which may lead, in the case of failure, to the 
institution of a single set of rules considered by numerous researchers as 
totally unrealistic. This single commission would require that all countries 
give up their jurisdiction over securities, which seems highly unlikely.  
The role and composition of the two committees set up following publication of the 
report are defined as follows on the EC website:   
The European Securities Committee (ESC) is composed of 
representatives of Member States, chaired by the European 
Commission. It may invite experts and observers to participate in its 
meetings. The Committee will be chaired by the Commission, which 
will also provide the secretariat. 
It will be consulted by the Commission when drafting legislative 
proposals on securities policy issues. In this respect, it will take on the 
functions of the existing High Level Securities Supervisors Committee 
established by the Commission on an informal basis in 1985. 
This Committee may also act as a regulatory committee in the context 
of work on future legislative proposals conferring implementing 
powers on the Commission, which must be decided by Co-decision. In 
its future regulatory capacity, it will vote on draft technical 
implementing measures that develop basic legislation submitted to it 
by the Commission. 
The Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR) is 
composed of high-level representatives of the national public 
authorities competent in the field of securities. This Committee may 
invite experts or observers to participate in its meetings. It will set out 
its own operational arrangements. 
The CESR will advise the Commission on securities policy issues. 
After consulting the ESC, the Commission may mandate the CESR to   109
prepare draft implementing measures. In so doing, it will act in a 
transparent manner, fully involving market participants, consumers 
and end-users on a regular basis. 
The CESR will also play an important role for the transposition of 
community law in the Member States. It will enhance consistent and 
timely day-to-day implementation of the Community law through 
reinforced co-operation between national regulators. 
4.5.7  The directive on prospectuses 
The directive on prospectuses is at level 2
109 with respect to the technical details of 
the various forms of prospectuses. The direction of the EC is clear.  
It is a system of complete mutual recognition. At this time, mutual recognition is only 
guaranteed when the prospectus includes the elements required by directive 
80/390/ECE and the authorities of the host country may request additional 
information relating to their market specifics, including translation, which involves 
higher costs. Complete application (on level 4) of a European passport for an issue 
will imply automatic acceptance of the prospectus in all countries when it has been 
accepted in the country of origin. The language of drafting is independent of the 
authority of the country which is contemplated. It must be one recognized by the 
authority of the country which gives a final receipt in the case of an issue limited to 
the state of the head office. The prospectus may be drafted in the “usual language of 
international finance” in the other cases. For shares, the prospectus must be approved 
by the authority of the country of head office. For debt security, the authority may be 
other than the country of head office for large issues if criteria of attachment exist. 
This is the case if the issue is registered in the host country. 
The European visa system for prospectuses therefore goes further than the Canadian 
mutual reliance review system. There is effectively mutual recognition and reciprocal 
delegation of the power of review except, however, for small-scale issues. It remains 
to be seen, however, to what extent this system will in fact allow European offers and 
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not  international-style offerings. This  depends on the wishes of countries to use 
provisions of general good justification. In theory, the quick application of the 
various directives should limit recourse to these provisions. In effect, a passport 
system can only function properly if the conditions of authorization are relatively 
similar in the different jurisdictions. Otherwise, a broker who is refused permission to 
do business in one jurisdiction could obtain a permit valid for the whole of the 
Community from a more compliant jurisdiction. FESCO, which became CESR 
(Committee of European Securities Regulators), defined the minimum (not limitative) 
standards which are based on the principle that individuals who wish to offer 
financial services must meet high standards of integrity, ability and knowledge. 
4.5.8  Control, legal proceedings and competition 
The mutual recognition procedure poses significant problems with respect to law 
enforcement. The responsibility for supervision is divided between the state of origin 
which is primarily responsible under the ISD and the host state, which keeps 
important powers of enforcement for investor protection and integrity of the financial 
system. This problem is handled in two ways. Firstly, the directive sets out a 
hierarchy of responsibilities and interactions between the authorities of the country of 
origin and the host country. Secondly, a procedure of close cooperation and 
information exchange has been set up (Moloney, 2002, p. 409-416). Cooperation 
between countries and between various financial authorities in the same country is 
expressly provided for in the directive. 
Competition between exchanges is a key element of upgrading the ISD
110. The 
Community says [Translation] With respect to global market efficiency, regulatory 
provisions directly limit competition between infrastructures which execute trades 
does not seem to produce, in terms of price, improvements which would justify such 
strong intervention in market structures to encourage execution on stock markets. A 
recent analysis of trading prices covering almost all shares traded in the main 
European stock exchanges has not in any way substantiated the hypothesis that 
concentration improves market efficiency (as measured by average ranges between 
actual buy and sell prices)
111. There is thus a major difference in this respect between 
the Canadian and European situations.  
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4.6 Conclusion 
Research studies and market observation allow us to argue that a regulatory 
monopoly is not necessarily preferable to regulatory competition, either in company 
law or securities.  
However, it is useful not to systematically oppose the two ideas and a certain form of 
competition is surely compatible with minimum harmonization. Besides avoiding the 
high cost of imposing uniform regulation on jurisdictions which do not wish to give 
up their prerogatives, this pragmatic approach allows for local adjustments and 
initiatives which may allow local or changing realities to be taken into account. This 
is the path taken by the European Community.  
The European system of mutual recognition allows a certain form of competition but 
does not lead to the disappearance of local authorities, which several countries are 
currently strengthening. For example, in France, modernization of regulators has 
resulted in two new authorities:  the Autorité des marchés financiers (AMF) and the 
Commission de contrôle des assurances, des mutuelles et des institutions de 
prévoyance (CCAMIP). For greater efficiency these authorities result from the 
merger of existing bodies. The AMF, in particular, is the result of the merger of the 
Commission des opérations de bourse (COB), created in 1967, the Conseil des 
marchés financiers (CMF), created in 1996, and the Conseil de discipline de la 
gestion financière, created in 1988. Its mission will be to protect savings invested in 
financial products, investor information and proper market operation.  
Europe seems to have adopted a position which reconciles a form of regulatory 
competition since certain jurisdictions may apply minimum standards and others may 
require more. However, the minimal harmonization imposed prohibits the second 
group from refusing to allow intermediaries or companies located in the least 
stringent jurisdiction access to its market. Regulatory competition is therefore 
balanced by minimal standards, which limit the possibilities of a race to the bottom. 
This approach to harmonization for securities reflects a model of reciprocity and not 
convergence.  
The reciprocity approach is based on the concept of respect for standards and 
regulations of other jurisdictions. To the extent that two or more jurisdictions have 
relatively similar principles in common, it is possible for them to accept, within the 
context of bilateral or multilateral agreements, that an entity which meets the 
requirements of the jurisdiction of origin also meets the requirements of the other 
jurisdictions. This mechanism can be set up based on minimum standards.    112
For Warren (1990), the manner in which the EC has partially harmonized company 
and securities law to allow reciprocal recognition is an example of this pragmatic 
approach. This approach is applicable between jurisdictions which display, from the 
outset, similarities in terms of regulation. It has however been put in place in a 
European Community which is very diverse in terms of securities regulation and the 
role and responsibility of commissions
112.  
Commonality requires the development of a body of equivalent or uniform rules 
which apply in all jurisdictions. In the securities field, these rules should include 
accounting and disclosure principles, insider trading, market manipulation, conflicts 
of interest and fraud (Warren, 1990, p. 191). The agreement in force between Canada 
and the United States (MJDS) is a reciprocal recognition system based on the 
establishment of substantially equivalent standards (Warren, 1990). As we will see in 
the following sections, this treaty operates almost unilaterally because shares of 
Canadian companies are traded on the American market whereas trades in Canada of 
American shares are extremely rare. Commonality does not necessarily require the 
disappearance of local jurisdictions. It seems however essential, in a non-
homogenous body such as the EC, to maintain a degree of regulatory competition. 
According to Niemeyer (2001): 
Thus, harmonization may very well improve the competition between 
different markets and agents. However, given the differences in legal 
system and regulatory tradition, harmonization is difficult. 
Furthermore, it may not even be desirable. First, individuals are likely 
to demand certain proximity in the regulation and supervision of 
securities markets. If this proximity is reduced, their confidence in the 
appropriateness and impartiality of the regulation and supervision 
may be hurt. 
Second, a far-reaching harmonization would reduce a healthy 
competition between different regulatory regimes. If the harmonized 
regulations are not open enough, they could easily curtail the 
development of new services and techniques. In the present non-
harmonized regulatory situation, there are possibilities to compare 
how different regulatory structures handle different problems. There 
are therefore also possibilities to learn and over time improve the 
regulatory framework. In a fully harmonized world, this will be more 
difficult. As the pace of change in the markets increases, the need for 
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regulatory change also increases. There is a clear risk that a fully 
harmonized regulatory system would be less flexible.  
The issue of an adequate model of reciprocal delegation was debated at the 8th law 
symposium at Queen’s University in 2001. Maykut (2001) presented this model as a 
reasonable and viable alternative to centralization proposals. For Maykut, this model 
recognizes and makes the most of the political and constitutional realities of our 
country. Maykut shows that the delegation of powers to securities commissions is in 
accordance with the Canadian constitution and points to the example of the MJDS, 
where a real delegation of power exists between the Canadian and American 
authorities. She presents inter-provincial delegation as a natural progression from the 
MRRS. She observes that this mutual recognition is at any rate becoming required 
between national jurisdictions because trades are becoming more and more frequently 
transborder. For the author, a condition precedent of setting up such a system is 
uniformity of legislation. The European experience shows, however, that uniformity 
is not an essential condition.  
Minimal harmonization is certainly required, but perfect uniformity is neither an 
absolute condition nor probably a desirable situation. It would eliminate possibilities 
of innovation which are one of the advantages of regulatory competition. 
Anand (2001) opposes this proposal with the following arguments. Reciprocal 
delegation cannot be put in place without harmonization of provincial regulations. 
Anand then writes that “uniformity can only be achieved with a national regulator in 
place”. Two observations can be made. Firstly, a system of delegation can function 
without regulatory uniformity. Minimal harmonization is required, as the European 
example shows. Secondly, this harmonization may occur without a central authority 
even if it requires the creation of structures and mechanisms which bridge 
divergences between regulations of various jurisdictions. The Lamfalussy Report 
recommends onerous structures and a complex process which respond to the 
significant differences separating the regulations of European countries. The CSA 
already exists in Canada and its recent proposal for regulatory uniformity shows that 
harmonization may be attained without a national commission.    114  115
PART 5 
5- THE CANADIAN AND AMERICAN FINANCIAL SYSTEMS:  COMPETITION AND 
REGULATION 
The debate on the centralization of securities regulation in Canada has recently been 
reopened in the name of improved efficiency and reduction of costs for issuers and 
investors.  Because of the fragmentation of securities regulation, Canada suffers from 
a net disadvantage compared to other jurisdictions, which limits development of its 
market.  This argument was put forward in the following manner by the Ontario 
Teacher’s Pension Plan Board which, in its comments submitted to the Ontario 
Securities Act Five Year Review Committee
113 (Five Year Committee), wrote: 
The Provinces need to recognize that Canada is suffering as a 
destination for business and capital because they refuse to give up 
jurisdiction to a first class regulatory regime that is administered and 
enforced by a first class regulator.  
Centralization of securities authorities in Canada constitutes the first recommendation 
of the Five Year Committee and the Ontario Securities Commission.  
The American situation is often put forward as an example of regulatory 
centralization and its implementation within a federal state.  For example, the Five 
Year Committee writes (p. 6):  
Canada competes with other jurisdictions around the world for 
capital and for investment opportunities. Our regulatory regime must 
be part of our competitive advantage. This requires that our 
regulators be able to operate efficiently and that our regulatory 
requirements not be more onerous than those existing in other 
jurisdictions (particularly the United States), except as may be 
required to satisfy our public policy objectives. 
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Various participants recommend total harmonization with the American system
114.  
The IDA, in its answer to the Five Year Committee, proposes that Canadian 
regulatory Policy must, in general terms, be congruent with the SEC standards, and 
in some case recognize US standards to ease the regulatory burden for Canadian 
Companies. Such statements suggest that American securities regulation is a model 
for centralization and efficiency. They also suggest that the American model could be 
transferred to Canada. These two statements require careful analysis which we will 
discuss here from the viewpoint of concentration and competition.  
Market participants agree that a dynamic and innovative market is essential to 
maintain and develop the securities industry in Canada.  In theory, innovation and 
dynamism go hand-in-hand with competition.  In the United States, competition 
between stock markets grew in the 1900’s and played a decisive role in reducing 
transaction costs and stimulating innovation. In Canada, to the contrary, the financial 
system has become progressively concentrated and the six large banks, in addition to 
controlling most banking activity, control two-thirds of brokerage firms through their 
subsidiaries.  Dealers, through the IDA and the TSX Group inc., the single remaining 
market group, play an important regulatory role. The principal dealers own one of the 
Canadian alternative trading systems. The level of concentration in the Canadian 
financial market has therefore become extreme. An eventual merger between the 
principal banks, often mentioned, will increase this concentration.  The Canadian 
situation is therefore totally different from that which exists in the United States.  
This concentration is in part the result of a wish to improve the competitive position 
of the Canadian securities market faced with an attractive and very dynamic 
American market.  However, proposals respecting the regulatory structure in Canada 
cannot ignore this reality and the transposition of an American model, although very 
different from what is generally said, cannot take place without significant 
adjustments.  
We will begin by analysing the evolution of the American financial system and its 
regulation.  In the second part we will study the evolution of the Canadian financial 
system and its current structure.  This exercise will give us a better understanding of 
the enormous differences which separate these two systems and reveal the fact that, in 
many areas affecting the financial world, American regulation is very broadly 
decentralized and competitive. 
The introduction of the dimension of competition into the debate surrounding 
securities regulation in Canada is essential for several reasons. Firstly, market 
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participants all wish for a dynamic and innovative market; these two characteristics 
are generally the hallmark of competitive markets. Secondly, several theoreticians of 
regulation maintain and demonstrate that regulation does not always have a public 
interest orientation, namely the correction of market dysfunctions and consumer 
protection. Private interest theories see the regulatory process as a competition 
between interest groups where the best organized and structured groups are able to 
capture the benefits of regulation to the detriment of less organized groups
115.  Becker 
(1983) shows that the most highly concentrated sectors are more likely than others to 
impose their priorities. Capture theory defends an extreme situation where the 
regulatory process is subservient to the needs of an industry. Mechanisms which may 
lead to such situations are the differences in levels of expertise, transfers of human 
resources from the sector to the regulatory organization and vice versa (the revolving 
door process) and the infiltration of organizations by upper-level industry staff.  Here 
again, capture is more likely when concentration is great.  Furthermore, it has become 
impossible to deal with securities regulation without dealing with the banking sector, 
which owns the main brokerage firms in Canada. In addition to dominating the 
banking field, the large Canadian institutions also dominate securities. The main 
objective of this study is therefore to illustrate the process of concentration of the 
Canadian financial sector while, however, going beyond the narrow framework of 
financial corporations. These play a growing and important role with regulatory 
organizations and this role must be examined.  A parallel with the American situation 
will be drawn.  
American securities regulation is more complex than it initially seems, despite recent 
changes giving broader powers at the federal level. It is therefore important to 
understand the main characteristics of American financial regulation.  It is also useful 
to assess the current regulatory systems in Canada. This is the second objective of 
this Part. 
In the third section we will discuss the issues relating to the American and Canadian 
situations in terms of regulation of the financial sectors. In the United States, the SEC 
may be considered a regulatory monopoly with respect to important securities, in the 
face of a competitive and fragmented industry. In Canada, provincial securities 
regulation creates a form of regulatory competition in the face of a very heavily 
concentrated industry. The establishment of a national commission will lead to the 
setting up of a regulatory monopoly. Authorization of the mergers of banks, which 
own the main brokerage firms, and the growing concentration in this sector, seems to 
be leading Canada to oligopoly. According to the forecasts of regulatory 
theoreticians, a situation where a regulatory monopoly governs an oligopoly is 
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potentially dangerous.  This cannot be ignored in the present discussion surrounding 
the restructuring of securities regulation in Canada. 
5.1 The American system:  market competition, regulatory monopoly 
The level of competition in American securities markets is significant and grew 
rapidly during the 1990’s.  The United States General Accounting Office states that in 
March 2002, the SEC oversaw nine exchanges, the over-the-counter market and 
seventy alternative trading systems as well as twelve clearing houses
116. The 
existence of several exchanges stimulated competition, but the growth of alternative 
trading systems or ATS was the major element in the reduction of transaction costs 
(Benhamou and Serval, 1999). This growth was moreover stimulated by the slowness 
of American exchanges to adopt efficient  trading platforms, as several European 
countries have done.  Several analyses have shown important differences between the 
cost of trading on the NYSE and on NASDAQ (Huang and Stoll, 1996; Chung et al, 
1999). These observations, unfavourable to NASDAQ, lead to regulatory intervention 
to change the behaviour of market makers. However, it appears clear that the 
development of ATS played a major role in the overall reduction of transaction costs 
and improvement of the quality of services.  
In the United States, the stock market has become progressively more competitive, 
the number of institutions offering trading services has grown, and transaction costs 
have decreased.  It does not appear that this evolution took place to the detriment of 
liquidity or the quality of information, in particular because of the existence of data 
consolidation systems.  The regulation of this large collection of institutions and 
organizations is entrusted to the SEC, which has intervened several times to stimulate 
competition. It has also promoted the emergence of ATS, despite the fact that setting 
up these systems fragments trades and potentially harms liquidity.  Faced with such 
fragmentation, a single regulatory body might be best.  However, American 
regulation is not totally centralized and it is, moreover, opposed and sometimes even 
connected with the recent setbacks of several large corporations.  
5.1.1  Regulation of the securities industry in the United States 
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The securities industry in the United States is one of the most regulated
117. Its 
regulation is, moreover, an effort shared between federal and local decision-makers 
(at the level of each State) and self-regulatory organizations. For example, in the 
State of Tennessee
118, the Securities Division is responsible for the administration of 
the Tennessee Securities Act of 1980. This division registers brokers, handles public 
complaints involving trades in securities and authorizes new share issues.  The 
Division acknowledges, however, that it only looks after around 15% of all share 
issues taking place in the State.  Issuers who have registered their securities on a 
national exchange benefit from an exemption under either the National Securities 
Markets Improvement Act of 1996 (NSMIA) or the SEC provisions.  Local 
commissions therefore in fact manage the issuances of small businesses
119.  
By using one of the 5 regional SCOR (Small Capital Offering Regulation) programs 
or certain types of direct federal investment (Regulations A, D and Intrastate), start-
up businesses may raise capital more easily and less onerously than conducting a 
traditional initial public offering (IPO). They then register with one or more States in 
which their shares will be sold, and not with the SEC (under an SEC exemption).  
They thereby avoid the traditional investors for start-ups who are gluttons in terms of 
percentage of voting rights (venture capital companies and angel investors) and their 
alternative, bank financing. Compared to an IPO, the amounts raised are less 
(between $1 and 20 million), and disclosure requirements are reduced. 
An issue may be sold by the business or by a commissioned sales agent, and use mass 
methods of communication. The Internet represents an ideal media for businesses 
conducting initial direct offerings (direct public offering or DPO) authorized to 
promote their securities themselves
120.  The gross proceeds of the issue must be put in 
trust with an independent bank until a predefined minimum amount is reached.  This 
method of financing has the disadvantage, however, of an illiquid secondary market 
because of restrictions on the sale of shares and the fact that these shares are not 
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traded on a stock exchange. To address this issue, in 1995 the SEC authorized the 
Pacific Stock Exchange to publicly list securities subject to SCOR regulation and 
Regulation A
121.  Since January 13, 1998, securities listed on Tier 1 of that exchange 
are “covered securities” within the meaning of the NSMIA of 1996 and come under 
the jurisdiction of the SEC. A great majority of businesses use this type of issue as a 
private placement, however, and investors hold the shares until the business is sold, is 
listed on an exchange, or redeems its own shares.  The SB-1 and SB-2 legislation is 
distinguished from other types of issues by small businesses in that it corresponds to 
initial public offerings reserved for start-up companies. Businesses must therefore 
register with the SEC but the procedure is simplified.  
Regulation of the securities industry in the United States takes into account the 
realities of a very fragmented market.  In particular, financing of small business is 
overseen at the local level and use of simplified procedures is allowed.  Small issues 
represent the vast majority of Canadian issues. In particular, the program of start-up 
capital partnerships (or “capital pools”) allowed 868 issues between 1991 and 2000, 
mainly in the western provinces.  This represents 46% of the 1,891 IPOs in this 
period.  In total, during this period, 1,217 issues raised an amount less than or equal 
to $1 million, and 1,491 raised less than CDN$5 million. Less than 10% of issues 
raised gross proceeds greater than US$20 million.  Almost 90% of Canadian IPO’s 
would have met local American regulation and could have taken advantage of “not 
covered securities” status. The image of centralized regulation applied throughout the 
United States should therefore be qualified, particularly when talking about small 
issues.  
5.1.2  Criticisms of centralized regulation 
The American regulatory system is the object of criticism which cannot be ignored.  
It may be grouped into three sub-headings. For several observers, the centralizing 
influence is one of the factors contributing to the multiplication of accounting and 
financial scandals.  For other authors, the centralized system eliminates regulatory 
competition and impairs the ability for rapid adaptation of regulation to market 
evolution.  Finally, American securities regulation is considered onerous and costly. 
5.1.2.1 The accounting and financial scandals argument 
As mentioned in section 3.4, the wish of the American federal government to impose 
a uniform securities law seems to have had indirect negative effects. These 
interventions are seen by certain researchers as direct, although partial, causes of 
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recent financial scandals. The exclusion of the States from lawsuits for securities 
having national scope eliminated several lawsuits and does not seem to have allowed 
uniformity of decisions.  However, this effect was reinforced by the inaction and lack 
of means of the central regulatory body, the SEC. Based on the American example, it 
does not seem that the Enron affair can be a very solid argument to require uniform 
securities legislation in Canada. 
5.1.2.2 The regulatory competition argument 
Regulatory competition is the situation under which, in a given area, economic agents 
may choose the regulatory system which governs them.  Such a system prevails in the 
United States in the field of company law, where Delaware offers what appears to be 
the most attractive company law. Such a regulatory structure allows differences to 
exist between jurisdictions and may generate a race to the bottom. However, this does 
not seem to happen. In fact, in a properly functioning economy, businesses which opt 
for a less strict system tell investors that they present additional risk and thus see their 
cost of capital grow accordingly.  
Regulatory competition may lead to a situation which seems sub-optimal because of 
inter-jurisdictional differences. However, it presents two major advantages. Firstly, 
the regulated businesses, intermediaries or investors may indicate their preferences by 
changing jurisdiction. The needs of those regulated are therefore taken into account 
more than in the classic (top-down) approach, where the agents, if they are heavily 
structured and organized, have more influence on the development of the laws 
governing them. Secondly, competition between jurisdictions allows more rapid 
reaction to changes in the economic environment, which are particularly rapid in the 
financial sector. Romano (2002, p. 13) describes as follows the advantages of 
regulatory competition in the field of securities: 
Regulatory competition, moreover, offers a distinctive advantage 
over a single regulator for securities law. It better aligns the 
incentives of issuers, and of regulators, with the interests of 
investors, and will thereby lead to the promulgation of rules that 
investors most prefer. That is so because issuers will be drawn to the 
regime preferred by investors to lower their cost of capital, and 
regulators will be able to discern the efficacy of their regulatory 
choices by the flow of firms into and out of jurisdictions. 
An analysis of regulatory competition was conducted in Part 4 of this report and will 
not be repeated here.  However, it was important to show that regulatory uniformity is   122
not the only means available and that competition between authorities, widely 
practiced in the United States, has significant advantages.  
5.1.2.3 American regulatory costs 
It is difficult to maintain that an alignment of the Canadian regulatory system with 
that of the United States would reduce costs for Canadian businesses. American 
regulation is onerous, costly and complex. Gagné et al (2002) observe that American 
regulation of businesses and consumers comprises 130,000 pages in the federal 
register and 4,000 new regulations are added each year.  In banking, Pattisson (1994) 
notes that institutions face 200,000 pages of banking laws, standards and regulations, 
of which 4,000 change each year.  He writes (p. 2) that the regulatory structure is 
disproportionately thick. In securities, the US System is much more costly for market 
participants than the Canadian system. By US standards, most of our market 
participants are small and cannot afford the cost of a US style designed for its much 
bigger markets and players (answer to the OSC preliminary report (2002) by the 
BCSC).  In fact, the minimum standards to maintain listing on the NASDAQ require 
capitalization greater than US$50 million, or around CDN$75 million.  Only 590 
Canadian businesses meet these criteria, representing 14% of officially listed 
corporations
122. 
Corporations whose securities constitute the TSX 60 index have characteristics quite 
similar to those whose securities trade on the NYSE (average capitalisation of US$5 
billion as opposed to $3.6 billion for NYSE stocks).  
5.1.3  The American banking sector 
According to Weelock and Wilson (2002), there were 14,483 banks in the United 
States at the end of 1984.  At the end of 1999, only 8,563 remained because of 
bankruptcies (1,312), but especially because of a large wave of mergers after the 
removal of legal barriers. Consolidation activity accelerated between 1997 and 1999 
(Hughes et al, 2002).  At the end of 1999 we saw the lifting of the Glass Steagall Act, 
which kept the activities of deposit, insurance and brokerage institutions 
independent
123, resulting in new consolidation in the industry. However, there 
nonetheless remained slightly more than 8,000 American banks at the end of 2001 
(Olson, 2002). 
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The American banking system is unique in several ways:  it includes a large number 
of banks and is governed by a multiplicity of regulatory organizations with 
overlapping authority as well as banking laws which differ from State to State. For 
example, the Financial Institutions Division of the Ohio Department of Commerce
124 
authorizes the creation of new deposit institutions (banks, credit unions, savings and 
loans, and savings banks), approves the restructuring of institutions already registered 
and checks compliance of institutions with State statutes and regulations. The Federal 
Reserve System, the American central bank, is decentralized in the sense that its 
authority is divided between twelve regional banks governed by a common board 
composed of seven governors appointed for fourteen years by the President of the 
United States.  According to Olson (2002), the American banking system is 
characterized by its duality, in the sense that it has developed jointly at the federal 
level and local level:  
We have nationally chartered banks supervised by the federal 
government and state-chartered banks supervised by both state and 
federal regulators. (…) Now that interstate banking is a reality, I 
submit that the dual banking system remains an important factor 
underlying the strength and flexibility of our financial system. As 
Chairman Greenspan has reminded us in the past, the freedom of 
banks to choose their regulator is the key to the protection of banks 
from the potential for unreasonable regulatory behaviour. (…) But I 
believe that the ability of banks to choose their regulator has fostered 
both the continued competitiveness of the industry and vitality of the 
economic activity it finances.  
5.1.4 Conclusion 
The United States practices strong regulatory competition or a two-level (local and 
national) system in several areas, such as company law and banking.  In the area of 
securities, regulation of local issuers remains with the States. The progressive 
encroachment of the federal government, particularly in terms of lawsuits, is 
criticized and alternative models of regulation based on competition have been 
proposed. Finally, the American financial landscape includes a large number of 
institutions and markets. It is fundamentally different from Canadian financial 
markets.  
                                                 
124 http://www.com.state.oh.us/odoc/dfi/dfiabout.htm.   124
5.2 The Canadian market:  regulatory competition and market oligopoly 
The Canadian financial system is traditionally an oligopoly (Bordo et al, 1993). In 
1987, a timely amendment to the ten-year reform of the 1980 banking legislation 
allowed banks to acquire brokerage firms. This amendment promoted increased 
concentration in the sector.  Bill C-8, which came into force in October 2001, 
authorized institutions other than deposit institutions (such as life insurers, money 
market mutual fund managers and stock brokers) to become members in the Canadian 
Payments Association.  This statute also set up a procedure for reviewing proposed 
mergers of large financial institutions, which includes a review of their effect on the 
public
125.  According to the International Monetary Fund (2003, p. 22)
126: 
The financial sector reforms of 2001 appear to have been implemented 
effectively. The new consumer protection agency is up and running, a 
framework for bank mergers has been established, and measures had 
been taken to encourage entry in the payments and banking systems, 
including by branches of foreign banks. The officials noted that, while 
some applications by new banks were close to approval, there had 
been relatively modest interest by potential entrants, possibly 
reflecting the dominant role of the existing major banks and the fact 
that the reforms were relatively new. 
This statute, intended to promote competition through the introduction of foreign 
players, therefore seems to have had little effect for the moment.  The several large 
Canadian banks presently own the large brokerage firms and their already significant 
influence in the only Canadian stock market should grow
127. Brokers, through the 
IDA, are co-owners with the TSX Group Inc. of Market Regulation Services Inc. (RS 
Inc.).  The large brokerage firms play a key role in the fixed income market and are 
shareholders of one of the Canadian ATS (Candeal.ca Inc.).  
                                                 
125  According to Roy, J. (2003), Vers une théorie des systèmes financiers, March 21, 2003, HEC, 
Montreal. 
126  IMF Country Report No. 03/33, February 2003. 
127 The concentration in the insurance field is also high.  At the end of 1999, the five main companies 
represented more than 54% of the Canadian market in terms of premiums and 57% of Canadian 
general assets.  They were Great West, Clarica, Manulife, Sun Life and Canada Life. (See 
http://www.fin.gc.ca). This concentration grew again at the end of 2002, with the merger of Sun Life 
and Clarica, implemented on December 31, 2002. Manulife also launched a hostile take-over bid for 
Canada Life on December 9, 2002, but the board of directors of Canada Life announced on Monday, 
February 17, 2003 that Great West had agreed to purchase all its common shares for $7.3 billion cash. 
Before these transactions, the life insurance sector was already more concentrated in Canada than in all 
other countries studied by the Group of Ten (Group of Ten, 2001). The five largest companies 
controlled 73.1% of assets in the sector. The ratio of concentration was 25.2 in the United States at the 
time.   125
5.2.1  Canadian banks and the brokerage industry 
Canadian banking activity is spread between nine national banks and fifty 
subsidiaries of foreign banks.  The six large Canadian banks control approximately 
90% of total banking assets and offer a wide range of financial services.  
 
They are:  
•  The Royal Bank of Canada (RBC, and RBC Financial Group), 
•  The Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (CIBC, owner in particular of 
CIBC Wood Gundy and CIBC Trust),  
•  The Bank of Montreal (BMO of which the subsidiaries of BMO Financial 
Group include Nestbitt Burns and the Harris Bank of Chicago), 
•  The Bank of Nova Scotia (which owns Scotia Capital), 
•  The Toronto-Dominion Bank, which owns TD Waterhouse Canada Inc. and 
TD Securities Inc., 
•  The National Bank of Canada (which owns National Bank Financial, as a 
result of the merger of Levesque Beaubien Inc. and First Marathon Inc.). 
Table 11 shows various indicators of Canadian market concentration. For the Task 
Force on the Future of Canadian Financial Services (MacKay letter), Canada was the 
developed country with the most concentrated banking sector in 1997. The method 
used by the Royal Bank gives a ratio of Canadian concentration of 46% as opposed to 
81% for the MacKay letter, so Canada is surpassed by Switzerland and the 
Netherlands.  However, the study by the Bank for International Settlements confirms 
the MacKay letter data and also shows strong growth in the concentration, which 
increased from 60.2 to 77.1% from 1990 to 1997. Such an increase is not seen in any 
other country. Only the United States saw growth in the same direction but the 
concentration index was only 11.3% in 1990.  Canada, along with the Netherlands,   126
seems to be the OECD country where the banking sector is the most concentrated.  
Despite this already high concentration, the largest banks have tried several times to 
merge.  According to Cookey et al (2001, p. 1), in 1998 these attempts lead to new 
legislation on mergers for financial institutions. 
In 1987, the federal and provincial governments amended legislation so that banks, 
trust companies and foreign brokerage firms could own brokerage firms. This leads to 
a profound reorganization of ownership in the securities industry. The large Canadian 
banks acquired leading brokerage firms or created their own firms.  
According to the IDA
128, at the end of 2002 the Canadian securities industry included 
200 brokerage firms (as opposed to less than 119 at the beginning of 1990).  Three 
broad types of brokerage firms coexist, namely the integrated brokerage firms (78% 
of business in the sector), institutional brokerage (9%) and retail brokerage
129 (12%).  
In 2001, the seven main integrated firms, including the brokerage subsidiaries of the 
six large Canadian banks and a large American brokerage firm (Merrill Lynch), had 
more than 70% of the business in the industry.  They are:  
•  BMO Nesbitt Burns, owned by the Bank of Montreal, 
•  CIBC World Markets, owned by CIBC, 
•  National Bank Financial, part of the National Bank of Canada, 
•  RBC Dominion Securities, owned by the Royal Bank of Canada, 
•  Scotia Capital Inc., owned by the Bank of Nova Scotia, 
•  TD Securities, owned by TD Bank Financial Group, 
                                                 
128 Merrill Lynch, Strategis web site, at business trends and profitability in the Canadian securities 
industry, July to September 2002, see also:  http://www.fin.gc.ca/tocf/2002/cansec_f.html. 
129 Integrated brokerage firms serve the institutional and retail markets. Institutional brokerage firms 
also work with pension funds, insurance companies, mutual funds, banks and trust companies.  Retail 
brokerage firms offer products and services to retail investors.   127
•  Merrill Lynch, which had captured a significant share of the Canadian retail 
market, withdrew from the retail market.  CIBC purchased the Canadian retail 
brokerage business of Merrill Lynch at the end of 2001 and its securities and 
mutual fund services in 2002.  
At the end of 2001, all the large integrated brokerage firms in Canada belonged to the 
banks, of which six represent more than 90% of total banking assets in 2002. These 
institutions are heavily involved in the holding of  exchanges and various self-
regulatory organizations.  
Table 11:  Ratio of concentration in the Canadian banking sector according to 
various studies 
Task Force on the Future of 














6                 1997
7 
Switzerland 71%  80% 53.2% 57.8% 
Australia 69%  --  72.1%  73.9% 
Netherlands 75%  57% 73.7% 82.2% 
Canada 81% 46%  60.2%  77.1% 
France --  36%  67.8%  69.3% 
United 
Kingdom  40% 19%  43.54%  35.2% 
Japan --  12%  31.8%  29.1% 
United States  19%  7%  11.3%  25.56% 
Germany 15%  20%  17.1%  18.8% 
1:  Task Force on the Future of Canadian Financial Services:  Competition, Competitiveness and the 
Public Interest Background Paper No. 1, September 1998. 
2:  Royal Bank of Canada, Canada’s Banks: A Strategic Asset, Spring 1998. 
3:  Group of Ten, Report on Consolidation in the Financial Sector, available at www.bis.org, January 
2001. 
4:  The ratio equals the total banking assets of the five largest banks over total banking assets.  
5:  The ratio equals the total banking assets of the five largest banks over total assets of all financial 
institutions.  
6:  Indeterminate method of calculation. 
7:  Data from the United Kingdom and Germany are dated 1998 and that of Switzerland 1997. 
 
Source:  MacKay letter, Royal Bank of Canada report and Group of Ten Report. 
 
 
5.2.2  The Canadian Exchange or the TSX Group Inc.   128
The restructuring of Canadian exchanges was carried out quickly.  The Alberta and 
Vancouver exchanges merged in 1999, soon to be joined by the Winnipeg Exchange 
(2000), to form the CDNX (Canadian Venture Exchange)
130.  This restructuring was 
motivated by the goal of cost savings and the wish to make it easier for small 
businesses to access the TSE.  The CDNX is therefore the national junior exchange. 
In May 2001, CDNX shareholders accepted a buyout offer from the TSE, which was 
approved by the Alberta, British Columbia and Ontario securities commissions in 
July 2001.  The CDNX became a subsidiary operating separately but owned by the 
TSE, soon using the TSE infrastructure.  In October 2001, small-cap stocks of the 
Montreal Exchange were transferred to the CDNX
131, which opened an office in 
Montreal.  The Montreal Exchange specializes in derivatives.   
On April 3, 2000, the Toronto Stock Exchange was demutualized and continued 
under the name Toronto Stock Exchange Inc., and the broker members of the 
Exchange became shareholders of the new entity.  On July 10, 2002, the Toronto 
Stock Exchange Inc. was renamed TSX Inc. and the CDNX was renamed the TSX 
Venture Exchange Inc.  On August 31, 2002, no person owned more than 10% of the 
Group TSX Inc.
132. The TSX Group Inc. owns about ninety brokerage firms
133. 
Following the initial offering of the TSX Group inc., the TSX Group inc. has four 
operating subsidiaries: TSX Inc, the TSX Venture Exchange inc., TSX Markets 
(trades) and TSX Datalink (data).  In addition, TSX Inc. holds 18% of CDS (The 
Canadian Depository for Securities Limited), 50% of the shares of RS Inc. and a 40% 
interest in Candeal.ca Inc. 
5.2.3 Clearing  houses 
CDS is the only Canadian entity offering deposit and clearing services for securities 
other than derivatives
134. CDS is a private corporation owned by the large Canadian 
banks, the IDA and the TSX Group Inc.
135.  A Canada-wide organization for the 
deposit, clearing and settlement of securities, the CDS offers electronic clearing 
services which allow participants to declare, confirm and settle securities 
transactions. The institution is governed at the federal level by the Bank of Canada 
                                                 
130 See Boisvert and Gaa (2002) for an analysis of the reasons for, consequences and methods of this 
restructuring. 
131 A first transfer of certain classes of small-cap stocks took place in November 1999.  Large-cap 
stocks were transferred to the TSE on December 6, 1999. 
132 TSX Group prospectus,  p. 48.  
133 http://www.ledevoir.com/2002/09/12/8967.html. 
134 http://www.banqueducanada.ca/fr/paiement/other-f.html. 
135 The Montreal Exchange transferred the shares it held in CDS to the Toronto Exchange, in 
accordance with a memorandum of understanding dated March 15, 1999, between the exchanges.    129
under the Payment Clearing and Settlement Act.  At the provincial level, the activities 
of the CDS are governed by the Ontario and Quebec securities commissions
136.  
The Canadian Derivatives Clearing Corporation (CDCC), a private business 
corporation
137, issues options, futures and options on interest rate futures and on 
shares and clears them.  These contracts are traded on the Montreal Exchange.  Since 
the beginning of 1999, the CDCC has provided clearing, settlement and 
administrative services to the Winnipeg Commodity Exchange and the WCE Clearing 
Corporation.  The CDCC is recognized as a self-regulatory organization in Quebec.  
It is subject to the joint supervision of the Quebec and Ontario securities 
commissions.  Under an agreement between the exchanges, all derivatives for interest 
rates and listed shares are traded on the Montreal Exchange.  The Montreal Exchange 
Inc. is now the sole shareholder of CDCC
138.  
5.2.4  Alternative trading systems in Canada 
According to certain participants, the Toronto Stock Exchange has for a long time 
been afraid of competition by alternative trading systems (ATS), and succeeded in 
preventing their introduction in Canada. The Teachers Pension Board Plan, in its brief 
to the CSA respecting ATS, wrote on November 24, 1999:  
We expect the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSE) to propose that they be 
the consolidator and regulator of ATS. The fear we have with this 
proposal, is that the TSE has resisted change and been steadfast in its 
opposition to ATS and Crossing Networks (…). If Canada is to regain 
some of the trading volume that is has lost to the U.S. we will need 
flexibility and innovativeness. The TSE has rarely shown these 
attributes. 
During the fall of 2001, the Canadian securities commissions finally adopted national 
standards on ATS
139.  National Instrument 21-101 defines an alternative trading 
system as a marketplace that does not act as a self-regulatory organization or list 
                                                 
136 The CDS also collaborates, when necessary, with the Alberta and British Columbia securities 
commissions.   
137 The Canadian Derivatives Clearing Corporation has been in existence since 1975, but has only been 
a private corporation since the beginning of 2001 http://www.cdcc.ca/accueil_fr.php/. 
138 The Board of Directors of CDCC is composed of the President of Montreal Exchange Inc., one 
member firm representative, one public director, and CDCC’s Senior Vice-President and Chief 
Clearing Officer. 
139 National Instruments 21-101 “Marketplace Operation” and 23-101 “Trading Rules” set up a 
regulatory framework applicable to all Canadian markets, exchanges and ATS.   130
securities for trading, which allows a significant reduction in fixed transaction costs. 
ATS are the Canadian equivalent of the American electronic crossing networks.   
Following this legislative reform, three alternative trading systems for fixed income 
trades emerged in Canada
140, namely, Bloomberg Tradebook Company Canada, 
CollectiveBid System Inc.
141 and Candeal.ca Inc.
142. 
Bloomberg Tradebook Company Canada is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Bloomberg 
Canada LLC. CollectiveBid System Inc. is a private business founded in 1999 in 
Toronto. It provides services to Merrill Lynch, JP Morgan Securities Canada, 
Laurentian Bank Securities and HSBC Bank Canada. Candeal.ca Inc. combines 
quotes and updates the prices offered by the six major brokers on a screen showing 
the best quotes in real time, which allows institutional clients to have access to a more 
liquid and more transparent market.  Candeal.ca Inc. is owned by the TSE Group and 
brokers
143. Despite a favourable regulatory framework, market conditions have not 
been conducive to the growth of ATS in Canada. Their number and trading volume 
are still low.  
5.3  Regulatory monopoly and market competition in Canada 
The provincial regulatory securities commissions delegate part of their powers to 
self-regulatory organizations, which regulate their members and supervise 
intermediation in the Canadian market.  Canadian exchanges are self-regulating for 
members and markets.  The regulation of members consists of registering 
representatives of participants, ensuring that participants and their representatives 
meet professional standards for qualification, minimum capital, internal organization 
and handling of clients’ complaints. Market regulation governs participant activity
144.  
The disappearance of the Western exchanges and the redefinition of the role of the 
Montreal Exchange have profoundly affected the traditional situation.  Self-regulation 
of members has become the prerogative of the IDA
145 and market self-regulation is 
currently the responsibility of RS Inc., owned by the IDA and the TSX Group Inc.
146.  
                                                 
140 Several ATS such as Instinet Canada Inc. or Versus Technologies Inc., associated with E-Trade, 
operate in the field of variable income securities. 
141 http://www.collectivebid.com/. 
142 http://www.candeal.ca/en_h/index.asp. 
143 BMO Nesbitt Burns, Basis100 Inc., CIBC World Markets. Inc., MoneyLine Telerate, National 
Bank Financial Inc., RBC Dominion, Securities Inc., Scotia Capital Inc. and TD Securities Inc. 
http://www.finextra.com/fullstory.asp?id=6110. 
144 Over-the-counter trades are governed by member regulation.  
145 Except in Quebec, where the Montreal Exchange governs brokers. 
146 The Montreal Exchange is not covered by RS Inc.    131
Self-regulation, which was previously entrusted to each Canadian exchange, is now 
more or less under the aegis of a single institution.  
5.3.1 Market  regulation 
For ATS, governed by two instruments in December 2001, to function, a new 
generation of self-regulating organizations must be created.  These providers of 
regulatory service, recognized by securities authorities, supervise markets and may 
impose disciplinary measures. Each ATS must be governed by a supplier of 
regulatory services which is [Translation] an organization recognized and supervised 
by the securities commissions to offer regulatory services to marketplaces, exchanges 
or ATS, which sign an agreement to such effect
147. 
The TSX Inc. has thus made a subsidiary of its regulatory division, which has become 
RS Inc.  RS Inc. is recognized as an SRO by the Ontario, Quebec, Alberta, Manitoba 
and British Columbia securities commissions. 
RS Inc. provides regulatory services to the TSX Inc. and the TSX Venture Exchange 
Inc.  The regulatory mission of RS Inc. is to develop, administer and enforce the 
Universal Market Integrity Rules (UMIR”) and other marketplace requirements 
applicable to trading in the Canadian securities market in a neutral, cost effective, 
service oriented and responsive manner
148. RS Inc. manages requirements for 
business and exchange trading and oversees compliance of members with these 
requirements. The only other self-regulatory organization for a market is the Montreal 
Exchange
149.  
RS Inc. is owned 50% by TSX Inc. and 50% by the IDA
150.  The present board of 
directors of RS Inc. includes eleven directors, five of whom are appointed by the two 
shareholders, five independents (including at least one representative of an ATS) and 
the President.  RS Inc. is a monopolistic not-for-profit business corporation 
“independent” of its two shareholders. When an ATS wishes to be established, it 
must come to an agreement with RS Inc. or an exchange, this last option being 
somewhat theoretical as ATS compete with exchanges.  RS Inc. has become a de 
facto monopoly for market self-regulation.   
                                                 
147 CVMQ 2001-2002 Annual Report, French version. 
148 The RS Inc. web site gives access to the UMIR, see http://www.regulationservices.com/. 
149 In the mutual fund industry, the Mutual Fund Dealers Association of Canada is recognized as a 
self-regulatory organization by the Ontario, British Columbia, Saskatchewan and Alberta securities 
commissions. 
150 http://www.regulationservices.com/whatsNew/. It is expected that any new market will be offered 
an interest in RS Inc.   132
5.3.2 Member  regulation 
 
Brokers trading on one of the exchanges must be members of a self-regulatory 
organization, which governs the broker-client relationship, and sets out rules of ethics 
and minimal capital requirements to ensure investor protection.  In Canada, this self-
regulation of members is the mission of the IDA and the Montreal Exchange, the 
evolution and effect of which we will look at in turn.  
The traditional role of the IDA is to represent the national securities industry.   
Following the process of demutualization, and the abandonment by the Toronto 
Exchange of member regulation in 1996, the IDA also became an SRO.  
Its mission is to protect investors and enhance the efficiency and competitiveness of 
the Canadian capital markets.  The regulation of members consists of
151:   
•  Registering members, which implies verifying compliance with high 
professional standards and minimum professional qualifications;  
•  Checking financial compliance, i.e. the existence of minimum capital; 
•  Checking sales compliance, to ensure member firms have effective procedures 
to process and analyse the investment needs and risk tolerances of clients; 
•  Managing complaints received against a member firm or one of its registered 
employees, and impose penalties where applicable;  
To do business in Canada, a dealer must be a member of an SRO. Everywhere in 
Canada except in Quebec, the IDA is a monopoly because it is the only recognized 
SRO
152.  
Under section 351 of the Quebec Securities Act, which states that SRO’s existing at 
the time of the coming into force of the Act may continue their activities (a 
grandfather clause), the CVMQ has allowed the IDA to carry on its activities in 
Quebec.  In October 2001, the Montreal Exchange specialized in derivatives trading 
and this redefinition of its role lead to a decrease in the number of its approved 
                                                 
151 http://www.ida.ca/About/roles_en.asp. 
152 Note that dealers with a restricted practice must be registered with the Mutual Fund Dealers 
Association of Canada.   133
participants, which currently number 74, only 17 of which are exclusive
153.  The IDA 
today includes more than 190 stock brokers, effectively making it the sole self-
regulatory organization for members of the securities industry in Canada
154.  
5.3.3 Who  regulates? 
The presence of many representatives of the regulated industries in the regulatory 
organization is not abnormal.  It results from the asymmetry of information between 
the organizations and the regulated businesses.   
As Laffont and Tirole (1991) indicate, the clear answer to the problem of regulatory 
capture would be to reduce the share taken by representatives of the regulated sector 
or sectors in the regulatory process
155.  It is therefore interesting to estimate the 
relative importance of participants in the respective sectors directly concerned with 
regulations in the composition of boards of directors of Canadian regulatory 
organizations.  Table 12 sets out the composition of these boards, taken from annual 
reports and information available on the web sites of these organizations. Twenty 
seven percent (27%) of the directors of self-regulatory organizations come from a 
deposit institution or related organization. Twenty two percent (22%) come from a 
Canadian bank or related institution. Five percent (5%) come from a Quebec deposit 
institution or related institution. In total, the securities industry and banking 
institutions dominate the board of directors of Canadian SRO’s.  Issuers hold 10 of 
the 124 positions, representing 8% of the total and the investors supposedly protected 
by these bodies are not present.  The financial services industry is therefore able to 
significantly influence Canadian regulatory organizations, of which they control the 
boards of directors.  
                                                 
153 Following the demutualization process, Montreal Exchange Inc. was recognized as an SRO on 
November 24, 2000.  
154 The Act respecting the Agence nationale d’encadrement du secteur financier (AANESF, S.Q. 2002, 
c. 45) sets up a new mechanism of general application to recognize SRO’s. Existing SRO’s will have 
to be recognized again as SRO’s, within six months of the coming into force of the new section (see 
transitory provisions 740 and 741 of the AANESF). 
155 However, Laffont and Tirole (1991) observe that this reduction can be sub-optimal if it reduces the 
knowledge of the regulator in the area regulated.    134
Table 12:  Breakdown of boards of directors of self-regulatory organizations and other 
key organizations in the Canadian securities industry 
The organizations studied are:  the Investment Dealers Association of Canada (IDA), the Investment 
Funds Institute of Canada (IFIC), The Canadian Depository for Securities Limited (CDS), the 
Canadian Derivatives Clearing Corporation (CDCC), the Canadian Capital Markets Association 
(CCMA), the Montreal Exchange, Market Regulation Services Inc. (RS Inc.), the Toronto Exchange 
(TSX) and the Mutual Fund Dealers Association (MFDA). 
Self-Regulatory Organizations and Others
 
Composition of Boards of Directors  
  Number of persons sitting on   










Insurance 3        3 
Attorney 3  1      1 
Bank 3  1      4 
Bank (dealer subsidiary of one)  13  4      17 
Bank (trust subsidiary of one)  2        2 
Bank (mutual fund subsidiary of one)  4        4 
Foreign bank (mutual fund subsidiary of 
one)  1       1 
Quebec bank   1  1      2 
Quebec bank (dealer subsidiary of one)  1        1 
Savings union  1        1 
Quebec saving union  1        1 
Quebec savings union (trust subsidiary of 
one)  1       1 
Quebec savings union (dealer subsidiary of 
one)  1       1 
Venture capital  2        2 
Advisor 3        3 
Consultant 3        3 
Dealer 16  1      17 
Issuer 10        10 
Trust 1        1 
Manager 8        8 
Government of Canada  1        1 
Government of Quebec  1        1 
Not stated  6        6 
Media 1        1 
SRO  1 1 2  2  6 
SRO (itself)  2        2 
Mutual fund  20  2      22 
University 2        2 
Total 109  11  2  2  124 
Table created from annual reports and web sites.    135
5.3.4 Conclusion 
The Canadian financial sector is therefore highly concentrated. 8,000 American banks 
correspond to nine Canadian banks.  Seventy trading systems for securities operating 
in the United States are served by twelve clearing services. Canada has only one 
exchange group, two clearing agencies, one regulatory service and a few ATS, which 
are mostly under the direct or indirect control of the large banks and their related 
brokerages. To our knowledge, no developed country presents such a high level of 
banking, financial and self-regulatory concentration. The financial aspect is governed 
by the provincial securities commissions. The centralization proposals for regulation 
of securities responsibilities will, faced with such a group, lead to a single securities 
commission.  
5.4 Findings and implications 
 
The analysis of the Canadian and American situations for securities regulation leads 
to three important findings for public policy in Canada. Firstly, the American 
regulatory framework is complex, has not proven its effectiveness and is not 
transferable to Canada. Secondly, the structures of the industries regulated in the two 
countries are totally different.  Finally, the risks of significant influence by the 
industry on the regulatory framework or even regulatory capture are high in Canada.  
We have put forward the fundamental differences which exist between market 
organizations and securities regulation in Canada and the United States. The 
American banking and securities markets include a very large number of participants, 
which strongly compete with each other. The situation is totally different in Canada, 
where activity is highly concentrated. A regulatory response must take this major 
difference into account.  
The United States enjoys regulatory competition in the field of company law.  In the 
banking sector, a dual system has been set up which also allows a certain form of  
competition. Securities regulation is segmented, as small issuers are governed locally. 
The transfer of the American regulatory system to Canada is therefore difficult to 
conceive. On the basis of a standard established at the level of gross proceeds of 
issue, a Canadian SEC would be responsible for less than ten percent of initial 
offerings.  
In the securities area in particular, the United States is considered to have onerous, 
costly and strict regulation.  This regulation applies, for securities, to a business world 
very different from that in Canada.  The SEC is considered as being inefficient, slow   136
and lacking resources.  The United States therefore does not provide a model for 
regulatory centralization in the various areas related to the financial sector.   
Moreover, centralization would harm the capacity for adaptation by the regulatory 
system. Centralization, in particular for legal actions in the securities industry, is 
widely condemned and related to a series of market scandals. 
The centralization the American government would like to have has not brought 
about perfect uniformity and the laws and regulations have been applied unequally.  
For several authors, limitations on the right of legal actions by the States for the 
benefit of national lawsuits alone have had very negative effects. 
The main argument opposing the adoption in Canada of a regulatory framework 
based on that of the United States relates, however, to the structure of the industries 
regulated. The Canadian financial sector is already extremely concentrated and this 
trend is continuing. There is strong pressure to permit the merger of a few existing 
banks and mergers continue in the related field of insurance.  Exchanges have been 
restructured and the dealers association plays a very important role at different levels, 
including regulation.  Representatives of the financial industry constitute the majority 
of members of SRO’s and key institutions in the financial sector. It seems that the 
sole competitive element remaining in the entire Canadian financial system is the 
regulatory aspect and is the result of provincial jurisdiction over securities. The 
proposed single commission would lead to the regulation of an oligopoly by a 
regulatory monopoly in a sector where the industry already dominates the regulatory 
organizations. Unless the capture theory of regulatory organizations does not apply in 
Canada, the eventual elimination of the single element of competition must therefore 
be considered with extreme care.  
As Coleman pointed out in 1992, a model similar in certain respects to that taken by 
the European Community could, by instituting mutual recognition, improve the 
current system while preserving a certain level of regulatory competition which 
seems essential, given the concentration of institutions and markets.   137
PART 6 
6- GROWTH OF THE CANADIAN SECURITIES MARKET:  FINDINGS AND CHALLENGES 
In his letter to the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance of Canada, 
MacKay (2002) writes: Vibrant and fair capital markets and their key components 
(including the securities regulatory apparatus) are essential to the health of 
Canada’s economy and to the success of Canadian-based companies. The 
development of a dynamic, liquid and efficient equity market is an important 
condition to the economic development of a country.
156  It allows companies to obtain 
financing at the lowest possible cost, thereby improving their competitiveness.  In 
Canada, the stock market has undergone major upheavals and, according to the 
promoters of regulatory centralization for securities, regulatory decentralization and 
multiple securities commissions hurt its development. MacKay established a direct 
link between the regulatory situation and the securities market in Canada.  However, 
there is relatively little empirical data and, as Harris observes (2002): the debate in 
Canada typically has not been informed by robust empirical analysis and suffers from 
a lack of empirical data on the central issues in respect of Canadian securities 
regulation.  Several authors have a relatively optimistic view of the Canadian market.  
For example, Boisvert and Gaa mention (2002):  in Canada, the number of shares on 
the Toronto Stock Exchange has doubled in the last five years, while the dollar value 
of trading has increased three-fold. Jenkinson and Ljungqvist (2002) place Canada 
among countries where the increase in stock exchange listings was the highest from 
1981 to 1998, far ahead of the United States, Japan, and the United Kingdom. 
This relatively optimistic vision is contrary to alarmist statements that the Canadian 
stock market is heavily penalized by its regulatory structure. An analysis of the 
evolution of this market is therefore in order. 
The goal of this study is to contribute to a better understanding of the reality and 
issues in Canadian securities markets. We seek firstly to characterize the evolution of 
the Canadian securities market since 1990. Curiously, it is a difficult task, as 
available data is generally incomplete or contradictory. It is also distorted by the 
restructuring of the exchanges in 1999. This characterization will be done according 
to the main aspects that allow us to describe a stock market and its evolution, and by 
using the main markets of OECD countries as a point of reference. In the second 
stage, we will analyze the competitive position of the Canadian market based on the 
evolution of trades for interlisted stocks.  Finally, we will discuss the known factors 
                                                 
156 This is the classic view as expressed for example by Bekaert and Harvey (1998), with respect to 
developing economies. Given growing market integration and foreign market financing possibilities, it 
is unclear whether this argument is still as important in developed economies in the 2000’s.    138
to assist, or instead limit, the development of modern markets and try to determine 
the importance of these factors in Canada.  In particular, we will attempt to determine 
to what extent regulatory elements can interfere in this respect. In conclusion, we will 
look at the real challenges affecting a market very much subject to American 
competition, which debates centered solely on regulatory structure tend to obscure. 
6.1 Canadian market development 
6.1.1  Measurements of stock market development 
The number of listed corporations or securities, total capitalization and trade volume 
are classic indicators of the level of development of a stock market. Each of these 
variables, however, captures only a single aspect of complex reality: the number of 
securities may hide considerable differences in size and capitalization gives little 
information if the securities are rarely traded. Moreover, the evolution of these 
different quantities over a given period provides more information than the level, 
especially when the evolution is compared to that of other markets. 
Finally, because of market globalization, the capacity of a market to attract 
corporations already listed elsewhere and to keep the trading of domestic securities 
has become an important factor.  Accordingly, we find three groups of indicators:     
1) capitalization levels, trade volume and number of listed corporations, 2) the 
evolution of these levels during the period 1990 to 2002 and 3) the evolution and size 
of trades in Canada of securities of foreign corporations and foreign trades of 
Canadian interlisted securities. 
Each of the measures of market size must be subject to analysis and adjustments.  The 
number of listed corporations must be considered in relation to listed but not 
operating corporations and the study of the distribution of the size of companies, in 
particular due to the existence of capital pools, which allow initial offerings of 
$500,000 and less—tiny compared to international standards. Total capitalization is 
an indicator that suffers also from several types of gaps. Its variation may have two 
origins.  It may be related to the growth of issued capital through initial or secondary 
offerings net of redemptions.  It is an important indicator, often clouded by the effect 
of variations of market indices, which is the second factor explaining the variation.  
Capitalization amounts issued by the exchanges therefore combine two effects which 
it is crucial to distinguish. Trading volume is also an important indicator, but the 
effect of the variation of the index must also be distinguished from the real increase 
in activity.  As with capitalization, the Canadian variation will be compared to that of 
other developed countries.   139
Most data available for Canada, which mainly comes from the stock exchanges, is 
subject to several problems, which it is useful to note:   
•  Inactive companies:  not numerous on most markets, represent more than 20% 
of the corporations listed in Canada; 
•  Foreign corporations, whose capitalization is enormous compared to the size 
of the Canadian market, were taken into account in the capitalization of 
several exchanges. Several disappeared from the lists, and accordingly from 
the calculation of total capitalization, without being specifically mentioned, 
during the 1990’s. This is the case for IBM, which disappeared as a listed 
security in Canada in 1995.  The TSX showed a total capitalization of $1,300 
billion in 2001, but $264 billion was associated with foreign securities, which 
are almost never traded on this market;  
•  Securities traded on several exchanges, mostly banks, showed in the 
capitalization of each exchange until the restructuring in 1999.  It is incorrect 
to calculate total Canadian capitalization by adding the capitalization of the 
four exchanges which were active before the restructuring. Restructuring 
therefore causes an apparent lowering of capitalization and of the number of 
companies, which is simply a return to normal;  
•  Capitalization of fixed income securities. The CDNX includes in its 
capitalization a significant amount as capitalization of debt instruments
157;  
•  Securities interlisted in the United States: several Canadian securities are 
almost exclusively traded in the United States. 
Moreover, the restructuring of the Canadian exchanges greatly influenced data and its 
evolution.  The Alberta and Vancouver Exchanges merged in 1999, soon joined by 
the Winnipeg Exchange (2002) to form the CDNX
158, which is now the Canadian 
Venture Exchange. In May 2001, the CDNX became a subsidiary operating 
separately but owned by the TSE, whose infrastructure it was to soon use.  In October 
2001, small capitalization securities of the Montreal Exchange were transferred to the 
                                                 
157 CDNX Monthly Review, December 2000, p. 5. 
158 See Boisvert and Gaa (2002) for an analysis of the reasons, consequences and methods of 
restructuring.   140
CDNX, which opened an office in Montreal
159, and the Montreal Exchange 
specialized in derivatives. It is therefore difficult to have a clear image of the 
evolution of the Canadian securities market.  However, such an image is necessary to 
assess and guide public policy in this strategic sector of the economy. 
6.1.2  Number and characteristics of public corporations 
The overall evolution of the number of securities officially listed in Canada is greatly 
influenced by the exchange restructuring.  In addition, the Canadian market is made 
up of a number of small companies with a high mortality rate, which makes it an 
atypical market compared to the stereotype of markets of developed countries. 
6.1.2.1 A very small-cap market 
Table 13 gives a breakdown of corporations listed in Canada, according to their net 
book value in 2001
160. Around 21% of listed Canadian corporations in 2002 were not 
operating.  These corporations reported no assets or no longer send information to 
SEDAR. Most listed corporations are very small: 67% of operating corporations have 
shareholder equity of less than $10 million. More than 70% of companies whose net 
book value is less than $10 million come from British Columbia or Alberta.  Finally, 
on the sole basis of shareholder equity, only 415 companies could be listed on the 
NYSE, and approximately 590 on NASDAQ
161.  
The relative importance of small-cap securities must be taken into consideration 
when studying methods of organizing and regulating markets.  Small-cap securities 
are generally rarely traded, which creates liquidity problems. Low liquidity causes 
higher trading costs and, according to several authors, is inversely related to the 
market risk premium
162. Both factors directly influence the cost of capital for 
businesses. Moreover, the small size of many issuers requires more flexible and 
restrained regulation. 
                                                 
159 The transfer covered 108 corporations. A first transfer of certain classes of small-cap securities took 
place in November 1999. Large-cap securities were transferred on December 6, 1999.  
http://www.newswire.ca/releases/September2001/27/c1721.html. 
160 Since capitalization cannot be calculated for around 25% of securities which are not regularly 
traded or have been suspended, book values have been used. 
161 By keeping capitalization equivalent to equity, the threshold to maintain listing on the NASDAQ is 
US$50 million or  approximately CDN$75 million and on the NYSE is US$100 million or CDN$155 
million. Securities, however, must comply with other criteria respecting shareholding and revenues. 
162 See Swan (2002) for an analysis of this relationship and a review of the different studies on this 
subject.   141
Table 13:  Distribution of shareholder equity for corporations listed on the 
Canadian market for the end of November 2002 
In millions ($) 
Province of 



















British Columbia  965 104  30  44  32  1175  222  1397 
Alberta  569 123  36  53  21  802  270  1072 
Ontario  327  142 64  130 28  691  177  868 
Québec  150  61 22  52 19  304  54  358 
Yukon  75  13  5 1  94  30  124 
Foreign  45  11 3  13 8  80  92  172 
Manitoba  17  3 1  7 5 33  12  45 
Nova Scotia  6  6 3  4 5 24  14  38 
New Brunswick  9 6  2    3  20  5  25 
Saskatchewan  7 5    2  2  16  3  19 
Newfoundland  2    6   8    8 
Northwest Territories  3       3    3 
Prince Edward Island  1    1   2    2 
Total  2176  474 167  312 123 3252  879  4131 
Source:  Cancorp Financials. The place of incorporation of corporations with a Canadian charter has 
been estimated from the city of their head office.  A non-operating corporation is a corporation which 
reports no assets or did not file financial statements after 2000. 
 
During the period preceding the exchange restructuring, the number of corporations 
listed in Alberta regularly increased from 1990 (742) to 1998 (1,035), especially 
because of capital pools, representing total growth of 39.5% (Table 14). In 
Vancouver, the situation is reversed: the number of listings went from 2,104 to 1,384, 
a 34% decrease. The Montreal Exchange saw a smaller decrease (11.9%), dropping 
from 657 in 1990 to 579 in 1998. The Toronto Stock Exchange, on the other hand, 
showed regular growth and the number of listed corporations increased by 20% (from 
1,193 to 1,433). Taking all exchanges together, there was a decrease in the total 
number of listed companies in the Canadian marketplace from 4,696 in 1990 to 4,431 
in 1998, representing a 5.6% decrease, which seems to be specifically related to the 
disappearance of several companies in British Columbia.   142
6.1.2.2 The disruptive effects of restructuring 
On November 22, 1999, the trading of certain classes of shares of small-cap 
corporations was transferred from the Montreal Exchange to the CDNX
163. On 
December 6, 56 large-cap corporations (64 securities) on the Montreal Exchange 
were transferred to the Toronto Exchange and interlisted securities are henceforth 
only traded on the TSE.  The number of corporations listed in Montreal went from 
532 on November 30, 1999 (759 securities) to 129 on December 31, 1999 (140 
securities), a decrease of 403 listed corporations (619 securities). The transfer covered 
over $1,000 billion
164 of capitalization; however, they were essentially securities 
already traded in Toronto, and the transfer had little effect on the capitalization of that 
exchange
165.  The transfer seemed to be an opportunity to de-list around 400 
securities which probably did not meet the criteria of either of the two original 
exchanges.
166  In October 2001, all remaining small-cap securities were transferred 
from the Montreal Exchange to the CDNX. These activities make it difficult to follow 
the evolution of the market.  
6.1.2.3 Creation and disappearance of listed corporations 
During the period studied, the number of listed corporations decreased overall by 
808, dropping from 4,696 to 3,888.  Between 1991 and 2000 there were 1,891 initial 
public offerings (IPO) of companies other than mutual funds, trusts or limited 
partnerships, of which 1,217 issues raised amounts less than $1 million, mainly 
within capital pools (868 issues). The net decrease in the number of businesses 
therefore translates into a significant “death rate”, which may result from mergers, 
going private, or delisting
167.  
                                                 
163 Annual report of the Montreal Exchange, 1999, p.12. There were 532 listed corporations left in 
Montreal on November 30, 1999, as compared to 579 on December 31, 1998, and 47 were therefore 
transferred. In total, 1,384 corporations  from Vancouver, 1 035 from Alberta and 47 from Montreal, 
or  2,466 corporations, were therefore transferred The CDNX gained 2,358 corporations. The 108 
securities that disappeared probably did not meet the CDNX listing requirements.  
164 Estimated based on the difference in stock market capitalization as at November 30, 1999 
($1,005.873 billion) and  on December 31, 1999 ($0.684 billion),  according to the 1999 annual report 
of the Montreal Stock Exchange. 
165 91 companies were listed both on the Montreal and Toronto Exchange, three of which were also 
listed in Vancouver.  One company was listed in Toronto and Vancouver.  No foreign interlisted 
company was listed on more than one Canadian Exchange. 
166 An increase of 403 securities on the Toronto Exchange (more companies transferred from 
Vancouver and Alberta to Toronto) was observed, but the increase was only 23 securities from 1998 to 
1999.  
167 For December 1998 only, there were 25 de-listings on the TSE (TSE Review, December 1998), and 
four in Montreal   143
The Canadian market is therefore characterized by the presence of a large number of 
new businesses (an average of 189 IPO’s per year), generally small-cap, but also by a 
significant death rate among listed corporations.  There are thus more initial Canadian 
offerings, but their gross proceeds are less than in other countries: in Canada, there 
are around 189 IPO’s per year, as opposed to 47 in France, 80 in United Kingdom 
and 43 in Germany according to Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2002)
168. On average, 
initial offerings raised $131 million in Germany, $74 million in France and $93 
million in United Kingdom.  In Canada, the average amount initially raised by an IPO 
is $31 million if we exclude capital pools, $17 million if we count all issues and close 
to $2.5 million, if we leave out five privatizations and five demutualizations which 
raised a third of the total gross proceeds during the period. 
 
Table 14:  Annual distribution of the number of listed corporations on the 
Alberta, Vancouver, Montreal, Toronto and CDNX exchanges between 1990 and 
2001 
Year Vancouver  Alberta  Montreal  Toronto CDNX  Total 
1990 2104  742 657  1193   4696 
1991 1905  690 609  1138   4342 
1992 1738  614 584  1119   4055 
1993 1642  672 573  1193   4080 
1994 1599  755 575  1251   4180 
1995 1515  797 558  1258   4128 
1996 1495  874 555  1323   4247 
1997 1429  999 577  1420   4425 
1998 1384  1035  579  1433   4431 
1999     129  1456  2358  3943 
2000     128  1398  2598  4124 
2001     118  1316  2688  4122 
2002    80  1304  2504  3888 
 
Sources:  Montreal Stock Exchange:  Rapport d’activité au 31 décembre 2002, http://www.m-
x.ca/f_stat_fr/0212_stats_fr.pdf,  Revue mensuelle, 1999-2001; Statistiques, Recherche et information 
sur le marché (1991), Statistiques, faits saillants:  Négociations, inscriptions, membres (1992, 1993); 
Revue boursière et répertoire des sociétés (1994, 1995, 1996, 1997 and 1998). Toronto Stock 
Exchange Review, Alberta Stock Exchange Review, Vancouver Stock Exchange Review, and CDNX 
monthly Review. ftp://ftp.cdnx.com/Publications/CDNXReviews/. 
 
                                                 
168 Authors also count 4,541 IPO’s in the United States, representing 412 per year, for an average 
amount of approximately $93 million.    144
6.1.2.4  Canada and other countries 
The United States represents the largest exchange in the world, with over 7,500 
companies in 2000 (Table 15).  Canada is in second place if we use S&P data, for a 
very significant change in the number of listed corporations from 1999 to 2000 (the 
number triples), as compared to Germany (the number doubles) or France (a 40% 
increase).  The strong Canadian growth is, however, due to a different basis of 
measurement; the S&P takes into account only companies listed on the Toronto 
Exchange in 1990, but includes those of the CDNX in 2000.  If data provided by the 
Toronto Exchange is used for the entire period (Panel B of Table 15), the variation in 
the number of listed companies is only 12.49%, when corrected for the 56 
corporations transferred from Montreal to Toronto.  This evolution is similar to that 
of the United States and the United Kingdom. 
 
Table 15:  Distribution of countries sampled according to the number of listed 
corporations at the end of 1990 and 2000 and distribution of the number of listed 
corporations at the end of 1990 and 2000 
Panel A Initial distribution 
 2000  1990  Variation 
 Rank  Number  Rank  Number  in  % 
United States  1  7,524  1  6,599  14 
Canada 2  3,977  4  1,144  248 
Japan 3  2,561  2  2,071  23.7 
United Kingdom  4  1,904  3  1,701  11.93 
Germany 5  1,022  7  413  147 
France 7  808  5  578  39.8 
Panel B Corrected distribution to take account of stock exchange restructuring 
 2000  1990  Variation 
 Rank  Number  Rank  Number  In% 
United States  1  7,524  1  6,599  14 
Japan 2  2,561  2  2,071  23,7 
United Kingdom  3  1,904  3  1,701  11.93 
Canada TSE  4  1,398  4  1,193  17.18 (12.49) 
Germany 5  1,022  8  413  147 
France 7  808  6  578  39.8 
Sources:  Standard & Poors, Emerging Stock Market Fact Book, New-York, 2000, 2001, and TSE 
Review, 1993 and 2001, Five Year Statistical Summary.   145
6.2 Capitalization Growth 
Table 16 shows capitalization growth in Canadian markets. Total capitalization of the 
Montreal and Toronto Exchanges in 1998 was $1,664.57 billion ($830.37 and 
$834.20 billion).  Following incorporation into the TSX of securities already listed in 
Montreal and Vancouver, on December 31, 1999 the Toronto capitalization should be 
(if new issues are omitted) $2,159 billion, taking into account the 29.72% variation in 
the SP/TSX index.  However, capitalization in Toronto was $1,145.30 billion at the 
time. The difference simply results from no longer double counting interlisted 
securities.  Canadian capitalization data prior to 1999 is therefore the only data 
allowing analysis and comparisons.   
Figure 1 shows that the gross cumulative growth in capitalization of the Toronto 
Stock Exchange is very high.  This growth reflects, however, mainly the variation of 
the market index during the period. However, real growth in Canadian market 
capitalization, corrected for fluctuations in the index, is only 4.2% annually, and it 
drops to 4% when growth from restructuring is eliminated. This growth represents net 
creation of capitalization.  It almost corresponds to growth in the GDP calculated 
during this period by the OECD, namely 3.2% annually.
169  
Real Canadian capitalization growth is therefore slow and not very different from that 
of the economy. Statements referring to dynamic growth in Canadian exchanges 
should thus be given serious qualification, especially since capitalization data is not 
systematically related to data on activity, because of the phenomenon of interlisting.   
Moreover, the growth of the Canadian market should be compared to that of the main 
developed markets. They saw strong increases in the last decade. In terms of market 
capitalization, Canada is among the top six countries between 1990 and 2000 (Table 
17), and we have used the five other countries as a basis of comparison.   
                                                 
169 http://www1.oecd.org/publications/e-book/0102071E.PDF.   146
 
Table 16 :  Growth of Canadian market capitalization between 1990 and 2002.  Amounts 
are expressed in billions of Canadian $ as at December 31
st each year.    
Vancouver  Montreal  Toronto CDNX 
















1990  2.95  373.04 251.83  44.37  703.30 280.70  280.70   
1991  3.59  395.10 278.32  57.18    703.50 308.00  308.00   
1992  4.13  367.29 272.69  37.91    703.10 308.90  308.90   
1993  7.32  495.71 356.17  26.17    862.10 432.30  432.30   
1994  6.24  448.40 365.89  12.69    803.70 441.90  441.90   
1995  7.29  502.07 417.27  19.21    978.70 499.70  499.70   
1996 14.71 638.98  539.64  17.46    1,176.70  666.50  666.50   
1997 9.47 750.85  636.44  16.74    1,270.30  812.30  812.30   
1998 6.83 910.03  830.37  198.88
4   1,350.30  834.20  834.20   
1999 6.74  0.68      1,498.20  1,145.30  1,142.75  16.65
1 
2000   1.09     1,433.90  1,156.70  1,154.04  14.87 
2001        1,246.70  982.10  978.75  10.59 
2002        909.02  897.90  897.90  11.12 
Sources:  Statistiques, recherche et information sur le marché, Bourse de Montréal (1990 et 1991), Statistiques, 
faits saillants: Négociations, inscriptions, membres, Bourse de Montréal (1992 et 1993), Revue boursière et 
répertoire des sociétés, Bourse de Montréal (1994 à 1998), Revue mensuelle de la Bourse de Montréal (1999 à 
2001), Toronto Stock Exchange Review, Alberta Stock Exchange Review and Vancouver Stock Exchange 
Review, and CDNX Monthly Review (ftp://ftp.cdnx.com/Publications/CDNXReviews/). 
1CDNX capitalization excludes capitalization of companies interlisted on other Canadian exchanges, but 
includes capitalization of debt instruments.  For 2000 and 2001, the table shows corrected capitalization.     
Respectively out of $107 and $137 billion of capitalization reported for 2000 and 2001, only $14.87 and $10.59 
billion correspond to share capitalization.  Information is unavailable for 1999. 
2To eliminate the effect of double counting from interlisting, we have estimated the amount of Canadian 
interlisted share capitalization from interlisted companies in Canada in 1998, and from capitalization for these 
securities for each year from 1990 -1998. 
3This is the corrected (decreased) capitalization for Canadian companies for the transfer of non-interlisted 
companies from Montreal for 1999, 2000, 20001. 
4Data for 1998 is in accordance with values given by the Exchange, but is still inexplicable.  The enormous 
growth of domestic capitalization in 1998 may be related to the fact that the Exchange counted that year total 
capitalization of companies for which it listed derivatives.  Total capitalization of non-interlisted securities 
transferred to Toronto in 1999 is $2.55 billion, and cannot explain the lowering of capitalization by $1.98 
billion from 1998 to 1999. 
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Figure 1:  Cumulative Canadian market capitalization on the Toronto Stock 
Exchange between 1991 and 2001.  Net growth is gross growth adjusted for end-











Source:  TSE Review and Datastream.    148
Table 17:  Ranking of the first 6 countries at the end of 1990 and 2000 by market 
capitalization, distribution of market capitalization in billions of US$, according 
to S&P data.  Panel A shows gross data, panel B shows data net of index 
fluctuations. 
2000 1990  Panel A  Variation (%) 
Rank Capitalization Rank Capitalization 
United States  393.76  1  15,104  1  3,059 
Japan 8.19  2  3,157  2  2,918 
United 
Kingdom 
203.53  3 2,577 3  849 
France 360.83  4  1,447  5  314 
Germany 257.75  5  1,270 4  355 
Canada S&P  247.93  6  842  6  242 
Canada 
corrected 
218.60  7 771 6 242 
2000 1990  Panel B  Variation (%)  Net Capitalization  Net Capitalization 
United States  23.50  3,778  3,059 
Japan -29.34  2,062  2,918 
United 
Kingdom 
51.83  1,289 849 
France 62.10  509  314 
Germany 52.39  541  355 
Canada S&P  26.86  307  242 
Canada 
corrected 
16.12  281 242 
Sources:  Standard & Poors, Emerging Stock Market Fact Book, New York, 2000 and 2001. TSE 
Review 1993 and 2001, Five-Year Statistical Summary, Bank of Canada exchange rate at the end of the 
year, and market index per country from Datastream. 
 
In 1990, Canadian market capitalization consisted, according to S&P, in 
capitalization of listed companies on the Toronto Stock Exchange only, expressed in 
US dollars.  In 2000, it was the capitalization of Canadian companies listed on the 
Toronto Stock Exchange and on the CDNX in US dollars. Capitalization of the 
CDNX includes capitalization of debt instruments for an amount of CDN$97 billion.   
This is an unusual practice, and share capitalization is only $14.8 billion. Total 
Canadian capitalization was thus artificially inflated in 2000. As data was only 
available on the international level, we are only using TSE capitalization for Canada 
in 1990 and 2000, but we are using S&P data for other countries.   Canadian market 
capitalization more than tripled in the last decade, increasing from US$242 billion at 
the end of 1990 to US$771 billion in 2000.  Canada ranks behind France, Germany   149
and Switzerland
170 in 2000.  Market capitalization for Germany tripled in ten years
171, 
whereas that of Japan stagnated. If these variations are corrected to neutralize 
variations in the market index (Panel B of Table 17), the net Canadian capitalization 
increase is, however, much lower than that of other countries (with the exception of 
Japan).  The net Canadian capital created is 16% in ten years, as opposed to 62% in 
France, 52% in the United Kingdom and Germany, and 24% in the United States. 
6.3 Growth of trade volume 
On the basis of data from Levesque, Beaubien and Geoffrion Inc., Shearmur (2001, p. 
223) shows extremely rapid growth in the value of trades on Canadian stock 
exchanges between 1976 and 1998.  Table 18 shows, over the last decade, a 
breakdown of this growth essentially related to the growth of the Toronto market.  
Total volume of trades between 1990 and 1998 in $ grew slightly on the Alberta 
Exchange, whereas it decreased in Vancouver.  It grew strongly on the Montreal and 
Toronto Exchanges.  Average annual growth is around 24.5%.  As the average annual 
return on capital from the index in this period is around 7%, real growth is around 
17.7%. 
Growth in the value of trades is, however, a worldwide phenomenon, stimulated by 
technological change and the unusual returns several markets experienced during the 
1990’s. A comparison with other developed markets must therefore be made. It is 
presented in Table 19, for 1990 and 2000
172.  The United States holds first place with 
a value for trades of around $32,000 billion in 2000, followed far behind by Japan 
($2,700 billion), then by the United Kingdom with $1,800 billion.  France and 
Germany follow with around $1,000 billion each.  
The relative position of the Canadian market is deteriorating: it was in 9
th position in 
2000, with US$635 billion, whereas it was in 6
th position ten years earlier.  The 
Canadian stock market was surpassed by that of Spain, Italy, and the Netherlands.   
The value of trades rose from $71 to $635 billion between 1990 and 2000, but this 
increase is less than that of France, Spain, Italy and the Netherlands, which explains 
the drop in the Canadian ranking.  In net terms, volume growth of Canadian trades is 
much less than that of the United States, but approximately the same as that of France 
                                                 
170 Switzerland has a capitalization of $792 billion.  Canada was in seventh position in 2000, whether 
we include capitalization of shares on the CDNX or not (for a total US$781 billion). 
171 In France and Germany, significant privatizations between 1995 and 1997 explain a large part of 
the increase in capitalization. 
172 For 1990 S&P reports the volume on the Toronto, Montreal and Vancouver Exchanges, and for 
2000 the volume on the Toronto and CDNX Exchanges, and it does not appear useful to correct this 
data.   150
and the United Kingdom.  Although the value of Canadian trades was 4.05% of the 
American volume in 1990, it represented 1.99% in 2000, and this decrease can be 
only partially explained by the differences between the market index returns in the 
two countries, which is around 3% during this period.  Canada is thus progressively 
losing strength to other markets and in particular to the American market, the volume 




Table 18:  Growth of gross trading volume expressed in billions of Canadian $ 
on various Canadian stock markets 
  Vancouver Alberta  Montreal  Toronto  CDNX 
1990 4.06  0.62  15.40  64.01  
1991 3.47  0.57  18.33  67.75  
1992 3.57  0.98  21.06  76.16  
1993 6.78  2.14  30.35  147.06  
1994 5.78  2.23  32.44  181.91  
1995 6.42  3.37  38.59  207.67  
1996 12.00  5.97  50.17  301.30  
1997 8.67  3.87  61.91  423.17  
1998 3.79  1.78  55.65  493.21  
1999    0.46  529.00  1.15 
2000    1.00  944.25  15.98 
2001      712.52  3.61 
2002      637.70  3.23 
Sources:  Revue mensuelle de la Bourse de Montréal, Toronto Stock Exchange Review, Alberta Stock 
Exchange Review and Vancouver Stock Exchange Review.  
                                                 
173 It is, however, possible that the American volume is overestimated, in particular by double counting 
NASDAQ trades (Dyl and Anderson, 2002).   151
 
Table 19:  Ranking of countries sampled and trading volume in billions of US $ 
at the end of 1990 and 2000.   Panel A shows gross data.  Panel B shows data net 
of index fluctuations. 
2000 1990  Panel A  Variation 
(%) Rank  Volume  Rank  Volume 
United States  1,719.65  1  31,862  1  1 751 
Japan 68.16  2  2,694  2  1  602 
United Kingdom  557.71  3  1,835  4  279 
France 825.64  4  1,083  5  117 
Germany Na  5  1,069
*  3 502 
Canada 794.37  9  635  6  71 
2000 1990  Panel B  Variation 
(%)  Net Volume  Net Volume 
United States  355.11  7969  1 751 
Japan 9.80  1759  1  602 
United Kingdom  229.03  918  279 
France 225.64  381  117 
Germany Na  455
*  502 
Canada 225.35  231  71 
Sources:  Standard & Poors, Emerging Stock Market Fact Book, New York, 2000, 2001, and stock 
market index by country from Datastream. 
*Data for Germany is not comparable between 1990 and 2000.  The method of recording volume was 
changed in 1997 to eliminate partial double counting of trades (Emerging Market Fact Book 2001, p. 
37). 
 
As with capitalization, the strong increase shown reflects two cumulative effects: a 
net growth of volume, representing actual volume for new trades, and a price effect 
related to variation in the index.  We have decreased volume growth to roughly take 
into account index changes in the price of SP/TSX securities at the end of the year.    
Figure 3 shows that most of the strong increase in volume on the Toronto Stock 
Exchange comes from the increase in the index. Variations in the volume therefore 
result to a great extent from the increase in the average value of securities during the 
period.   
Stock market growth is fuelled by internal factors, namely demand for capital from 
local companies and demand for securities from local investors. This growth may 
also be triggered by the issue of securities by corporations or, on the contrary, 
weakened by the transfer to other markets of trading in local securities.     152
 
Figure 2:  Cumulative growth in trading volume on the Toronto Exchange 
between 1991 and 2001.  Net growth is gross growth adjusted for fluctuations in 
























Source:  TSE Review and Datastream. 
 
 
6.4 The Canadian stock market in relation to the American market 
Given competition by exchanges to keep domestic corporations and attract foreign 
securities, it is important to analyze activities of interlisted foreign securities and 
securities of Canadian corporations, traded mainly in the United States. 
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6.4.1  The attraction of the Canadian stock market 
Table 20 is made up of tables of interlisted foreign securities from the Toronto Stock 
Exchange Review.  They are mainly securities of American corporations. 
The value of (worldwide) trades of interlisted foreign securities increased from 1990 
to 1998, reflecting the existence of several large-cap securities, such as General 
Motors, Sony and Phillips Petroleum. The value traded decreased considerably in 
1999, mainly because of the withdrawal of Mobil Corp and Citicorp from the 
Canadian market. The number of interlisted foreign securities decreased sharply from 
54 in 1990 to 18 in 2002. However, the worldwide volume of trades executed for 
securities listed in Canada is insignificant, as these trades were conducted on other 
markets.  The percentage volume of trades carried out in Canada is consistently less 
than 1%.  In 2001, 23 corporations
174 were listed both on an American (or foreign) 
stock exchange and on a Canadian stock exchange. But only one of these 23 
securities is more than 50% traded in Canada, and it was a very small-cap security 
(Gold Reserve Inc), which disappeared in 2002.  For fifteen of the securities, 
Canadian volume represents less than 0.02% of total trading volume, and for 
seventeen of them Canadian volume represented less than 1% of total trading volume.  
The presence of foreign corporations on the Canadian market is symbolic—more than 
99.9% of the value of trades for these securities is outside the Canadian market. 
For comparison, interlisted foreign securities represent around 10% of trading volume 
on the NYSE (Boisvert and Gaa, 2002, p. 23) and more than 900 foreign securities 
are listed on the NYSE and NASDAQ. The Swiss market has 150 listings of foreign 
securities, London reports 448 and Luxembourg 208, according to data from the 
World Federation of Stock Exchanges (WFE). Canadian markets thus trade 
practically no foreign securities any more
175.  
                                                 
174 The number of securities does not always correspond exactly to the number of different interlisted 
companies, as the same business may list several different securities.  In 2001, however, all listed 
securities are issued by different corporations. 
175 The situation seems different, however, on the derivatives market.  The Montreal Exchange reports 
an increase of 35% in 2002, as opposed to 9% in 2001, of its market share for interlisted Canadian 
options traded in the American market (April  23, 2003 ME press release).    154
Table 20:  Annual distribution of the number and value traded of foreign and 
American interlisted securities and the breakdown of trades between Canada 
and other countries.  
Securities of which the value traded 
is  Traded in Canada






















1 in % 
1990 54  212,379  15  27.78 29  53.70  0.00  47 0  100.00 
1991 57  218,813  14  24.56 29  50.88  0.20  48 1 99.80 
1992 63  251,522  21  33.33 27  42.86  0.10  49 6 99.90 
1993 62  326,617  20  32.26 29  46.77  0.20  46 4 99.80 
1994 56  297,547  14  25.00 31  55.36  0.10  42 3 99.90 
1995 47  282,585  13  27.66 25  53.19  0.10  35 5 99.90 
1996 47  316,994  15  31.91 19  40.43  0.20  34 6 99.80 
1997 35  369,691  8  22.86 20  57.14  0.10  26 2 99.80 
1998 32  452,385  8  25.00 19  59.38  0.00  26 2  100.00 
1999 24  203,057
2  7  29.17 14  58.33  0.60  17 2 99.40 
2000 23  186,971
2  7  30.43 11  47.83  0.70  17 2 99.30 
2001 23  180,345
2  4  17.39 12  52.18  0.10  19 1 99.90 
2002 18  176,192  5  27.78 9  50.00  0.10  14  0  99.90 
Sources:  Toronto Stock Exchange Review, December 1990 to December 2002. 
1 The percentage of value traded is based on capitalization. 
2 The total value traded reported by the TSE Review for 1999, 2000 and 2001 is respectively 189,934, 168,771 and 
170,011 and does not correspond to the total value traded for each interlisted security (reported in this table). 
3 Certain securities did not trade:  in 1990, Coleco Ind and Stan West J, 1993, British Tel instl, in 1996, Owens 
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6.4.2  The attraction of the American market for Canadian stock exchanges  
Table 21 shows significant growth in the number of interlisted Canadian securities 
over the past decade. The number went from 143 in 1990 to 237 in 2000, a 65% 
increase. The trading value also grew considerably: from $69 billion in 1990 to 
$1,280 billion ten years later. In 2001, the trading value decreased to $805 billion, 
mainly because of the loss of value of Nortel Networks (a $353 billion decrease) and 
BCE Inc. (a $75 billion decrease). The percentage of trading volume which took 
place outside Canada sharply increased from 1998 to 2000, a year in which only 46% 
of trades of interlisted securities was made in Canada. The TSX seemed to regain 
ground and in 2002 the Canadian share exceeded 60%. This variation seemed in large 
part associated with the crash of technological stocks which, following their large dip, 
were abandoned by American investors. Nortel represented $508.3 billion of trades in 
2000, of which 65.7% took place in the United States.  Trades rose to $41.9 billion in 
2002, of which 51.2% were in the United States. BCE dropped from $96.8 billion and 
25.5% of U.S. trades to $25.5 billion and 12.6%. Corel went from $9.1 billion and 
88.5% of U.S. trades to $194 million and 58.1%. These three stocks together 
represent a decrease in trading volume in the United States of around $350 billion.  
We will have to wait several years to experience a significant and sustainable 
realignment of the proportion of interlisted stocks traded in Canada.    
The proportion of stocks traded mainly on foreign exchanges went from 40 
companies out of 143 in 1990, or 28%, to 36% in 2001 and 37.1% in 2002. This does 
not include Canadian companies directly listed on an American exchange (without 
being interlisted). There were thirty-five of them in 2001 according to the final 
prospectus of the TSX Group inc. (p. 18). We calculated that Canada is still the main 
market (where most trading takes place) for 67% of interlisted companies whose 
annual trading volume is less than $120 million. However, in 2000 91 Canadian 
stocks had a trading volume of over $1 billion.  85 of them were interlisted.   In 2001 
the corresponding figures were 83 and 75 respectively. Heavily traded Canadian 
stocks are thus almost all interlisted. We then calculated as follows the proportion of 
heavily traded interlisted stocks, for which the main market was the United States. In 
2000 this proportion was 32%. In 2001 it was 36%. In 2002, it reached 38%. More 
than one-third
176 of heavily traded Canadian stocks are now traded more in the United 
States than in Canada.  The Canadian stock market does not seem to attract trading in 
foreign stocks. On the other hand, the U.S. market captures a significant portion of 
the trading of large interlisted Canadian companies. This is a very worrisome 
situation, given the importance of a stock market for a country. 
                                                 
176 Around 90% of heavily traded stocks are interlisted, and 38% of them are mainly traded in the 
United States.  In relation to the number of large-capitalizations, 33.4% of stocks are now mainly 
traded outside of Canada, and this proportion is growing.    156
Table 21:  Annual distribution by number and value traded of Canadian stocks 
traded in the United States and geographical breakdown of trades  
Securities of which the value 
traded is  Traded elsewhere
1    %  
< $100 
million 















1%  # > 50%  Traded  
in Canada
1
1990 143  68,540  93  65.03 16 11.19  45.3  8  40  54.7 
1991 139  59,115  91  65.47 16 11.51  39.6  6  35  40 
1992 137  68,019  79  57.66 16 11.68  40.2  7  30  59.8 
1993 157 149,760 70  44.59 29 18.47  54.1  12  46  45.9 
1994 172 199,014 83  48.26 35 20.35  50.7  15  57  49.3 
1995 200 249,886 85  42.50 48 24.00  45.3  27  74  54.7 
1996 222 334,304 74  33.33 66 29.73  42.2  20  81  57.8 
1997 243 411,477 85  34.98 69 28.40  35.4  24  85  64.6 
1998 244 490,663 92  37.70 75 30.74  34.8  19  93  65.2 
1999 222 566,331 88  39.64 69 31.08  42.1  18  74  57.9 
2000 237  1,280,983    71  29.96 85 35.86  54.1  32  89  46 
2001 213 805,399 79  37.08 75 35.22  46.7  19  77  53.3 
2002 194 665,373 55 28.35 73  37.63  38.8  6  73  61.2 
Source:  Toronto Stock Exchange Review, December 1990 to December 2002. 
1 The percentage of trading value is based on capitalization. 
2 Certain securities show zero trading value: in 1990, Fahnestock II, in 1994, Currage inc. and U. 
Dominion, in 1995, Curragh Inc., in 1996, STN inc., in 1997, Trizec Hahn and Moores Retail, and in 
1998 Rea Gold and Tee-Com.  
The number of Canadian securities listed in Canada is significantly lower than that reported in other 
studies (Houston and Jones, 1999, Table 2). These authors base their estimates on lists of the American 
stock exchanges and therefore include securities listed on any of the Canadian stock exchanges in 
addition to those which are only listed on American stock exchanges.  Our estimates only cover 
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6.5 Competitive advantages of stock markets  
There are two sub-categories of works respecting stock market development.  The 
first includes texts devoted to developing countries and refers to factors such as 
privatization, opening of markets and a legal system ensuring investor protection (La 
Porta et al, 1997; Black, 2001).  However, as Black has noted, markets such as those 
of the United States and the United Kingdom have already reached this level of 
development and we will deal mainly with the second sub-category of works which 
deal with competition and comparative advantages between developed markets. 
These works attempt to answer the following question:  What factors lead investors 
and issuers to prefer one market over another?  These factors may be put into three 
groups, respectively related to the quality of markets (and information), applications 
for registration and various other factors we will group under the heading of 
marketing. 
6.5.1 Market  quality 
For Halpern (2000), the main requirement for markets to operate is information, 
which leads to a bias in favour of domestic stocks, as well as risk capital, stock 
exchange development and governance, initial offerings and the dynamics of 
intermediaries. Wells (2000) recognizes the growing competition between stock 
exchanges and relates their competitive advantage to the mechanism of discovering 
prices, which is associated with the various components of market quality. In 
particular, for Wells, the aspect which will guide stock market growth is the demand 
by institutions for block trades, which few exchanges adequately support.  
Theoretical models developed to explain the growth of trading volume in interlisted 
securities (Chowdhry and Nanda, 1991) show the emergence of a dominant market in 
accordance with the winner take most rule. These models distinguish liquidity traders 
from informed traders.  Liquidity traders trade without any specific base of 
information and are attracted to the market where trading costs are lower and create 
liquidity.  Informed traders base their trading on analysis and information.   
Essentially, they are institutional investors, who maximize their return by trading in 
the most liquid market.  Accordingly, even if the total trading volume increases when 
a stock is listed on a secondary market
177, the trading volume in the country of origin 
may increase or, on the contrary, sharply drop depending on whether or not the 
country has a dominant market position. The Canadian market is apparently not a 
dominant market for foreign stocks (except one in 2001), and it is progressively 
                                                 
177 Foerster and Karolyi (1993) observed a 62% increase in the total trading value of Canadian 
securities in the three months following their listing on an American exchange.  This increase is 
especially noticeable on the American market, but the value traded on the Canadian market also 
increased by 26%.    158
losing its role as the principal market for high-volume Canadian stocks (with the 
exception of banks, probably because of rules governing the holding of these 
institutions). It is possible that this phenomenon will grow, to the extent that, 
according to Eun and Sabherwal (2003, p. 1), attracting non-US listing is now a top 
priority of the US stock exchanges. This tendency of moving trades to American 
stock exchanges is not specific to Canada.  Pagano et al, (2002, p. 1) shows that in 
1986-1997, many European companies listed abroad, mainly on U.S. exchanges, 
while the number of US companies listed in Europe decreased.  The authors state that 
the listing of EU companies in the United States went from 53 in 1986 to 207 in 1997, 
while in the same interval, their listing within Europe went from 267 to 309.  In 
addition, interlisting of Canadian corporations has been facilitated since November 1, 
1998, by the implementation of the MJDS which allows Canadian corporations to list 
their stocks in the United States, under easier criteria than what exists for other non-
American corporations
178. However, as Pagano et al (2002, p. 2657) point out:  of 
course, if exchanges compete for new listings by adjusting their regulatory standards, 
this motive for cross-listing may diminish over time. 
Models predict that the transfer of trading will continue to gravitate to the country 
offering the most favourable trading conditions. For investors who must trade large 
blocks of shares, the various components of trading costs are an essential element in 
the choice of trading location. Foerster and Karolyi (1998) analyzed the evolution of 
ranges following the decision of Canadian corporations to list their stocks on the 
American market. They measured both the posted bid-ask spread and the effective 
spread
179, and took into account the different factors influencing the ranges, such as 
price level, size and volume of trades. The two measures of the range showed a 
significant drop following listing of stocks on an American market, but this decrease 
especially affected stocks for which the transfer of trading to the United States is the 
greatest. This decrease is measured on the Canadian market and shows that the 
Canadian market adjusts to a more competitive environment as soon as the stocks are 
widely traded on a competitive market. Trading costs may thus be lower on the 
American market than the Canadian market, and interlisting may reduce these costs 
even on the Canadian market.  There is little evidence, however, as cost measurement 
is difficult.  Costs depend on volume and liquidity, size of trade, price of stocks.   
Cleary et al (2002) showed the great sensitivity of trading costs to various factors; 
they cite and criticize the study of Elkins (1998), who compares the impact cost of 
                                                 
178 The MJDS is a joint initiative of the CSA and the SEC. See National Instrument 71-101:  The 
multi-jurisdictional disclosure system at  http://www.cvmq.com/upload/fichier_pdf/norme/71-
101ang.pdf. 
179 The  effective spread is the difference (in absolute value) between the price of the trade and the 
middle of the range.   159
institutional trading on the NYSE (0.18%), the NASDAQ (0.35%) and the TSE 
(0.29%), and noted significantly higher trading costs
180.  
Kryzanowski and Rubalcava (2002) analyze the range and length of holding 
Canadian interlisted shares. Their results suggest that the TSE has consistently lost its 
share of executed order flow (share turnover) relative to the U.S. primary trade 
venue, and that this loss is associated with increased relative trade costs in the TSE.  
Doukas and Swidler (2000) observe an abnormally positive return for Canadian 
companies interlisted in the United States, which results in a reduction in the cost of 
capital.  According to this work and that of Foerster and Karolyi (1993 and 1998), the 
transfer of trading to the United States lead to increased volume, a lower cost of 
capital and decreased trading costs, when they were directed towards the NYSE.    
Mittoo (1997) shows, before 1991, that the growth of trading volume after interlisting 
is greater for VSE securities than for those which were listed on the TSE.  This 
difference may be related to the less stringent requirements of the VSE. By meeting 
American standards, companies listed on the VSE improved their disclosure.  Their 
regulatory environment became more similar to that of the TSE, which seemed to 
have attracted greater interest from investors
181. 
In a recent study, Mittoo (2002) confirms that Canadian companies have always been 
attracted by the American stock market.  Between 1991 and 1998, 108 Canadian 
companies were listed in the United States
182. The abnormally positive return seen on 
listing in the United States is not as great as that reported in previous studies, and it is 
positively related to increased liquidity.  The trading volume increases by 40% after 6 
months.  Most of this increase is captured by the American market.  However, the 
effects of interlisting are different depending on the companies. Mittoo observes that 
decreased trading costs are only noticeable for securities of which the trading volume 
increases after the transaction, and it does not exist for natural resource companies.  
The listing effect in the United States on trading costs is therefore lower than that 
                                                 
180 The measuring of impact costs is difficult because it involves comparing the price of a trade to what 
would have been in the absence of the trade.  This unobservable price is estimated using different 
models, that chosen by Elkins/McSherry Co tend to underestimate the price effect.  In addition, several 
studies cited were conducted during the period where the tick was different in the United States and in 
Canada.  The lower increments in Canada, because of decimalization, might have temporarily lowered 
the trading costs measured. 
181 This observation is important for proponents of the overall lessening of the regulatory burden.  
According to the explanation put forward in this study, the lowering of standards could reduce 
liquidity and encourage more companies to interlist. 
182 Houston and Jones (1999) found 149 new listings during the same period.  The difference is 
probably due to the fact that Mittoo considers securities listed in Canada whereas Houston and Jones 
also include companies which are not listed in Canada.     160
reported previously by Foerster and Karolyi (1998).  The long-term performance of 
recently listed securities in the United States is significantly negative.  This may be 
related to the fact that Canadian companies list in the United States after a period of 
strong stock market performance.  Overall, this activity seems to have a positive 
effect on short-term prices, increased liquidity and lowering of trading costs which is 
not as great as that mentioned above. 
Although differences between levels of trading costs are relatively weak (Smith et al 
2000) and sometimes slightly lower in Canada due to more frequent use of upstairs 
trading and although the advantages of interlisting seem to be decreasing, the US 
market continues to attract Canadian companies.  This evolution has not been 
checked by the steps taken by the TSE in response to competition from American 
stock markets.  According to Mittoo (2002), the TSE adopted decimalization in April 
1996 for securities trading at $5 and up and implemented the minimum quotation 
increment reduction (MQIR) for two classes of shares.   However, the NASDAQ and 
the NYSE reacted quickly by adopting similar measures.  Several studies show that 
the spread decreased in Toronto following decimalization.  Liquidity gains related to 
interlisting seem to have also decreased, which could correspond to a lesser 
advantage in the US market.  However, it still exists. 
Trading costs, however, are only one aspect of the problem. Trades are the basis of 
the mechanism to determine price, through which information shown by orders 
comes together in the market price. For economists, the ideal way to determine price 
is a public auction. However, stock exchanges are not transparent auction 
mechanisms and must meet several challenges. According to the Wells (2000), the 
main ones are the following: 
•  Access: who can have access to the order book? 
•  Liquidity:  what measures are taken to ensure sufficient liquidity? 
•  Protection of order priority; 
•  Block trades must have a minimal impact on price, and all trading; 
•  Best possible trade, which relates to the problem of trading costs;   161
•  Transparency, which gives all participants information simultaneously; 
•  Fragmentation of orders and price centralization. 
We will not review here the Canadian situation respecting each of these factors, a 
study which is largely outside the scope of our report.  Order fragmentation and price 
centralization is, however, a major factor related to the information argument. Order 
fragmentation has been invoked to justify restructuring the Canadian stock exchanges 
and to restrict the activity of alternative trading systems. A fragmented system has 
little liquidity and requires setting up a centralized data system.  
The problem of fragmentation is crucial in a small market, where 80% of trading 
volume comes from institutional investors
183.  They must be able to dispose of their 
position quickly, without excessive market reaction. Fragmentation results in Canada 
from the splitting into two relatively equal parts trading in the most active stocks 
between Canada and the United States. It also results from internal trades, which 
happen when a broker combines orders of his own clients. Upstairs trading is allowed 
by TSX rules, but it is greatly restricted by the NYSE (Smith et al, 2000). This 
practice covers most trading by institutional investors (54% in 1997, according to 
Smith et al).  A broker does not place an order in the stock market, and does not 
reveal the trade immediately, which may have an important information effect on 
price.  Upstairs trading favours institutional investors and is used both by dealers with 
an unrestricted practice and by specialized systems such as Instinet. Canadian 
brokers, however, are required to report internal trading volume, which is counted in 
trading volume. We therefore estimate that less than 30% of trading value in 
Canadian stocks is conducted in the conventional Canadian market (the estimate is 
indicated in Schedule 3). 
The best operating structure for markets is an extremely complex problem, and we 
have mentioned it here only to point out the challenges to the Canadian market.   
Upstairs trading is developing quickly, but is creating a transparency problem and 
impairs information quality, a key element of market quality. 
It may help to keep part of the trading, which would perhaps move more rapidly to 
the United States, but this growth seems inevitable and gives businesses various 
advantages. Finally, only 30% of total trading value in securities of Canadian 
corporations is now done in the regular Toronto market.  This is a major challenge, 
                                                 
183 http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/en/About/News/Speeches/davidbrown_presentcreation_19990412.html.   162
absent from the list of problems raised by MacKay (2002), probably because it had 
little to do with regulation. 
6.5.2  The registration effect 
The effect of transferring trading to major markets is not a phenomenon specific to 
Canada. As Coffee writes (2002b), during the 1990's, the phenomenon of cross-
listing by issuers on international exchanges accelerated, with the consequence in the 
case of some emerging markets that trading followed, draining the original market of 
its liquidity. (..) A superior explanation is "bonding": issuers migrate to U.S. 
exchanges in particular because by voluntarily subjecting themselves to the U.S.'s 
higher disclosure standards and greater threat of enforcement (both by public and 
private means), they partially compensate for weak protection of minority investors 
under their own jurisdiction's law and also credibly signal their intention to make 
fuller disclosure, thereby achieving a higher market valuation and a lower cost of 
capital.  This effect is described by researchers as piggybacking (Licht, 2001; Coffee, 
1999; Black, 2001).  Businesses seek to increase their market value by complying 
with more strict disclosure and governance standards than those prevailing in their 
country of origin (Pagano et al, 2002).  The American market would be particularly 
attractive for this
184.  Businesses thus seek to be registered in the United States to 
benefit from higher prices in their national market.  However, as Black and Licht 
indicate, this strategy can only work if local institutions are adequately structured and 
understood by investors. 
Euronext has understood this problem well and offers market segments where 
disclosure requirements are aligned with international standards, i.e. American ones. 
[Translation] The creation of the NextEconomy and NextPrime segments meets the 
needs of investors seeking greater transparency and liquidity. (…)  For investors, 
these two segments constitute an additional, quality-based criterion for selecting 
companies, as choosing a company that is a member of one of the segments ensures 
them a high level of financial transparency consistent with the most exacting 
international standards 
185.  
Several studies have observed positive effects following registration in the United 
States of non-American corporations. Once again, there is a difficult problem for the 
Canadian stock exchange: for example, should criteria for disclosure and governance 
                                                 
184 See Coffee, (1999 note 7) for a list of provisions respecting governance in the United States, 
established before the events of 2000 and 2001 lead to an analysis of and probably an increase in these 
governance rules.  
185 See the provisions at:  http://www.euronext.com/fr/markets_prices/list/new_segments/description/.   163
be tightened to align them with American requirements for disclosure and governance 
or, on the contrary, should they be softened to meet a more local dimension?
186 
6.5.3 Marketing  aspects 
These are related to the sale of securities, but also to that of products and services.   
Trading securities on a segmented market may provide investors with profits from 
diversification and lower the cost of capital. There is much empirical evidence 
indicating that Canadian and American markets are progressively integrating, but that 
they are still partly segmented. (Foerster and Karolyi, 1998). 
However, all profits from diversification which can be obtained between two more or 
less correlated markets are likely to be minimal. Licht (2001) maintains that 
corporations may seek to be listed on larger markets to have access to a larger base of 
potential investors and to offer those investors greater liquidity. Works which equate 
growth in price and trading volume following interlisting confirm this hypothesis.  
Lang et al (2002) show that securities listed on a market other than their market of 
origin get increased interest from financial analysts, improved quality of their 
forecasts and a higher price for their securities. In Canada, the progressive reduction 
in the size of the conventional market to the benefit of the United States and the 
upstairs market could lead more companies to interlist.    
In addition, companies tend to follow their economic activity:  a company with high 
sales in the United States would be likely to issue in the United States since investors 
know its products and would be more inclined to buy shares in the company. 
The studies of Mittoo (1992) and Houston and Jones (1999, 2000) discuss the 
perceptions Canadian business executives have of the advantages, costs and net 
benefits of listing on American stock exchanges.  These authors confirm that the 
perceived advantages are increased trading volume, stock following by financial 
analysts, reputation and advantages facing competition.  The main obstacles are 
reconciliation of financial statements with American accounting principles and the 
additional disclosure requirements related to these principles.  The SEC requirements 
only appear to be a minor concern.  However, Houston and Jones show that the 
MJDS only had a minimal effect on the perceived and actual costs of interlisting, and 
write that this agreement did not lead to the hoped-for results. 
                                                 
186 This question is currently the subject of discussion.  In an article in the Globe and Mail ( Like it or 
not, TSX must match U.S. standards, May 17, 2003), Eric Reguly strongly opposes the position taken 
by the Chairman of the TSX and writes that:  If Canada and its stock markets want to play seriously in 
the integrated North American market, they have to live up to the new standard.   164
6.6 Summary and implications in terms of policies 
We have shown that the Canadian securities market is growing slowly and that large 
trades are moving increasingly to the United States. The proportion of trades of 
foreign securities conducted in Canada has become insignificant and it is becoming 
difficult to consider these stocks in the Canadian capitalization.  
On the other hand, since the beginning of the 1990’s a growing number of Canadian 
securities trade in the United States and, for these interlisted securities, around half of 
the trades are done outside Canada. A large number of Canadian corporations (thirty-
five), no longer trade in Canada. The only dynamic element of the market is the high 
rate of creation of new companies, but this creation is associated with a high 
mortality, which leaves the total number of listed corporations unchanged. Our 
conclusion approximates that of Gaa et al, (2002, p 31) who write: the results of the 
study (of national markets) suggest that the direction of change is towards a single 
global market through the interlinkage of national equity markets. Domestic 
intermediated markets would be undermined by this development, since the 
standardized products traded on those markets could be traded more efficiently and 
at lower cost on the global matching market. The domestic intermediated market 
would continue to exist, since there will always be relatively illiquid products and 
agents desired to trade them.  
Certain recent writings associate the difficulties of the Canadian market with 
regulatory factors and in particular with provincial jurisdictions, which would 
increase operating costs. However, the main challenges before the Canadian stock 
market do not seem to be of this nature. The progression of trades to the United 
States, the smaller and smaller portion of trades carried out on the downstairs market, 
and the total lack of attraction to Canada by foreign securities appear very 
problematic. It seems to us, however, difficult to associate these with regulation.  
Galper (1999) defines three business models for stock exchanges in the 2000’s.  A 
global exchange (GEX) dominates an economically linked community of several 
financial jurisdictions. It has the largest market capitalization in that community and 
the greatest trading volume and liquidity of any of its direct competitors. It trades 
both highly visible international securities and derivative products (...) It draws its 
clientele from a pool of both domestic and global investors. The TSX at least partially 
meets the criteria of a GEX, but more those of a regional market (REX), defined as 
follows:  the Regional Exchange dominates its local economy. It has the greatest 
concentration of regional listings available and is the chief expert in these listings. By 
virtue of its intense national concentration, its index becomes a barometer of the 
health of the publicly quoted part of the regional economy. It may trade securities   165
and derivative products. It draws its clientele primarily from regional investors, with 
a smaller share of international investors interested in benefiting from the available 
expertise and opportunities. 
The TSX Venture Exchange is clearly what Schulman (1999) defines as a Small and 
Medium Business Market (SMB), a category in which the NASDAQ also falls. To the 
extent that Canada has less than 600 corporations capable of being listed and traded 
on the NASDAQ, the TSX should also be put into this category. This seems 
especially true since trading of the best capitalized securities is progressively moving 
to the American market. The implications are significant in terms of development and 
regulatory strategy. According to the World Federation of Stock Exchanges, the main 
element to consider for SMB exchanges is location: an exchange provides a real 
estate function for companies in the sense that it is where companies locate their 
stock listings and it is where customers (investors) come to buy and sell that stock. 
Therefore, to enhance the profile of an SMB market, exchanges should create 
attractive SMB market communities with financial influence, recognized value, and 
uniquely beneficial services (Schulman, 1999, p. 14). Since the several large-cap 
securities are moving to the American stock exchanges, it seems inevitable that the 
Canadian exchange will become increasingly an exchange of medium and small 
businesses according to international standards. 
The stakes are high and cannot be ignored in the debate taking place in Canada.  The 
aspects of location, adaptation to different regional and sector factors, the framework 
of small-cap securities, the switch from risk capital to public financing and the 
survival of new issues will become major factors. Moreover, the reduction of real or 
perceived advantages from the transfer of trading to the United States should become 
a subject of study and careful thought. It seems strange that these issues have until 
now not been apparent in the debate taking place on regulatory revision.    166  167
7- CONCLUSION 
The main argument put forward by promoters of securities centralization in Canada is 
that participants face thirteen securities commissions, causing additional costs and 
hurting Canadian market competitiveness. In Part One we have shown that four 
provinces monopolize almost all issues, listed companies, population and economic 
activity in Canada. Most issuers therefore only deal with one securities commission.   
We also pointed out the initiatives taken by Canadian securities authorities to set up 
several important measures to limit problems caused by multiple jurisdictions. They 
are the memorandums of understanding respecting the mutual reliance review system 
and oversight of exchanges, national instruments, registration of representatives and 
the blueprint for uniform securities legislation. 
According to the promoters of centralization of securities regulation, there are serious 
problems of efficiency in terms of excessive costs and delays resulting from 
compliance with statutes and regulations. Part Two shows that there is little evidence 
supporting this point of view. On the contrary, empirical evidence is convergent, and 
it all shows that the initial offering process is less costly in Canada. These studies do 
not specifically show the additional costs related to regulation. Issuers and investors 
are subject to various forms of cost, of which regulation is a small component. These 
studies show, however, that the present structure does not create a comparative 
advantage over the American situation.    
A certain number of arguments are regularly put forward to justify revision of the 
Canadian model of securities regulation. More specifically, they are the 
insignificance of Canada internationally, jurisdictional conflicts, accounting 
manipulation, and the ineffectiveness of harmonization efforts. We show in Part 
Three that Canada is active on the international level and that Canadian securities 
authorities have set up a number of mechanisms based on the principle of 
cooperation. 
We have analyzed the American situation in terms of regulation and central authority.  
Finally, we have shown the homogeneity of the Canadian securities market, in terms 
of company characteristics and provincial initiatives. Given these different elements, 
it is difficult to maintain that strict uniform regulation and a single securities 
commission are best. 
Promoters of securities centralization maintain that a single authority would regulate 
the sector best, at a lower cost, and that completely unified regulation would be 
preferable to the present situation.  This view is the opposite of a market approach,   168
regulatory competition, which prevails in particular in American company law.  In 
Part 4 we analyzed the management model of regulation and its application in 
different contexts. We conducted an in-depth examination of the European situation, 
which combines regulatory competition for securities and minimum standards.     
Finally, we put in perspective and analyzed the various forms and alternatives to 
regulatory competition. It appears that regulatory monopoly is not necessarily 
preferable to regulatory competition, and that some competition is compatible with 
minimal harmonization. 
The debate over centralization of securities regulation in Canada has recently been 
relaunched in the name of improved efficiency and reduced costs for issuers and 
investors. The American situation is often put forward as an example of regulatory 
centralization and its operation in a federal State. In Part 5 we have shown the 
significant differences separating the two markets. The American financial market is 
very fragmented, both in banking and securities. Regulatory centralization may be 
best in such a case, although a number of researchers dispute this. Regulatory 
monopoly is however only apparent: it does not exist for banking or company law, 
and is only partial for securities, where the States keep a significant role in local 
small-cap financings. These local issues essentially correspond to financing in 
Canada. On the contrary, the Canadian financial system is highly concentrated; a 
half-dozen institutions essentially control the financing and intermediary business. 
Nothing therefore would lead us to believe that the American securities regulatory 
model is transferable to Canada 
According to promoters of securities centralization, regulatory decentralization and 
multiple securities commissions hurt development of the Canadian stock market.   
However, there is little information respecting the evolution of this market. We have 
discussed this evolution over the last decade and shown the special characteristics of 
the Canadian market. It is distinguished from other developed markets by the 
presence of very many undercapitalized companies and by the high incorporation and 
mortality rate of companies. Canada has little attraction for foreign corporations and 
there is a very clear movement in the trading of the largest Canadian companies to the 
United States. To understand the reasons for this situation, we have examined the 
factors causing investors to prefer one market over another. Our study has shown that 
the Canadian securities market is facing important challenges. They are strategic 
positioning in terms of market quality, the registration effect, and corporate visibility.  
Revision of the present regulatory structure is probably not a central element in the 
challenge put by this situation in terms of public policy. It seem strange that these 
aspects have so far been absent from the debate over the revision of the Canadian 
securities regulatory framework.   169
Schedule 1: National Instruments and other Canadian Texts on Securities 
 
Procedures and related topics 
 
•  National Policy 11-201: Delivery of Documents by Electronic Means 
•  National Policy 12-201: Mutual Reliance Review System for Exemptive 
Relief Applications 
•  National Instrument 13-101: System for Electronic Document Analysis and 
Retrieval (SEDAR) 
•  National Instrument 14-101: Definitions 
 
Capital market - certain participants  
        
•  National Instrument 21-101: Marketplace Operation    
•  Companion Policy 21-101: Marketplace Operation 
•  National Instrument 23-101: Trading Rules     
•  Companion Policy 23-101: Trading Rules      
 
Registration and related topics   
        
•  National Instrument 32-101: Small Securityholder Selling and Purchase 
Arrangements 
•  National Instrument 33-102: Regulation of Certain Registrant Activities 
•  Companion Policy 33-102: Regulation of Certain Registrant Activities 
•  National Instrument 33-105: Underwriting Conflicts   
•  Companion Policy 33-105: Underwriting Conflicts 
•  National Policy 34-201: Breach of Requirements of  Other Jurisdictions 
•  National Instrument 35-101: Conditional Exemption from Registration for 
United States Broker-Dealers and Agents      
•  Companion Policy 35-101 Conditional Exemption from Registration for 
United States Broker-Dealers and Agents 
•  Le mécanisme de traitement des plaintes et de règlement des différends      
•  Les acquisitions fermes - (Bought Deals)      
•  CSA Notice 33-305: Sale of Insurance Products by Dually Employed 
Salespersons 
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Distribution of securities 
        
•  National Policy No. 2-B: Guide for Engineers and Geologists Submitting Oil 
and Gas Reports to Canadian Securities Administrators 
•  National Policy No. 15: Conditions Precedent to Acceptance of Scholarship or 
Educational Plan Prospectuses      
•  National Policy No. 21: National Advertising - Warnings 
•  National Policy No. 22: Use of Information and Opinion Re Mining and Oil 
Properties by Registrants and Others 
•  National Policy No. 42: Advertising of  Securities on Radio or Television 
•  National Instrument 43-101: Standards of Disclosure for Mineral Projects
      
•  Companion Policy 43-101: Standards of Disclosure for Mineral Projects      
•  National Policy 43-201: Mutual Reliance Review System for Prospectuses 
and Annual Information Forms 
•  National Instrument 44-101: Short Form Prospectus Distributions    
•  Companion Policy 44-101: Short Form Prospectus Distributions      
•  Companion Policy 44-102: Shelf Distributions      
•  Companion Policy 44-102: Shelf Distributions      
•  National Instrument 44-103: Post-Receipt Pricing    
•  Companion Policy 44-103: Post-Receipt Pricing 
•  National Instrument 45-101: Rights Offerings      
•  National Policy 46-201: Escrow for Initial Public Offerings 
•  National Policy 47-201: Trading Securities Using the Internet and Other 
Electronic Means      
•  Policy Statement Q-28: General Prospectus Requirements 
•  Policy Statement 41-601Q: Capital Pool Companies 
 
Continuous disclosure 
        
•  National Policy 51-201: Disclosure Standards      
•  National Policy No. 3: Unacceptable Auditors      
•  National Policy No. 14: Acceptability of Currencies in Material Filed with 
Securities Regulatory Authorities      
•  National Policy No. 27: Canadian Generally Accepted Accounting Principles 
•  National Policy No. 31: Change of Auditor of a Reporting Issuer 
•  National Policy No. 41: Shareholder Communication      
•  National Policy No. 48: Future-Oriented Financial Information 
•  National Policy No. 50: Reservations in an Auditor's Report      
•  National Policy No. 51: Changes in the Ending Date of a Financial Year and 
in Reporting Status        171
•  National Instrument 55-101: Exemption from Certain Insider Reporting 
Requirements 
•  Companion Policy 55-101: Exemption from Certain Insider Reporting 
Requirements     
•  National Instrument 55-102: System for Electronic Disclosure by Insiders 
(SEDI) 
•  Companion Policy 55-102: System for Electronic Disclosure by Insiders 
(Sedi)      
 
Public offerings and specific transactions   
        
•  National Instrument 62-101: Control Block Distribution Issues 
•  National Instrument 62-102: Disclosure of Outstanding Share Data      
•  National Instrument 62-103: The Early Warning System and Related Take-
Over Bid and Insider Reporting Issues      
•  National Policy 62-201: Bids Made Only in Certain Jurisdictions 
•  National Policy 62-202: Take-Over Bids - Defensive Tactics      
•  Policy Statement Q-27: Protection of Minority Securityholders in the Course 
of Certain Transactions 
 
Trading in securities outside a jurisdiction   
        
•  National Instrument 71-101: The Multijurisdictional Disclosure System      
•  Companion Policy 71-101: The Multijurisdictional Disclosure System      
 
Mutual funds   
 
•  National Policy No. 29: Mutual Funds Investing in Mortgages 
•  National Instrument 81-101: Mutual Fund Prospectus Disclosure 
•  Companion Policy 81-101: Mutual Fund Prospectus Disclosure 
•  National Instrument 81-102: Mutual Funds     
•  Companion Policy 81-102: Mutual Funds 
•  National Instrument 81-105: Mutual Fund Sales Practices  
•  Companion Policy 81-105 to National Instrument 81-105: Mutual Fund Sales 
Practices 
•  Regulation 81-104 Respecting Commodity Pools 
      
Source: CVMQ, http://www.cvmq.com/fr/regl/normes_ins.asp   172  173
Schedule 2: Indicators of direct costs in different jurisdictions 
 
Estimates of direct costs of securities regulation differ depending on the work.  The 
causes of the differences are the following:   
•  Difference between expenses of the commissions and amounts collected:  the net 
surplus  of amounts collected by securities commissions represented 
approximately $30.71 million in Canada in 2002. In this study, we are using 
expenses to estimate direct costs.  The collection of fees over and above expenses 
is not unique to Canada. In 2000, in the United States, fees collected at the federal 
level were US$2.1 billion and SEC expenses were US$377 million.  The Texas 
State Securities Board incurred expenses of US$3.8 million for the 2001-2002 
fiscal year, but collected fees of US$103.6 million, which is greater than the costs 
of all Canadian commissions combined.  For purposes of comparison, surpluses 
were not taken into account.   
•  Inclusion or exclusion of small commissions.  The published data generally 
covers 4 or 6 of the largest commissions. 
•  Inclusion or exclusion of the Bureau des services financiers (BSF). Since 2002 
the cost of the BSF has been included in the calculation of direct costs.  That was 
not the case for the previous fiscal years. 
 
For 2000, the expenses of the four main commissions were $90 million. For the year 
2001, according to annual reports of the commissions, they were $104.09 million.   
 
For 2002, we used the FSA study
187, which allowed us to make certain comparisons 
between countries.  The calculated cost including the BSF is £56.8 million, or $133 
million. The increase from 2001 can be explained in part by taking into account the 
BSF, the expenses of which are estimated at $9.6 million, and two commissions not 
accounted for in 2001. 
 
Table A2 shows the main FSA data for Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom and 
the United States.  Panel A of Table A2 gives the FSA data, in £.  Panel B shows the 
main securities expressed in Canadian dollars.  Panel 3 shows the calculation of the 
direct cost per million dollars of capitalization and of the cost per registered 
company.  However, the FSA warns about this type of comparison because of 
measurement difficulties.  In particular, all comparisons with the United States are 
false because data relating to this country does not take into account State securities 
regulatory organizations
188. The estimates should be handled carefully. 
                                                 
187 In 2002, the FSA significantly adjusted its estimate of direct costs in 2001, which was £117 million, 
or $260 million, and seemed to relate to all financial regulation.    
188 For example, the Colorado Division of Securities reported expenses of US$2.717 million for fiscal 
year 2002-2003. The Texas State Securities Board incurred expenses of US$3.8 million for fiscal year 
2001-2002. http://www.ssb.state.tx.us/agencyinfo/02arsup.pdf   174
  
Table A2 Indicators of Costs in Different Jurisdictions 
 
 
     Australia  Canada  UK  US 
Panel 1:  FSA Data, millions of £             
Securities firms and fund management         
firms - prudential supervision  73.8  55.4  18.0 821.1
Supervision of and standards for exchanges /         
clearing and settlement systems / market service providers    4.0  
Supervision of, and standards for conduct on capital markets  1.4  4.0 149.0
Standard for / approval of listings of securities       11.0 7.2
Total cost of securities regulation  73.8  56.8  37.0 977.3
Market capitalization (domestic stocks, billions of £) 251.8  389.5  1,013.6 6,889.1
            
Panel 2:  Data expressed in Canadian $             
Total cost of securities regulation (millions of Can 
$) 173.4  133.5  87 2,296.7
Number of listed stocks    1,410  3,967  2,332 7,074
Market capitalization (billions of Can $)  591.7  915.3  2,382 16,189.4
            
Panel 3:  Estimates of the relative cost of regulation              
 $ / millions of capitalization  293.1  145.8  36.5 141.9
 $ K / Listed securities    123.0  33.6  37.3 324.7
% of Capitalization    0.029  0.015  0.004 0.014
 
Sources:  FSA, Indicators of the costs of regulation in different jurisdictions, 
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/annual/ar02_03/ar02_03app8.pdf 
Bank of Canada (exchange rates) 
 
                                                                                                                                           
 http://mutualfunds.about.com/gi/dynamic/offsite.htm?site=http://www.dora.state.co.us/securities    175
 
Schedule 3:  Estimate of Proportion of Value of Trading in Canadian Securities 
on the Regular Toronto Market in 2001 
 
Total value of Canadian trades on the TSE, in billions of $  712.52
U.S. portion of value of interlisted Canadian trades
1, in billions of $  376.12
Total value of trading in Canadian securities, in billions of $  1,088.64
   
Value of trading on upstairs market (estimate)
2, in billions of $  384.76
Value of trading on regular or downstairs market, in billions of $  327.76
   
Proportion of value of trading in Canadian securities on the regular Toronto    
market  30.10%
Source: TSE Review 2001. 
1 Total value of trading of interlisted Canadian companies multiplied by the proportion of trades 
conducted outside the Canadian market:  805.40 x 46.7%. 
2 Total value of Canadian trades on the TSE multiplied by the estimate of the proportion of trades going through 
the upstairs market: 54% of volume. The estimate is from Smith et al (2000), p.5 and it is probably an 
underestimate since the data dates back to 1997. 
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Abbreviations 
 
AMEX  American Stock Exchange AMEX  Bourse  AMEX 
ATS Alternative  Trading  System  SNP  Système de négociation parallèle 
BCSC  British Columbia Securities 
Commission 
CVCB  Com. Des valeurs de Colombie-
Britannique 
BDC  Business Development Bank of Canada BDC  Banque de développement du Canada 
CDCC Canadian  Securities Clearing 
Corporation 
CCCPD  Corporation canadienne de compensation 
des produits dérivés 
CDNX  Canadian Venture Exchange  CDNX  Devenu TSX croissance 
CDS  Canadian Depository for Securities  CDS  Caisse canadienne de dépôt de valeurs 
limitée 
CESR  Committee for European Securities 
Regulation 
CESR  Committee for European Securities 
Regulation 
CPC  capital pool company  SCD  Société de capital de démarrage 
CSRS  Canadian Securities Regulatory System  CRVM Centralisation  de  la réglementation des 
valeurs mobilières 
CSA  Canadian Securities Administrators ACVM  Autorités canadiennes en valeurs 
mobilières 
EC  European Community  CE  Communauté européenne 
EDGAR Electronic  Data Gathering, Analysis, 
and Retrieval System 
EDGAR Electronic  Data  Gathering, Analysis, and 
Retrieval system 
FASB  Financial Accounting Standards Board 
(US) 
FASB  Financial Accounting Standards Board 
(US) 
FESCO  Forum of European Securities 
Commissions 
FESCO   Devenu CESR 
FSA  Financial Services Authority (U.K.)  FSA  Autorité des services financiers du 
Royaume Uni 
FSCO  Financial Services Commission of 
Ontario 
FSCO Commission  des  services financiers de 
l’Ontario 
FSTQ  Solidarity Fund QFL  FSTQ  Fonds de solidarité des travailleurs du 
Québec 
GAAP  Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles 
PCGR Principe  comptable généralement reconnu
GAO United  States  General Accounting 
Office 
GAO  Bureau du vérificateur général (USA) 
IAS  International Accounting Standards, 
now the IFRS 
IFRS International  Financial  Reporting 
Standards  
IASB  International Accounting Standards 
Board 
IASB  International Accounting Standards Board




Association canadienne des courtiers en 
valeurs mobilières   178
IDS  Integrated Disclosure System  RII Régime  d’information  intégré 
IJC Interjurisdictional  Competition  IJC Concurrence  interjuridictionnelle 
IOSCO International  Organization of Securities 
Commissions 
OICV Organisation  internationale des 
commissions de valeur 
IPO  Initial Public Offering  PAPE  Premier appel public à l’épargne 
ISD Investment  Service  Directive  DSI  Directive européenne sur les services 
d’investissement 
ME Montreal  Exchange  BDM Bourse  de  Montréal 
MF  Mutual fund    OPC  Organisme de placement collectif 
MFDA  Mutual Fund Dealers Association  MFDA  Mutual Fund Dealers Association 
MJDS  Multi-Jurisdictional Disclosure System  MJDS  Multi-Jurisdictional Disclosure System 
MOU Memorandum  of  Understanding MOU  Protocole  d’entente 
NASDAQ National Association of Securities 
Dealers Automated Quotations 
NASDAQ Bourse NASDAQ 
NRB  Net Regulatory Burden  NRB  Fardeau réglementaire net (Levich, 93) 
NSMIA  National Securities Market 
Improvement Act 
NSMIA National  Securities Market Improvement 
act 
NYSE  New York Stock Exchange  NYSE  Bourse de New York 
OSC  Ontario Securities Commission  CVMO  Commission des valeurs mobilières de 
l’Ontario 
OTC Over-the-Counter  OTC  Marché au comptoir ou hors cote 
PAC  Programme d’aide à la capitalisation PAC  Programme  d’aide à la capitalisation 
FSAP  financial services action plan  PASF  Plan d’action sur les services financiers 
PSLRA  Private Securities Litigation Reform ActPSLRA  Private Securities Litigation Reform Act 
CVMQ  Commission des valeurs mobilières du 
Québec 
CVMQ  Commission des valeurs mobilières du 
Québec 
QSSP  Québec Stock Savings Plan  REAQ  Régime d’épargne-actions du Québec 
MRRS  Mutual Reliance Review System  REC  Régime d’examen concerté 
RS  Market Regulatory Services Inc.  SRM  Service de réglementation des marchés 
Inc. 
RSS Registration  Streamlining System  RSS  Système d’enregistrement des 
représentants  
SAB  Statement of Accounting Board  SAB  Norme comptable américaine émise par 
l’Accounting Board 
SCOR  Small Capital Offering Regulation  SCOR  Small Capital Offering Regulation 
SEC  Securities and Exchange Commission  SEC  Commission des opérations de bourse 
américaine 
SEDAR  System for Electronic Document 
Analysis and Retrieval 
SEDAR  Système électronique de données, 
d’analyse et de recherche  
SEDI  System for Electronic Disclosure by 
Insiders 
SEDI Système  électronique de déclaration des 
initiés 
SLUSA  Securities Litigation Uniform Standard 
Act 
SLUSA  Securities Litigation Uniform Standard 
Act 
SPE  Special Purpose Entities  SPE  Entité à vocation particulière   179
SPEQ Société  de  placement dans l’entreprise 
québécoise 
SPEQ  Société de placement dans l’entreprise 
québécoise 
SRO Self-Regulatory  Organization  OAR Organismes d’auto-réglementation 
TSX  Toronto Stock Exchange, formerly TSE TSX  Bourse de Toronto 
TSX 
venture 




Bourse de croissance TSX,  
anciennement CDNX 
UMIR  Universal Market Integrity Rules  RUIM Règles  universelles d’intégrité du marché
USL Uniform  securities  legislation  USL Projet d’uniformisation de la législation 
en valeurs mobilières 
VC Venture  capitalist  SCR  Société de capital de risque 
WFE  World Federation of Exchanges  WFE  Fédération mondiale des Bourses 
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